Smallholder agriculture as a rural development strategy: The case of Malawi by Chipande, G. H. R
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
https://theses.gla.ac.uk/ 
 
 
 
 
Theses Digitisation: 
https://www.gla.ac.uk/myglasgow/research/enlighten/theses/digitisation/ 
This is a digitised version of the original print thesis. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Copyright and moral rights for this work are retained by the author 
 
A copy can be downloaded for personal non-commercial research or study, 
without prior permission or charge 
 
This work cannot be reproduced or quoted extensively from without first 
obtaining permission in writing from the author 
 
The content must not be changed in any way or sold commercially in any 
format or medium without the formal permission of the author 
 
When referring to this work, full bibliographic details including the author, 
title, awarding institution and date of the thesis must be given 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Enlighten: Theses 
https://theses.gla.ac.uk/ 
research-enlighten@glasgow.ac.uk 
S M A L L H O L D E R  A G R f C U L T U R E  AS 
A R U R A L  D E V E L O P M E N T  S T R A T B G Y f 
T HE C ASE O F M A L A W I
By
G.  H R .  C H I P A N D E
Dissertation Submitted to the Department of Political 
Economy at the University of Glasgow in part fulfilment 
of the requirements for the degree of 
Doctor of Philosophy.
19*^ January, 1983.
ProQuest Number: 10647057
All rights reserved
INFORMATION TO ALL USERS 
The quality of this reproduction is dependent upon the quality of the copy submitted.
In the unlikely event that the author did not send a com p le te  manuscript 
and there are missing pages, these will be noted. Also, if material had to be removed,
a note will indicate the deletion.
uesL
ProQuest 10647057
Published by ProQuest LLO (2017). Copyright of the Dissertation is held by the Author.
All rights reserved.
This work is protected against unauthorized copying under Title 17, United States C ode
Microform Edition © ProQuest LLO.
ProQuest LLO.
789 East Eisenhower Parkway 
P.Q. Box 1346 
Ann Arbor, Ml 48106- 1346
C O N T E N T S
Page
ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS
I INTRODUCTION 1
1. Study Methodology 2
2. Hypotheses to be Tested 2
3* Summary and Outline 4
Notes to Chapter I 11
II. A-HISTORICAL BACKGROUND TO THE MALAWI ECONOADT 14
1. The Nature of Malawi*s Resources 14
A, Natural Resources 15
Topography 15
Land Availability 1 5
Patterns of Land Use 18
a. The Plateaux Region 18
b. The Shire.Valley and Lake Malawi
•Littorale
Mineral Resources 19
Water Resources 20
B, Human Resources 21
I. Labour Force 21
2. A, Brief Economic and Political History of Malawi 24
A. The Colonial Period 24
I. Introduction to Settler Agriculture in 
Malawi 25
II. Tools Used in Consolidating Settler 
Agriculture 26
a. Taxation 27
b. Labour Certificates 28
c. Restrictions on Migration 28
ii
d. Forced L abour and Alienation of Land. 28
III. The Effects of Colonial Policies on the
Development of Smallholder Agriculture 30
a. Obstacles to Smallholder Production 30
b. Some Progress Within the Smallholder
Sector 32
c. The Revolutionary Approach to Peasant
Agricultural Development 33
d. Labour Migration 33
e. Summary 36
B# The Federal Period, 1953 - 1964 38
I. Introduction 38
II. Consequences of Federal Agricultural Policies 
in Malawi 39
a. Attempts to Modernize Peasant
Agriculture 39
- Land Reform 39
- Extension Services 41
b. Bias Towards Settler Agriculture K 42
0. Labour Migration 43
C. Post-Independence Development Strategy 44
I. The Dual Approach to Agricultural
Development 44
II. Smallholder Development Strategy 47
a. The Integrated Rural Development
Package (IRDP) 47
b. The More General Approach 48
c. The National Rural Development
Programme (NRDP) 49
ill
III. Smallholder Productivity Since’' Independence 50
Notes to Chapter II 52
III. MALAWI*S RURAL DEVELOPMENT STRATEGY 61
1. The Concept of Rural Development 61
A. The Case for Rural Development 61
B. Critique of the Rural Development Strategy 62
a. External Intervention 63
h. Incompatibility between Means and
Objectives 63
c. Assumption that Improved Peasant
Production for the Market will
Improve Peasant Welfare 63
d. Other Criticisms 64
67
2. Smallholder Agriculture and Rural Development in 
Malawi
A. The Rural Development Policy Outlined 67
I. Aims and Objectives of Rural Development
in Malawi 67
B. NRDP and its implications for Rural Poverty 
Reduction 71
I. NRDP and IRDP Compared 71
II. A Critical Review of Rural Development
Strategy in Malawi 73
C. The Impact of Other National Policies on NRDP 74
I. Export Promotion Strategy : Its Impact on
Smallholder Agricultural Development 74
II. Pricing and Marketing Policies and
Smallholder Production 77
iv
a. Pricing Policy in the Development 
Process: The General Case 77
b. Agricultural Marketing and Pricing of 
Smallholder Crops in Malawi 78
i. Marketing of Smallholder Produce 
Through ADMARC 80
ii. Smallholder response to Price 
Incentives in Malawi 84
III. The Impact of the Incomes Policy on
Smallholder Agricultural Production 89
Notes to Chapter III 93
IV. SMALLHOLDER AGRICULTURAL DEVELOPMENT IN THE LILONGWE
LAND DEVELOPk'IENT PROGRAMME (LLDP) 98
1. Background on LLDP 98
I. Aims and Objectives of LLDP 98
II. Natural Characteristics 99
III. Development Strategy in LLDP 101
. IV, Innovation Adoption Behaviour 103
2. Production Conditions in LLDP 104
A. Level of Capital Stock and Availability of 
Capital Finance 104
I. Lumpiness of Mechanical Implements 104
II. Lack of Financial Capital 105
a. Low Returns on Capital 106
b. Inappropriate Technology 107
B. Impact of LLDP Strategy on Farm Productivities 108 
3* The Problem of Labour Availability and its Conse­
quences on Smallholder Agricultural Development 110
A. U U -^rVvx n  ^
B. labour Availability and Smallholder Credit 113
I. Smallholder Credit in Malawi 113
II, Types of Credit 114
a. Supervised Credit 114
b. Unsupervised Credit 114
c. Commercial Bank Credit 115
III, Performance of the Credit Programme in LLDP 116
a. Objectives of Credit Programme 116
b. LLDP Credit Strategy and Its results 116
i. Impact of Credit on Smallholder
Farm Productivity and Incomes 117
c. Distribution of Seasonal Credit in LLDP 118
i. Individual Credit 119
ii. Group Credit 120
d. Coverage of Credit Programme in LLDP 122
C# Labour Availability and Adoption of Innovations
in LLDP 124
I, Labour and Peasant Production 124
Notes to Chapter IV 127
V. SAMPLE SURVEY OF SMALLHOLDER AGRICULTURAL HOLDINGS
IN LLDP ; A DESCRIPTION OF SURVEY RESULTS 1/1
1, Survey Methodology 131
A. Sampling Procedure 131
B. Data Analyses 133
C. Household Typologies 134
I. Criteria of Classification 134
II. A Summary of the Main Characteristics of
the Household Typologies 137
vi
a. Typology I (Female-Headed Households) 137
b.. Typology II (Male Headed Households 
Growing neither Tobacco nor Improved 
Maize) 141
C m Typology III (Tobacco Growers) 143
d. Typology IV (Improved Maize Growers) 145
2 m Description of Survey Results 147
A. Household Characteristics 147
I. Household Size 147
II. Main Occupation of Household Head 148
III. Age of Household Head 149
IV. Level of Formal Education 150
V. Membership of Farmers’ Club 150
B. Farm Characteristics 153
I. Farm Size 153
II. Land Availability 156
C. Labour Availability 158
I. Family Labour 158
II. Hired Labour 160
D. Input Use and Farm Credit 164
I. Farm Inputs Applied 164
II. Credit 165
III. Cash Purchases of Inputs 169
IV. Main Constraint(s) to Farming Operations 171
E. Household Incomes 173
I. Subsistence Income 173
II. Reported Cash Incomes 177
Notes to Chapter V 178
vii
VI. AN ANALYSIS OF THE SURVEY RESULTS
1. Interhousehold Differences in Incomes Analysed 181
A. Factors Associated with Crop Revenue 182 
I. The Relationship between Crop Revenue and
Crop Enterprise Undertaken 184
II. Innovation Adoption and Access to Credit 185
III. The Relationship between Input Credit and
Cultivated Area 188
IV. The Relationship between Cultivated Area
and Crop Revenue 191
B. Farm Size and its Determinants 192
I. Labour Availability 192
a. Family Labour 193
b. Hired Labour 196
II. Factors Associated with Labour Hiring and
Cash Purchasing o^f Inputs 1 99
2. Summary of Data Analysis 202
A. Observed Pattern of Income Distribution 
According to Labour and Credit Availability 203
B. Effect ^ of Crop Enterprise on Household Incomes 208
I. The Linear Programming Model 208
a. Food Self-Sufficiency Constraint 208
b. Labour Constraint 209
c. Land Constraint 210
d. Financial Constraint 211
II. Crop Enterprises Considered 212
a. Gross Margins 212
b. Labour Demands 213
III. The Linear Programming Results 214
a. With Labour Constraint but no Financial
Constraint ' 214
viii
b* Without Labour Constraint but with Input
Purchasing Constrained 217
0. With both Labour and Financial
Constraints Operating 220
3. Models of Innovation Adoption in LLDP 222
A. Labour Availability and Innovation Adoption in
LLDP 222
I. The Semi-subsistence Family Model 222
II, The Emergence of a Rural Labour Market 225
4. A Summary 233
Notes to Chapter VI 235
VII. POLICY IMPLICATIONS. RECORffiENDATIONS AND CONCLUSIONS 238
1. The Agricultural Development Strategy Considered 241
2. A Summary of the Main Findings Emerging from the 
Survey Data Analyses 244
3. Propositions for Improving the Lot of the Poorer 
Households 249
I. Reducing the Labour Bottlenecks 249
a. Mechanisation 250
b. Hired Labour 250
c. Alternative Cropping patterns 252
II. Non-farm activities Aimed at Raising the
Incomes of the Poor Households 254
4. Conclusion
APPEimiX I 263
BIBLIOGRAPHY 265
IX
LIST OF TABLES Page
2.1 Population Density, 1966 and 1977 16
2.2 Land Availability and Utilisation 17
2.3 Average Number of Paid Employees by Industry
For 1968, 1972, 1976 and 1980. 22
2.4 Malawians Abroad as a Percentage of de-facto
Population of Malawi, 1902-1972 35
2.5 Master Farmers, 1954- I960 41
2.6 Government Agricultural Expenditure 48
3.1 The Four Major Integrated Projects 72
3.2 NRDP Projects (Phase I) 72
3.3 Agricultural Exports, 1964-1977 76
3.4 Quantity of Smallholder Agricultural Prôduction
and its Destination in 1969 79
3.5 ADMARC Producer Price Indices for Maize and
Tobacco, 1970 -1978 82
3.6 ADMARC Crop Trading Accounts- Net Profit as a
Percentage of Farmers’ Receipts 83
3.7 Comparison of ADMARC Buying Prices with Mean
Local Market Prices, 1977 88
3.8 Statutory Minimum Daily Wage Rate for Blantyre-
Limbe, as at 1®^ January, 1968-1978 90
4.1 Proportion of Cultivated Land Under Maize,
Groundnuts, and Tobacco in LLDP, 1969-1979 103
4.2 Loans Given to Farmers, 1958-1960 105
4.3 Seasonal and Minimum Term Credit in LLDP,
1968/69 to 1976/77 106
4.4 Maize and Groundnuts Yields in Developed and •
Undeveloped Areas in LLDP, 1969/70 - 1972/73 109
LIST OF TABLES 
(continued)
4*5 A Comparison of Mean Yields of Different Maize
Varieties in LLDP 110
4.6 Individual and Group Credit in LLDP 121
5.0 .Summary Characteristics of Household Typologies
in LLDP, 1980/81 137
5.1 Reported Cash Income per Household by Household
Typology and Source 139
5.1a Mean Household Size by Administrative Unit 147
5.1b Distribution of Household Size by Household Category 147-8 
5.1c Age of Household Head 149
5.Id Main Occupation of Household Head 1 50
5.1e Level of Formal Education Attained by Household head 152
5.1f Marital Status of household head 1 52
5.1 g Membership of Farmers’ Club 1 52 
5.2a Distribution of Cultivated Land by Household and
Category, 1980/81 1 54
5.2b Land Cultivated as a Proportion of Total Land
Available to the Household 1 54
5.2c Change in Amount of Land Used by Household during
the (previous 5 years 1 56
5.2d Adequacy of Land Available, for household needs 156
5.38 Size Distribution of Family Labour Available to
the Household 159
5.3b Types of Labour Hired 162
5.3c Form of Payment for Hired Labour 1 63
5.3d Household Expenditure on Hired Labour 163
X I
LIST OF TABLES 
(continued)
5.4a Types of Inputs Used by Household Typologies 164
5.4b Reasons for Using Less Inputs than Required 165
5.4c Source of Farm Credit 166
5.4d Types of Inputs Obtained on Credit 167
5.4e Size Distribution of credit among the households
taking Credit 1 67
5.4f Number of Times Household took Credit in 5 Years 168
5.4g Type of inputs Purchased on Cash 170
5.4h Cash outlays on Farm Inputs 171
5.4i Major Constraints on Households’ Farming Activities 172
5.5a Total Maize Output Harvested in the 1979/80 season 174
5.5b Types of Livestock and Poultry Kept 175
5.5c Reported Cash Receipts from livestock
and Poultry Sales 175
5.5d Reported Cash Receipts from Crop Sales, 1979/80 176
5.5e Reported Cash Receipts from Business and
Self Employment 176
5.5f Receipts from Permanent and Temporary Employment 177
6.1 Reported Average Cash Receipts by Household . . .
Typologies and Sources 1 82
6.2 Relationship between Crop Revenue and use of Inputs 185
6.3 Source of Finance for Farm Inputs 185
6.4 The Relationship Between Total Input Credit taken
and Total Cultivated Area 1 88
6.5 Cultivated Area and Crop Revenue 191
6.6 Family Labour Availability and Crop Enterprise 193
xii
LIST OF TABLES
(continued)
6.7 Availability of Family Labour and Adoption of
Innovations (among non-labour hirers) 194
6.8 Relationship between Labour Hiring and Cultivated
Area 197
6.9 Crop Revenue and Expenditure on Hfred Labour 198
6.10 Gross Margins in LLDP, 1977/78 212
6.11 Crop Monthly Labour Demands in LLDP 213
6.12 Proportion of ilbuseholds Growing ''Groundnuts in LLDP 216
6.13 Crop Enterprises in the Feasible Solution when 
Labour Input is Constrained to Family Labour only
and the Financial Constraint is assumed away 216
6.14 Crop Enterprises in the Feasible Solution when a
Financial Constraint (for input purchasing) is 
Introduced, but Labour constraint removed 219
6.15 Crop Enterprises: in Solution when both
the Input purchasing and ,î»abour Hiring vConstraint's
are Operating,. 220
7.1 Smallholder Production, Yields and Hectarages of
Maize and Groundnuts in the Lilongwe District-1968/69 240
7.2 ADMARC Purchases of Tobacco and Groundnuts from 
Customary Land, 1950 -1974.
xiii
LIST OF GRAPHS
6.1 Income Function of A Semi-subsistence Household 
Growing a Traditional Crop 223
6.2 Income Function of A Semi-subsistence Household 
Growing a modern crop 223
6.3 Reaction of a Semi-subsistence Household to a
Labour Market in a non-innovating situation 228
6.4 Reaction of a Semi-subsistence Household to a labour 
Intensive Innovation in the existence of a labour 
market 229
LIST OF FIGURES
6.1 A General Model of Innovation Adoption in LLDP 183
6.2 The Vicious Circle of Rural Poverty 202
5.3 Effects of Labour and Credit Availability on
Crop Revenue 204
Currency Unit
Malawi Kwacha ( MK.) = 100 Tambala (t)
MK = US 01.15 = £0.63 Sterling.
(as at 16/5/78)
NB. The Malawi Kwacha was devalued by 15% towards the end of 1982
Xlv
Acknowledgements
This thesis arose out of my interest in the development 
of peasant agriculture. This interest which is partly due to
my peasant family background, was largely aroused by my contacts
with smallholder farmers, first while acting as a student 
assistant and interpreter to Johnathan Kydd (Lecturer in 
Economics, Chancellor College, University of Malawi), in his 
investigations of smallholder problems in Malawi, and secondly, 
through my own involvement in a number of surveys carried out
in various rural areas in the country, while both as a student
and a Staff-Associate in the Department of Economics, at 
Chancellor College. Thus, ray first acknowledgement goes to 
Johnathan Kydd, who inspired this study and who has, been my 
mentor throughout. To him, I owe a lot in terms of study 
methodology, analytical procedures, interviewing techniques 
and numerous other things which he taught me while acting 
as his assistant in the field, and which I found particulary 
useful while conducting my own research. His own continuing 
work in the field of smallholder agricultural development in 
Malawi, has been a constant source of inspiration to me.
My thanks also go to Kings Phiri and Megan Vaughan, both 
of the History Department, Chancellor College, who also involved 
•me in some of their survey work around Zomba District, as an 
assistant. From them I learnt a lot regarding recall memory 
interviewing techniques which proved very useful in investigating 
household production, expenditure aid consumption activities, in 
a situation where written records are usually non-existent.
This study was made possible by a scholarship which was 
awarded to me by the Malawi Government, for which I am 
particulary grateful. My sincere gratitude is also extended 
to the International Labour Organisation (ILO), and to the 
University of Malawi, Research and Publications Committee, for 
providing me with funds to undertake field work in the Lilongwe 
Land Development Programme.
ox; V
My acknowledgements aie» go to the staff of the Lilongwe 
Agricultural Development Division (LADD), whose help and 
cooperation enai^bled me to complete my field work on schedule. 
Special mention go to Mr. Masangano (then Project Manager of 
LADD), for encouraging me in my research and making temporary 
accommodation available to me during the whole duration of the 
field work; Mr. G.B. M t hindi (Project Evaluation Officer), who 
willingly discussed the research problems with me and offered a 
lot of valuable advice on how the study could be improved, as 
well as reading and commenting on my preliminary survey findings. 
To Mr. Namisengo (in-charge of LADD’s Library), I extend my 
sincere thanks, for his untiring efforts in digging out most 
of the background information for me. Special mention also 
go to Messers Kaimira (Project Officer - LLDP) and Moyo 
(Assistant Project Officer - LLDP), both of whom devoted their 
time and attention to me, taking me on their tours of duty 
around LLDP, as part of Liy familiarization exercise. Their 
intimate knowledge of the area and the people enabled me to 
achieve a good rapport with the smallholding community in the 
area. I would like also to thank the various Development 
Officers at the Unit Centres where I visited or carried out 
ray research, for all the help they offered me. The successful 
completion of the field work was very much due to the farmers 
whom I interviewed and the various local leaders, whose 
cooperation and encouragement helped me to proceed with my work 
with minimum problems. To them, I offer my sincere thanks.
It is through the help and guidance of Lawrence Smith, 
who patiently supervised this thesis throughout its duration 
that this thesis is finally presented in this form. To him 
I offert my sincere gratitude. I would also like to thank 
Mark Patridge and Joe Latham who helped me with the statistical 
analyses.
Lastly, but not least, my thanks go to my wife Ellen, who 
has not only lived with this thesis since its inception, but 
has been a pillar to my sometimes faltering strength. Her 
unflinching support and deep understanding have greatly 
contributed towards the timely completion to this thesis. To
my daughters Rosemary, Yamikani and Dorothy, and my son
XV i
Blessings, are due my thanks for all the sacrifices they have 
had to make while I pursued this study. Finally, I would 
like to say that any shortcomings in this study are entirely 
my responsibility.
S U M M A R Y
It is widely agreed that the growth strategy pursued in most of 
the developing countries during the 1950s and 1960s, resulted in 
a development pattern whereby most of the rural masses did > «
not share in the benefits of the development effort. The 1970s 
was therefore the decade during which many developing countries 
undertook rural development efforts, largely with the help of 
the World Bank and other donor agencies, in an attempt to bring 
the benefits of economic development to the rural poor. Small- _ 
holder agricultural development has been the commonest strategy 
undertaken by most of the developing countries (especially in 
sub-Saharan Africa), to achieve this objective.
This study looks at the extent to which the smallholder 
agricultural development effort has succeeded in improving the 
incomes of the smallholder population in Malawi. The study 
focuses its attention on analysing the innovation adoption 
pattern which has emerged in the Lilongwe Land Development 
Progamme (a poineering experiment in integrated rural development 
in sub-Saharan Africa). In particular,it looks at the factors 
that are associated with the adoption of productivity raising 
innovations, by examining the characteristics that are associated 
with innovation adopters in the area. This is done by building 
a model of household typologies, based on the observed adoption 
behaviour.
The findings from the study indicated that for a smallholder 
agricultural development strategy to succeed in reducing rural 
poverty. It must be in accoid with other national policies. In 
addition; the productivity raising innovations must be able to 
reach the poor households. This necessitates a careful analysis 
of the.constraints faced by the poor households so that appropriate 
innovation packages can beNdesigned for them.
It was observed for example, that in the situation under 
review, female headed households were seen not to adopt most of 
offered by the project. The distribution of inputs on credit did not 
improve the situation due largely to the credit rating criteria 
which rendered such households' credit risks, and also the stipule - 
tion of minimum packages, which in most casos proved to be beyond
the labour and financial resources of most of the poor households# 
More importantthe study indicated that those households that 
did not adopt innovations tended to rely largely on non-farm 
sources of income (such as petty trading, beer brewing and wage 
labour) not only to improve their household income positions but 
even to meet subsistencst needs, suggesting that the smallholder 
development effort was not particularly meeting their needs.
This suggested the need for a search for other means of impro­
ving the incomes of such households, to supplement the smallholder 
development effort.
CHAPTER I 
INTRODUCTION
Malawi, with an annual per capita income of US 0200
(mid 1 9 7 7 )  ^ is classified as one of the least developed
countries in the world. Like most other developing countries
in her category, she is characterised by low productivity (both
land and labour) in t he most predominant sector, the rural sector,
where small scale farming is the leading economic activity.
Over 90% of the rural population depends on peasant farming for 
(2)its livelihood. A sample survey of agricultural holdings 
conducted in 1968/69 reported that the annual incomes of about 
80% of the smallholder households were below K40 (about US 045)
(3)and a substantial proportion of this income came from the farm. 
Such evidence indicates that rural poverty (using the World Bank 
poverty line of US 060 per capita, quoted by Ghai and Radwan), 
was quite a. serious problem in the country. Thus one of Malawi’s 
development priorities was, and still is, to raise peasant 
productivities. The country has opted to achieve this objective 
within a smallholder context. Thus the development of smallholder 
agriculture has become a central element in the country’s rural 
development progamme (see Statement of Development Policies, 
op. cit., p.1)
Because smallholder agricultural production in the country 
is basically subsistence oriented, the main problem which the 
smallholder development effort is trying to solve is ”^ how to 
develop subsistence farmers".
The approach adopted in this study is to examine the impact 
of a smallholder agricultural development strategy on the 
reduction of rural poverty, by looking at what has been 
achieved so far in the field of smallholder agriculture in 
the country (with particular reference to the Lilongwe Land 
Development Programme-LLDP), and what this has meant in terms
of overall rural development. At the same time the theoretical 
basis of smallholder agricultural development will be examined 
to see how it relates to the broad objectives of rural development
1. STUDY METHODOLOGY
In order to investigate the impact of the smallholder 
development effort on rural poverty, the approach is to 
explore the main factors that are causally linked with 
raising small scale agricultural productivity (in the Malawian 
context) and the conditions under which increased smallholder 
productivity can reduce rural poverty. The investigation 
focuses on the examination of the characteristics of subsistence 
farmers, which are critical from the stand point of causality, 
to a movement into greater productivity and commercialization, 
as Mosher (1966) put i t . ^ T h i s  required collecting data 
from the Malawian smallholder sector that would facilitate:
(a) The diagnosis of the problem of low output levels 
on the Malawian small scale farms.
(b) An assessment of the impact which the smallholder 
development effort has had so far on the income 
levels of small scale farmers- especially the 
poorest section of the rural community*
The data collected is used to build models of the rural 
economy to try to explain interhousehold differences in income 
levels. A number of interrelated hypotheses concerning total 
household income (within the agricultural smallholding community 
in LLDP) are formulated and tested against the evidence provided 
by the data.
2. HYPOTHESES TO BE TESTED.
In analysing interhousehold differences in incomes among 
the survey population, emphasis will be placed on the household’s 
ability to adopt the various innovations introduced in LLDP.
After a decade or so of the smallholder development effort in 
the area, the emerging evidence tends to indicate that a
substantial proportion of the households in the area (about 30%) 
appear not to have adopted‘the innovations.A closer investi­
gation indicates that the non innovators are closely associated .
with small cultivated areas, an aspect which is consistent with
(7)observations in other parts of the world. However, it is 
argued here that while differential access to farm land , due 
to restrictive tenurial arrangements, may offer a plausible 
explanation of why there is a close link between farm size and 
adoption behaviour in such places as Asia or Latin America, the
Ï
universal access to farm land in Malawi tends to invalidate 
this p o s s i b i l i t y . T h e  main stand taken in this study on 
this issue is that , while farm size correlates with adoption 
behaviour , such a correlation does not necessarily imply 
causality. Because in the situation under review farm . 
size represents the total amount of land which à Lhousehold 
is able to cultivate, and not merely the amount of land under 
its disposal, as is usually the case in the Asian or Latin 
American cases, it is factors other than land availability per se 
which"play a crucial role in determining innovation adoption and 
therefore total farm and household incomes. This study proposes 
a number of such interrelated factors. A number of hypotheses 
intended to explore these interrelatiohships are listed below.
In chapters V and VI, these are either confirmed or discarded 
.according to the evidence provided by the survey data.
1. a) A household’s level of total revenue from sale of crops 
is likely to be closely associated with the type of crop 
enterprise undertaken ( ie. adoption or non - adoption of 
the innovations offered by ÿhe project).
1. h) Adoption of the innovations offered is likely to be
closely associated with a households’s access to seasonal 
credit.
1• c) A household’s access to seasonal credit is closely 
associated with its cultivated area.
2. aO Total farm Income is closely associated with the size 
of the,cultivated area.
2. b) For a peasant household solely dependent upon family 
labour (for agricultural work), the size of its 
cultivated area is closely associated with the number 
of family workers available to it (measured in adult 
equivalents)•
2. c) A household:’ 8 cultivated area is likely to be related 
to the household’s ability to hire labour (measured by 
total expenditure on hired labour).
2. d) The household’s ability to hire labour is closely related
to the household’s access to non-farm income earning 
opportunities (measured by total non-farm receipts).
3. Cash purchases of inputs are likely to be associated
with a household’s level of non-farm income.
SUmARY AND OUTLINE
The main message coming from this study is that there is 
a great need for a proper diagnosis of the problems facing a 
particular group of smallholder farmers before any steps are 
taken to rectify the situation. The study tries to point out, 
using Malawian evidence, both from colonial and post - colonial 
times, how an improper or incomplete evaluation of the problem 
can lead to designing policies which may actually worsen the 
situation. The study particularly emphasizes that labour 
requirements of small scale, farming in Malawi (and this could 
be generalised to other countries in Sub-Saharan Africa) have 
not been fully appreciated. It is generally assumed that 
smallholder households, because of their emphasis on subsistence
production have surplus family labour which can be usefully utilised 
in the production of cash crops, and hence integrate the house­
holds into the market e c o n o m y . T h i s  assumption is reflected 
in the fact that the innovation packages are usually designed 
on the basis that families have enough family labour to cope 
with them.
However, evidence indicates that while the households 
may possess surplus labour on an annual basis, due to the sharp 
seasonality of the particular farming system (rain fed agricul­
ture), many households actually suffer from labour shortages 
during the peak seasonl^^^ It is actually these peak labour 
demands which are the main constraints to many smallholder
households' farming activities in general, and innovation
(1 1 )adoption in particular.
The majority of innovations introduced in the Malawian 
small-scale agriculture ( this also applies to African agricul­
ture in general), are of the seed technology type. There is
ample evidence which indicates that these are usually more labour
(12)intensive than the traditional crops they replace. One
puzzle associated with seed technology is that in the Asian 
sub-continent they have been seen to improve smallholder produc­
tivities quite substantially while in Africa, generally, their
(1 3)results have tended to be disappointing. . It is often over­
looked that expansion of seed technology in Asia was largely 
accompanied by irrigation development (such as the expansion 
of the tubewell, program in Pakistan) ^  ^ What this irrigation
appears to have done was to have raised productivity and at 
the same time reduced the risk often associated with rain fed 
agriculture, so that returns to labour were higher and more secure, 
In addition, irrigation seems to have introduced an element of 
flexibility in the crop labour demands. That is , although 
the new crops required more labour say per hectare, the 
irrigation facility meant that the household could reasonably 
cope with the extra labour demands by regulating the rate at 
which the field is flooded, to match with its labour supply.
an aspect which is impossible" with rain fed agriculture, which 
predominates in Sub-Saharan Africa. Thus seed technology in 
Africa has invariably meant higher risks as most of these new 
crops tend to have specific environmental and input requirements, 
as well as higher labour demands on the peasant households. 
Unfortunately, because of the implied assumption of surplus 
labour in peasant agriculture, experimentation with the new seeds 
has been largely restricted to yield studies, soil conditions, 
etc. Even in LLDP, where the introduction of seed technology 
(improved maize and groundnut seeds) form the backbone of the 
smallholder development strategy, 'labeur requirement •considerations 
do not seem to feature‘prominently in the -designing of innovation 
packages.'
The evidence that seed technology is relatively more
labour intensive , implies that for its adoption to be widely
based, it must be accompanied by some form of controlling
labour demands, to match them with family labour supplies, or
 ^1 6 ^by the introduction of labour saving technology. Results from
this study tend to indicate that the use of labour saving tech­
nology, is very low in LLDP despite the apparent labour bottle­
necks. It appears that the option of labour saving technology 
is largely frustrated by the extractive pricing policy pursued 
by the state marketing agency in charge of purchasing smallholder 
crops (ADMARC), which is a common phenomenon of African small­
holder crop marketing systems,, which tend to make investment 
in smallholder agriculture unprofitable, and also by the 
unavailability of appropriate technology.
It is. therefore not surprising to see that the adoption 
of seed.technology in the African context has been largely 
associated with increasing labour hiring and/or large family 
work force.s. Even the provision of input credit has not . 
-succeeded^^ inducing a broad based adoption of innovations.
This thesis proposes two main reasons for this failure. The 
first is that inputs are assumed to be the only serious 
constraint among the small scale farmers and not labour. As 
a result emphasis has been placed on providing input credit only 
with the consequence that only those households for whom the 
above assumption holds, have benefited from the credit package.
In the second place, allocation of credit is based on the 
"ability to repay" criterion, ie. the ability to produce 
a marketable surplus over and above family subsistence needs, 
which is also closely associated with the amount of labour 
available to the household (translated through the size of the 
cultivated area),
The consequence of this oversight regarding the labour 
availability problem is the fostering of an adoption pattern 
that depends on labour hiring, which in the absence of proper 
rural wages monitoring, is likely to lead to more rural 
differentiation as the richer and more progressive farmers will 
tend to hire the smaller and poorer farmers, with the likely 
consequence that the latter group will be "crowded out" of 
cash crop production, and probably leading to increasing land­
lessness among the rural community. Although this is likely 
to happen sooner or later, given the fast population growth 
in the country and the rising pressure on the land, it appears 
that Its emergence could be slowed down(while appropriate 
solutions are being sought to deal with it when it finally 
arrives) by trying to achieve a widely based adoption pattern.
It appears that the achievement of a broadly based adoption 
pattern is prevented by lack of adequate information on the 
part of planners regarding the exact developmental needs of 
the various typologies of smallholder households.
This study therefore attempts to make two major contri­
butions to the study of small scale agricultural development.
The first contribution lies in the emphasizing the need for a 
more carefull analysis of the factots associated with innovation 
adoption and the need to investigate their interrelationships 
so as to enable us to isolate those factors that are merely 
associated with innovation adoption from those that are causally 
linked with it. The second, and most important contribution 
comes from the survey findings which have indicated that in LLDP 
( and this could be extended to other areas in rural Malawi), 
female headed households (which comprised about 16^ 1 of the 
sample), have been largely by-passed by the smallholder
oagricultural development effort. The main reason for this 
appears to he the deficiency ,in the family labour resource 
associated with this group of households. This has led to 
smaller cultivated areas and consequently restricted their 
access to input credit. As a result these households tend 
to increasingly rely on non-farm sources of income. But, 
because of limited non-farm income earning opportunities in 
the rural areas, the tendency for these households has been to 
hire themselves out to the "innovating " households, with the 
consequence that their labour problems are made worse, making 
their dependence on wage labour more or less a permanent 
phenomenon.
The study therefore argues that more insights into the 
characteristics of the rural population (such as resource 
constraints, sociological factors , etc.), would be gained if 
the households were disaggregated into some form of typologies 
based on one criterion or the other, rather than relying on 
aggregate attributes»of.the entire beneficiary.group. In this 
way , it would be possible to design à range of innovation 
packages that would cater for the needs of the various typologies* 
In addition, it is likely that the limitations of a smallholder 
development strategy as an overall means for alleviating rural 
poverty, will be revealed, by indicating those groups who for 
one reason or the other , cannot participate directly as farm 
operators, such as the landless and near landless households.
As a result it will be possible to direct the attention of 
planners towards more appropriate remedies for such households, 
such as rural employment creation programmes.
The study is divided into two parts. The first part 
which incorporates chapters II and III, looks at Malawi's small­
holder agricultural development problem in a historical context, 
while the second part, comprising chapters IV to VI, is largely 
devoted to an examination of the smallholder agricultural deve­
lopment effort in I^DP, as a case study.
In chapter II, Malawi’s smallholder development strategy is 
placed in a historical perspective, by looking at the country’s 
resources, which seem to dictate the need for an emphasis on 
small scale agricultural development. This is followed by an 
examination of the damage done to smallholder development 
prospects by the colonial agricultural policy which emphasized 
the encouraging of settler agriculture, and later attempts to 
rectify the situation. Chapter III focuses on the current rural 
development strategy in Malawi and how it relates to the overall 
agricultural development programme (both estate and smallholder 
development). The main conclusion emerging from this chapter is 
that it appears that estate agriculture, despite the damaging 
effect which it is seen to have had on smallholder agricultural 
development prospects during the colonial era, has continued to 
receive disproportional attention in post-colonial times. At 
the same time, efforts at smallholder agricultural development 
have tended not to be broadly based, A ^National Rural Develop­
ment Programme has been launched (since 1976/77) to try to 
initiate broad based smallholder agricultural development, but 
has not attempted to alter the balance between estate and small­
holder development, thereby watering down its effect as a sectoral 
corrective mechanism.
Chapter IV looks at a specific case of smallholder agricul­
tural development in the country. The aims and objectives of 
the development effort are analysed in the light of prevailing 
conditions in the area. The main conclusion emerging from this 
chapter is that labour availability appears to be a more crucial 
factor in innovation adoption in the area than is generally 
recognised. Chapters V and VI attempt a micro-level analysis <0^  
innovation '^behaviour, with the help of survey data collected 
in LLDP. In chapter V, the survey data«^>€ described, and a 
number of hypotheses to explain the observed pattern of innovation 
adoption are examined. In chapter VI, a more penetrating 
analysis of the survey data is undertaken, and the hypotheses 
developed in the previous chapter tested against the evidence 
provided by the survey data. Chapter VII, offers a summary 
of the main findings of the whole study, and some policy
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prescriptions regarding broadly based innovation adoption as 
well as alternative and additional measures of reducing rural 
poverty.
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CHAPTER II
A HISTORICAL BACKGROUND TO THE MALAWI ECONOMY
A proper understanding of the reasons behind the success or 
failure of a country's development strategy , let alone 
its emergence , is.impossible without some knowledge of the 
.political and economic,circumstances under which the strategy 
developed, and is being pursued. It is for this reason 
that this chapter will be devoted to a brief historical 
account of the political and economic developments in Malawi 
during the colonial era, and up to , and immediately after 
Independence, in order to put the development strategy in 
perspective. However, the objective will not be to provide 
detailed history of Malawi, a subject which has been 
covered with considerable detail by a number of writers,^ 
but rather to try to answer two main questions; viz:
(a) How did the current Malawian agricultural 
development strategy emerge ?
(b) What impact has the strategy had so far
on rural welfare?
To provide answers to these two questions will require both 
an assessment of the economic and political circumstances 
pertaining to the Malawi economy,asvwell as a critical 
evaluation of the agricultural development policies pursued 
in Malawi todate.
The central theme of this chapter is that three main 
factors contributed to the emergence of the particular 
agricultural development strategy currently being pursued 
in Malawi. These are:
(i) The nature of the country's resourceso
(ii) The country's economic and political history.
(iii) The country's development priorities as
seen at Independence.
15
It will be argued that, because of the nature of the country's 
resources, peasant agriculture offers the largest scope for 
improving rural wellbeing. However, despite the fact that 
this has been recognised both in pre- and post-independence 
times, the country's development record tends to indicate 
that peasant agriculture has either been largely neglected 
or relegated to a secondary role, with large-scale (or estate) 
agriculture getting priority. Consequently , there has 
been a general lack of a commitment to devise policies 
particularly appropriate to raising peasant productivity 
on a broad basis,
1, THE NATURE OF MALAWI'S RESOURCES
A, Natural Resources
(i) Topography
Malawi falls within the East African Rift Valley
System. This has resulted in great diversity in topography,
which in turn has produced a wide range of relief and
elavation, rainfall, climate and soil fertility. The combined
effect of all these variations is an agricultural diversity
similar to that in Uganda, which ranges through tropical,
subtropical and temperate crops, giving Malawi great
(2)agricultural potential in a number of crops.
(ii) Land Availability
Malawi, which is completely land locked, has a total
land area of 9.4 million hectares, of which 5.3 million
hectares (56?i) is said to be cultivable. ^ A s  Pike (1968)
has observed, by African standards, Malawi soils are regarded
as fertile although their nutrient status shows wide differences.
According to a survey carried out in 1968/69, only 1.4 million
hectares of the potentially cultivable area (representing 26%
of the cultivable land) were under permanent cultivation at the 
(5)time. This indicates that at Independence the country 
had great scope for increasing agricultural output through 
hectarage expansion. However, with the Malawian population
(4)
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growing at about 3% per year, between 1966 and 1977,^  ^
pressure on cultivable land has been mounting , reducing 
the scope of hectarage expansion as an option for increasing 
agricultural output. This is shown in table 2.1.
Table 2.1 Population Density. 1966 and 1977 
(Persons per square Kilometre)
Region ' Year
' 1966 1977 % Rise
Northern 18 24 33.3
Central 41 . 60 46.3
Southern 65 87 33.8
All Malawi 43 59 37.2
Source: Population Census, 1977
In 1968/69, it was indicated that then, average holding
size (on customary land) was 1.5 hectares, with an average
( Y ^of 4.6 persons per holding. Given the rapid population 
growth between the two census years , accompanied by the 
rapid expansion of the estate sector experienced during the 
same period, it is highly likely that most of the cultivable 
land has now been brought under permanent cultivation. This 
implies that either more and more of.xthe less suitable land 
is being brought under cultivation, or that the growing 
population is making itself felt through reduced hectarages 
per household, or alternatively , through increased rural- 
urban migration, or a combination of any of these.
Estimates of the Ministry of Agriculture, Land Husbandry 
Section , based on the current land use pattern in the country 
(see table 2.2), indicate.that by 1983, only in the Northern 
Region will there be some arable land still idle. The Central 
and Southern Regions are likely to have exhausted their 
potentially arable lands.
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Table 2.2 Land Availability and Utilization. 
( '000 hectares )
Region Total Land Potential Land Under Arable Estimated
Arable Cultivation Land Land Under
Land (1977) Still Cultivation
Availa­ (1983)
ble
(1977)
Northern 2688.7 994.7 679.8 314.9 822.7
Central 3553.4 1314.6 1196.8 117.8 1448.2
Southern 3170.4 1172.9 1130.8 42.1 1368.4
All Malawi 9412.1 ' 3481.8 3007.3 474.9 3639.3
Source: Land Husbandry Branch, Ministry of Agriculture and Natural 
Resources.
The results of the National Sample Survey of Agriculture
carried out in 1980/81 , will have to be awaited before more
information regarding the situation of sizes of holdings in the
smallholder sector is made available. At the moment , there
is growing speculation that in many parts of the Central and
Southern Regions, the land frontier has either been reached
or is being approached at a fast rate, and that the rapid
expansion of the estate sector during the past decade has
( 8)accelerated this process. This implies that there is now very 
limited scope in Malawi for increasing agricultural output 
through hectarage expansion, therefore calling for greater . 
reliance on the use of productivity raising inputs.
It would be erroneous to treat the land factor as though 
it was uniform throughout the country. The diversity in 
topography referred to above, has affected the regional distri­
bution of arable land, and so have temperature, climate and 
other related factors. These in turn have affected the farming 
systems of different regions, and therefore their land utilization 
patterns. At the same time, the regional disparity in land
utilization is not merely a product of geographical factors, 
it has political and historic factors as well.
(iii) Patterns of Land Use
Malawi can be divided roughly into three distinct zones 
each!with-its own climatic, temperature and soil fertility
conditions, and therefore having different agricultural
(9)potentials. These are :
(a) The Plateaux Region - comprising the Shire 
Highlands and Central Region Plateaux(Lilongwe and Kasungu 
Plains, extending into Mzimba/Rumphi Plains and Chitipa). These 
lie at an altitude of between 750metres to 1400 metres above
sea level. The region has a temperate climate, with mean annual 
temperature ranging between 18^C and 24^0. Mean annual rainfall 
is between 750 mm. and 1500 ram* This is the region of greatest 
peasant agricultural potential. Maize, finger millet and pulses 
are the main staples, while groundnuts and tobacco are the main 
cash crops. Wherever rainfall permits , tea, and other 
plantation crops are grown.
(b) The Highland Areas - of Vipya,Nyika, Misuku and 
Mafinga Highlands in the North;, Shire Highlands (Zomba,Mulanje) 
in the South; and the Kirk Range and Dedza in the Central. Their 
altitude ranges from 1400 to 2750 metres above sea level. They 
have very good agricultural soils, and where the slopes are well 
watered, legumes, potatoes,wheat and maize are grown. Their 
warm climate (mean annual temperature just below 18 C and a 
mean annual rainfall ranging from 1300 to 4000 mm.), makes them 
the most suitable for temperate crops and European settlement 
and consequently it is' the region where estate agriculture is 
concentrated (especially the Shire Highlands) as a result of 
its historic attraction to European settlers.
( c) The Shire Valley and Lake Malawi Littoral s 
rangig in altitude from 40 to 750 metres above sea level.
Rainfall is below 750 mm. (on average) per annum. Temperatures 
are high, averaging around 24^C. This is the region of least 
agricultural potential. Periodic variations in water levels 
in Lake Malawi and Shire River, add to water management problems.
I y
However, successful implementation of water level control 
projects would allow for irrigation schemes as well as reduce 
the occurence of devastating floods, thus enhancing the region's 
agricultural potential. Nevertheless, bulrush millet, cassava 
and rice are the main food crops in the region, while cotton 
is the main cash crop.
This diversity in agricultural potential indicates that 
there is no uniform solution to the country's agricultural 
development problem, as the development needs of each region 
are determined by different circumstances. There is therefore 
need for carefully tailoring of projects to the specific needs 
of each region* Indeed in some regions, -agricultural develop­
ment may not offer an immediate solution . However, these 
differences should not mask the fact that overall, Malawi's 
agricultural potential is quite substantial. With a mean 
annual rainfall of 1150 mm, ranging from 650 to3900 mm.,
Malawi is luckier than most other sub-Saharan African countries, 
where long droughts are a perpertual hazard to crops and livestock. 
In fact, only about 5% of the country is said to have an average 
rainfall below 750mm.',which i - S  considered to be the minimum 
required for dry farming in the type of climate , making 
most of Malawi cultivable for at least one type of crop or the 
other, giving the country great scope for diversifying her 
agricultural product mix, which could act as a cushion against
the disaster that usually follows as a result of total dependence
(1 1)on one or two crops.
(iv) Mineral Resources - Prospects for mineral
resources are very limited in the country as known exploitable
(12)minerals are.very limited, although exploration continues.
Bauxite on Mulanje mountain may become extractable once, 
or if ever cheap power becomes available, and so could pyrites
(13)and pyrrhotic (sources of sulphur) near Lilongwe. Consider­
able deposits of low quality coal are also said to be 
available in the Northern region. With escalating fuel prices , 
these could prove to be a valuable source of energy for industry.
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However , extraction of such deposits at present appears to be 
uneconomic. It is'pnly natural building materials such as 
sources of cement (marble, limestone and aggregates) and brick 
clays which occur widely throughout the country. Overall, 
raining and quarrying activities are not very significant in 
Malawi. Malawi thus does not have the fortune of relying on 
mineral resources to finance her development, programmes, as is 
the case with other developing countries, such as Zambia, Zaire, 
Nigeria and others, hence placing the onus of generating 
investible funds oh the agricultural sector.
(v) Water Resources - As already pointed out ,
Malawi is a landlocked country. This means that her only 
wateh resources are in the form of inland lakes and rivers.
The absence of a sea coast has naturally affected her transport 
network ( to the outside world), making her rely entirely on 
overland transport.
Lake Malawi, covering an area of some 2.4 million hectares 
is the most prominent feature in the country. Three other 
lakes (Chiuta, Chirwa and Ma,lombe) lie wholly or partly within 
the country's boundaries. A skeleton water transport system 
operates on Lake Malawi and the upper part of Shire River( Lake 
Malawi's outlet to the Indian Ocean, via the Zambezi River). 
However, the largest contribution of Malawi's water resources 
is by way of providing the many part time and full time 
fishermen and fish traders with a considerable means of livelihood. 
In 1978, recorded landings of fish were estimated at 67,500 metric 
tons (valued at K8.1 million) , of these, 66,900 metric tons 
were estimated to have been consumed locally, with the remainder 
having been exported, at an estimated value of K398,000.
Malawi's greatest potential in terms of the water 
resources is hydro-electric power. The country's industrial 
power is mostly electrical. In 1978, about 70% of this
electrical power was hydro, with the bulk of it coming
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from Nkula and Tedzani hydro-electrlcâl power plants situated 
on the Shire River.
B. Human Resources.
1. Labour Dorce.
Any discussion of a country’s agricultural potential is 
incomplete without an examination of labour availability in the 
country, especially when smallholder agriculture is the main 
subject under consideration.
With an average population density of 59 persons per
square kilometre (mid-1977), ^ M a l a w i  is one^he most densely
populated countries in East and Central A f r i c a . T h i s  gives
Malawi a large potential labour force. The World Bank (1981),
estimated that in 1979, the total Malawian population was
5.8 million, 49% of which was eligible to work (being within
( 17 )the 15-64 years age category). This implies that in 1979,
the Malawian labour force was around 2.84 million. The #ank 
further estimated that the Malawian labour force would grow 
at the rate of 3.3% per annum, between the years 1980 and 
2000.^ A c c e p t i n g  these estimates^(which seem reasonable, 
given that the Malawian population is growing at the rate of 
3% per y e a r , ^ w h i l e  50% of the population is in the 10-54 
ye§.rs age group (1977 census), the Bank's estimate that by 
.the end of the century, the Malawian labour force will stand 
at about 5.62 million, sounds reasonable.
Between 1971 and 1977, total paid employment in Malawi 
is estimated to have risen from 172,000 to 275,600,  ^
that is at an annual rate of about 9%. This represents a 
very fast rate of growth for any developing country. If, for 
the sake of argument » that rate is assumed to continue to the 
year 2000, then paid employment could reach 2.1 million at the 
close of the century. This could leave an estimated 3.52 
million eligible workers outside the formal labour market. 
However, a closer look at the structure of employment in the 
country presents even a more gloomier picture than this.
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Table 2.3 gives the structural pattern of paid employment
(21)
for the years 1968, 1972,1976 and 1980.' The table indicates 
that total pal'd employment grew by 9% between 1968 and 1972, 
by 8.6% between 1972 and 1976 and by 5*4% between 1976 and 
1980. The table also indicates that the agricultural sector 
ie by far the largest employer of paid employment. During 
the period under review , the agricultural sector has increased 
its share of paid employment from 33% in 1968 to about 51% 
in 1980. This rapid growth of employment in .the agricultural 
sector, has not been necessarily uniform during the whole 
period, as represented by the growth rates of 9.6%, 13.0% 
and 5.7% between the periods 1968-72, 1972-76 and 1976-80, 
respectively.
Table 2.3 Average number of Paid Employees by Industry
For 1968.1972.1976 and 1980.
Industry
1968
t
1972
000 8 
1976 1980
Annual growth rates(%) 
1968-72 1972-6 1976-80
1• All Indus­
tries 134.5 189.6 264.1 359.7 9.0 8.6 5.4
2. Agricultu­
re, etc. 44.1 63.7 103.9 182.7 9.6 13.0 5.7
3. Manufactu­
ring 17.2 23.2 36.0 39.1 7.8 11.6 6.0
4. Construc­
tion 15.5 18.2 21.1 37.9 4.1 3.8 16.8
5. Wholesale
et c. 9.4 15.9 20.7 19.5 14.0 6.8 - 7.9
6, Transport 
etc. 8.1 9.8 13.0 16.5 4.9 7.3 — 0*4
7. Community 
social and
personal ser­
vices. 37.4 . 54.2 61,9 49.2 9.7 3.4 2.6
8. Others 2.5 4.5 7.5 14.8 15.8 13*6 17.6
Source: Kydd and Christiansen (1982) , _op. cit. p. 20
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Two aspects are discernible from the above data. The 
.first is that, although paid employment in the Transport and
Manufacturing sectors has a pattern of growth similar to that
in total employment, during the period under review, by and
large, it is growth of employment in the agricultural sector,
which has dictated the pattern of paid employment in.the whole
economy. The second aspect is that the trend of growth seems
to be tailing off.
The rapid growth of wage employment in the agricultural
sector, seems to have been a direct result of the fast expansion
of the estate sector (more especially tobacco estates). The
1970s saw rapid expansion of the estate sector in the form of
enlarging existing estates and opening up of new ones (especially
by Malawian entrepreneurs). With the assistance of a low
minimum wages policy, deliberately formulated to boost rural
(22)wage employment and curb rural-urban migration, most of these 
estates used labour intensive production techniques, with the 
consequence that paid employment rose in this sector during the 
period. .
But, as hinted above , by the late 1970 and early 1980s, 
the land barrier appears to have been hit in many areas, thereby 
reducing the scope for raising agricultural output through 
hectarage expansion. This means that most of the estates have 
had to turn to relatively less labour intensive production 
techniques,in order to raise land productivity(such as greater 
use of mechanisation and other more sophisticated techniques of 
production). At the same time, the liberal credit policy which 
was used in order to encourage indigenous participation in 
estate production of tobacco has led into a number of insolvencies 
forcing a number of estates into closing down or going into
S3 )receiverships, thereby shedding labour. The result of these 
developments has been a reduced labour absorptive capacity of 
the agricultural sector (as far as wage employment is concerned). 
It therefore appears that, unless some fundamental structural 
change occurs in the economy soon, an increasing proportion of 
the rapidly growing labour force will find themselves outside 
the formal labour market. This means that, only smallholder 
agricultural development (at least in the short run), holds 
the hope for their livelihood and welfare.
However, the low productivity in the smallholder sector, 
coupled with the growing pressure on the land, limit the 
opportunities people can get on the land. This points to two 
possible courses of action:
(a) To improve productivity per hectare, via increased 
use of modern inputs, wide application of modern methods of 
agriculture and / or more intensive cultivation (eg. irrigation) 
to counter the declining fertili.ty trend due to land pressure,
(b) Rapid creation of off farm income earning opportunities 
to reduce over dependence on agriculture.
Both options will be considered in the concluding chapters.
2. A BRIEF ECONOMIC AND POLITICAL. HISTORY OF MALAWI
This section will attempt to briefly chart the main 
political and economic events in Malawi that helped to shape 
the current development strategy. For purposes of clarity 
the historical analysis will be divided into three chronolo­
gical periods, viz:
(i) Colonial Period (1891-1953)
(ii) Federal Period (1953-1964)
(iii) Post-Independence Period(1964 to date)
A, The Colonial Period
The story of British administration in Malawi, began in
the second half of the 19 Century, when David Livingstone,
a Scottish Missionary and explorer, driven by the desire to
m a k e  a n  o p e n  p a t h  f o r  c o m m e r c e  a n d  C h r i s t i a n i t y  i n t o  t h e  i n t e r i o r
of Africa, and so end slave trade in the region, persuaded both
the British Government and Christian bodies in England and
Scotland to back his expeditions into Central Africa. It was
mainly his second expedition (1858-64) which subsquently led
to the settlement of Europeans in Malawi. The story of how
events developed in the region, leading to the firm establishment
of British rule in Malawi, is'well documented elsewhere. Here►
we shall only concern ourselves with how colonial agricultural 
policy evolved.
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The main objective of Livingstone's expeditions was to facili­
tate European settlement in the area, which would in turn allow 
the inhabitant's to apply themselves to industrial pursuits and to 
cultivation of their lands. ' In this way they would produce 
raw materials to be exported to England in return for British 
munufactures. It was hoped that by encouraging the natives to 
occupy themselves in the development of the resources of the
country, a considerable advance might be made towards the err-
(25)
adication of slave trade.
I Introduction of Settler Agriculture In Malawi
As mentioned earlier, Livingstone's wish was that the inha­
bitants were to engage in industrial pursuits and agricultural 
production. This view was shared by most of the missionaries 
who followed his footsteps into Central A f r i c a . H o w e v e r ,  
those people who were .entrusted with consolidating British rule 
in the country viewed the situation differently. Instead they 
pursued a policy of encouraging European settlers and companies 
to take up agricultural production, with the natives playing the 
role of labourers. One argument put forward to justify such a 
move was that among the first Europeans to arrive in the country 
were a number who were primarily interested in the export of 
produce purchased from the Africans, but once the character of 
the indigenous subsistence economy became known, it was immedi­
ately realised that such a course of action was impossible and
(27)many Europeans turned to producing crops themselves. However,
there is no evidence to substantiate this claim. To the
contrary, there is ample evidence to indicate that well before
European settlement in Malawi, the "Karavi", were surplus
agricultural producers, who supplied not only the Portuguese
settlements on the coast but also other African groups.^
Such evidence suggests that either the nature of the African
system was misunderstood by the early administrators, or they had
other pressing reasons for encouraging settler agriculture.
An examination of the available evidence suggests that both 
aspects were in play. In the first place, Johnston , the 
architect of British administration in Malawi, is quoted to have 
said that the African farming system was conducted on a heedless
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(29)
system ruinous to the future interests of the country. This
was in reference to the slash and burn method of shifting cultiva­
tion, No attempt was made to establish the rationality of the 
system in the prevailing circumstances. Just because the 
African’s farming methods were different from those used by 
his European counterpart, it was assumed that the African was 
a bad agriculturalist. Yet many recent studies have established 
the rationality of shifting cultivation and other aspects of 
traditional agriculture,^ ^
The most important reason for promoting settler agriculture 
instead of peasant agriculture appears to have been Johnston's 
desire to attract European settlers in the country. Krishnamurthy 
(1972), points out that although Johnston believed that the future 
of the country belonged to the African, he nevertheless, under­
estimated the capacity of the African to make any contribution to 
the development of the protectorate in the immediate future. His 
opinion was that the country would be developed by Europeans
( 31)without whom, he thought, Central Africa would be of no value. ,
As Williams (1978), points out, to achieve this objective, the
administration had to provide conditions that would enable the
settlers in the Protectorate to achieve a degree of commercial
success sufficient to allow them to maintain a satisfactory
standard of living comparable to that enjoyed by settlers in
( 32)Rhodesia, Kenya, etc. In turn the settlers were expected to
provide the basis o^ .. a monetized economy on which the 
administration would depend for most of its revenue. It was in 
the pursuit of this objective that the development of settler 
agriculture took priority, much to the neglect of peasant 
agriculture, as will be indicated subsequently.
11. Tools Used in Consolidating Settler Agriculture.
Coffee Was the first estate crop to be introduced in Malawi 
(introduced in the 1880 s), and it enjoyed considerable success.
In 1885 there were l6 hectares (40 acres) under this crop and 
by 1896 it was covering an area of well over 4050 hectares 
(10,000 acres), rising to about 7,000 hectares (17,000 acres) 
by 1900. During this year, proceeds from coffee exports 
(which comprised about 80% of total exports) amounted to
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£62,000. However, after 1900, a combination of droughts and
pests, plus stiff competition from Brazilian coffee, saw the
decline of the coffee industry in Malawi, from which it has 
(33)never recovered. However, the main point is that encouraged
by these early successes of the coffee industry, the .admini­
stration was committed to attracting more European settlers 
into the Shire Highlands. Once these new entrants opened up 
estates , it was soon discovered , as Williams (1978), points 
out, that if these settlers had to succeed they needed :-^
(i) A steady supply of cheap labour.
(ii) Abundant cheap land.
(iii) Adequate communications (particularly transport).
Thus, one of the main tasks of the adiministration during the 
early years of colonial rule in Malawi was to respond to these 
demands. The following tools were used to this effect :-
(i) Taxes.
(ii) Labour certificates.
(iii) Restrictions on recruitment for work outside the 
country.
(iv) Denial of opportunities to Africans to grow certain 
cash crops,
(v) Forced labour and alienation of land.
(a) Taxation - was the first tool used by the administration
to help the settlers with their labour problems. During the
early years of his administration (1890s),Johnston introduced
a hut tax of 3 shillings per annum (which was equivalent to the
average monthly wage rate in the Protectorate). Although this
was intended as a source of revenue for the administration,
(35)it was soon put to other uses. Initially the tax was
payable either in cash or in kind, but later in order to force 
people to work on the estates, only cash was accepted.
d û
(b) Labour Certificates - Laier, net only had taxes to be paid, 
but a labour certificate had to be produced, duly signed by
an employer , stipulating that the holder had worked for a 
specific period of time. The tax rate was also raised to 
8 shillings per annum in 1912,'. but a tax rebate of 4 shillings 
was given on production of a labour certificate - thus encoura­
ging people to pay taxes out of wage labour. At the same time 
the settlers were allowed to pay taxes for their employees in 
return for 30 days labour#
(c) Restrictions on Migration - Due to the presence of
other cash earning opportunities, such as crop production ,
working as porters for the transporters,migration, etc., the
imposition of tax alone did not prove effective in making
(37)labour available on the estates* The settler farmers
persuaded the Government to close these gaps. Their first 
request was for a ban on recruitment of labour from Malawi for 
work outside the protectorate. Secondly they urged the G^ern- 
ment that a railway line be built to ease the transportation 
problem and therefore release labour from road - porterage.^ 
Missionaries in the country backed these requests on humani­
tarian grounds. The result was that in,.1908 a railway line 
from Blantyre to Chiromo was opened and later extended to
Nsanje. And in 1909, the Government introduced measures to
(39)restrict labour migration.
(d) Forced Labour and Alienation of Land - In addition to the 
above measures the Government encouraged a quasi-feudal tenancy 
system, whereby the settler farmers v/ere empowered to exact 
payment from the Africans residing on their estates. This was 
termed Thangata.
The system of Thangata. was made possible by settler 
control of land. V/hen Johnston embarked on the task of 
building the Protectorate's economy , he was soon faced with 
the problem of land disputes. Most of the settlers had 
acquired large tracts of land (mostly for speculative purposes).
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through dubious negotiations with the traditional leaders, to 
v/hich they claimed ownership, much to the surprise and indig - 
nation of the indigenous population, to whom individual owner­
ship of land was unthinkable. Thus naturally land disputes 
between the settlers and the indigenous people arose.
Johnston had to act to resolve this comflict. However, he 
was already committed to encouraging European enterprise, and he 
strongly believed ill the Western notion that individual ownership 
of land was a paramount condition for land development. Thus in 
his arbitration, he merely consolidated the position of the 
settlers by issuing them with certificates of claim over the 
lands they claimed. The amount of land involved in these claims 
was enormous. For example, it is said that in 1903, the British 
Central Africa Company claimed about 149,000 hectares (367,000 
acres), but cultivated only about 2,000 hectares (5,000 acres) 
During this time, the African population was growing-'-'fast as a 
result of the cessation of tribal hostilities, cessation of the 
slave trade, and an influx of migrants from Mozambique. The 
result was that there was pressure on the land and consequently 
many people found themselves residing on European estates as 
t e n a n t s . T h u s  the system of Thangata developed. Of this 
system, the Grant Commission of 1915 reported ; ^
"The tenants system was that natives living on the land were 
compelled to work for a month in the wet season for rent and 
another month also in the wet season for hut tax, that is 
two months of work."
It must be pointed out that given the short wet season in 
Malawi, ie 3 months on average, and the fact that the "ticket" 
month of 30 working days, rather than the calender month was 
employed, these tenants hardly had any time to tend to their 
own farms. Consequently, this had disastrous effects on peasant 
agriculture.
Thus it can be seen that through these policies and practices 
a large number of Africans were condemned to work for the European 
settlers, for very little pay and often very bad conditions.
Since both European and African agriculture were rain-fed and 
heavily dependent on labour, it meant that their peak labour 
demands (planting, weeding and harvesting) usually coincided.
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The settler farmers, with the help of the above measures, got 
the labour, while the African farmers, because of the severity 
of the punitive measures taken in cases of non-conformity with 
the above mentioned policies and practices, had their fields 
inadequately attended t o , ^ T h e  economic implication was 
that these policies and practices led to the creation of a 
peasant labouring class, greatly dependent on estates for its 
livelihood. Not only was African cash crop production in­
hibited, but even their subsistence output was at stake. In 
addition, the strained relations on the estates contributed 
to the inefficiency of European production, v/hich coupled with 
an inefficient transport system, made Malawi’s produce less 
competitive on the World market. (45)
111 The Effects of Colonial Policies on the Development of 
Smallholder Agriculture
(a) Obstacles to smallholder production
As already pointed out above, the devices used in promoting 
European agriculture, undoubtedly had a negative impact on the 
development - of peasant agriculture in Malawi. In the first 
place, they reflected the lack.of commitment on the part of the 
Government to develop this sector. For example, the policy of 
land alienation, initiated by Johnston, had , in addition to 
those evils associated with Thangata. other inhibiting aspects 
■ on peasant agriculture. For one thing, Johnston omitted any 
special provision for African participation in the development 
effort, except that he pledged that he was prepared to encourage 
those Africans that were willing to buy or lease land on an 
individual basis. But this was more of a token gesture than
anything else. This is illustrated by the fact that a few years 
later {.in_1910, when Alfred Sharpe was Governor), 47 Africans 
are said to have applied for land but the Government rejected 
their applications. In fact, the few Africans who were lucky 
enough to get Crown land under this provision, werei only allowed
O.feO hectare (2 acres) or less, for growing cotton. ^ T h i s  
contrasts sharply with the situation in Uganda, where peasant 
production was considered to be the backbone of the economy. 
There, peasants were allowed an average of 3*2 hectares (about 
8 acres), of v/hich 1.2 hectares were devoted to cotton growing,
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while plantains and subsidiary crops took up 1.2 and 0.5 hectares, 
r e sp ec t iv e ly . B e si d e s , those Africans who did venture into 
opening up agricultural estates, were not given the same 
privileges as their white counterparts. For example, they were 
denied the chance to benefit from the device of "labour 
certificates^.
In the second place, the policy of allocating land to . 
settlers, had the effect of unbalancing the peasant farming 
system. Johnston had designated, virtually all the land not in 
private (European) hands as Crown Land, from which new allocations 
could be made to intending settlers. The only safeguard against 
total dispossession of the Africans was that land which was 
currently being used by the Africans could not be alienated.
But during this time the mode of peasant cultivation was that 
of shifting cultivation. Thus,ieven if the people had secure 
tenure ovep the land they were currently using, once the soil w&s 
'exhausted they had nowhere to shift to, the consequence 
was declining peasant productivity.^
However, it is only fair to mention that despite the admini­
stration's negative attitude towards smallholder agricultural 
development, a few attempts were made to encourage small scale 
production of cash crops, especially cotton and fire-cured 
tobacco, when the failure of the settlers to produce these crops 
efficiently became apparent. For example, in 1904, Alfred Sharpe,,
JohnstonJs successor, offered tax rebates to Africans growing
( 51)cotton, as an encouragement to grow the crop. By far the big­
gest boost cane from Manning, Sharpe's successor, when in 1912, 
he initiated the Crown Land Ordinance. For all practical purposes,
this Ordinance was aimed at halting land alienation, by restricting
(52")the granting of freehold titles to European settlers. In add­
ition, he committed the British Cotton Growing Association to a
policy of promoting cotton growing as an African peasant industry.
However, progress in this direction was impeded by a number 
of factors, such as :
(i) Land shortage.
(li) Lack of funds for cash crop production.
(iii) Unfavourable marketing and price policies,
(iv) Inadequate transport services.
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At the "outbreak of the 1st World War, it is estimated 
that about 15% of the arable land in the country was under 
settler control this included most of the in I the Shire
Highlands. Thus most of the Africans who grew cash crops,
did so as tenants on estate lands. Most of the estate owners 
were hostile to this development, mostly due to the effect it 
had on their labour demands. Naturally, they put many obstacles 
in the way of the African cash croppers, such as outright bans 
on cash crop production on estate land, requiring the peasants 
to work on the estates during peak labour demands^etc. In 
addition, most of those African growers had no source of inputs. 
Hence, some of the estate owners took advantage of this situation 
by providing the Africans with inputs, such as tobacco seeds (or 
seedlings), watering cans, etc. In return, these "landlords" 
reserved the right to purchase the crops from the tenants, at 
very low prices, and auctioning the crops themselves, together 
with their own produce. Also, lack of adequate marketing 
facilities within commutable distances, forced these African cash 
croppers to sell their crops to the estate owners.
(b) Some Progress Y/ithin the Smallholder Sector.
Ironically, evidence* indicates that smallholder production 
of cash Crops (especially cotton and fire-cured tobacco) did 
begin to flourish, at a time when European production of the same 
began to decline, despite the above mentioned obstacles. For 
example, at the outbreak of the 1st World War, it is estimated 
that 10-15% of total exports (comprising mostly of tobacco and 
cotton) were produced by smallholders.^After  the war, small­
holder production of both crops continued to rise. It is 
estimated that between 1922 and 1932, smallholder production of 
cotton rose 7 fold in absolute terms, bringing the share of 
smallholder output from 14% to almost 100%. Tobacco production 
also went up, especially in Lilongwe, where in 1926, there were 
about 13,000 registered African growers. It was only during the 
depression of the 1930 s that there was a decline in smallholder
production, and this decline was much slower than that experienced
(' 55 )
in the Earopean sector.' This appears to have been noticed by
the colonial administration and other observers.
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During the inter-war period, peo’ple had began to realise
that the future of the protectorates agricultural industry lay
with peasant production. For example, the Secretary of the
British Cotton Qrowing Association is quoted to have remarked
that the introduction of white planters into tropical countries
like Nyasaland, brought difficulties and complications which
did not arise when the industry was solely in the hands of 
(55)natives. And the Hammond Report of 1924, called for opening
up of opportunities for cash crop p r o d u c t i o n . ^ A s  such, after 
the 2nd World War, although support for European agriculture 
continued, there was a marked move on the part of the Government 
towards a policy of encouraging peasant cultivation of those 
export crops which did not compete for resources with European 
agriculture, such as cotton, tobacco and groundnuts - for by 
this time, European agriculture was mostly concentrated in tea 
production in the Shire Highlands.
(C) The Revolutionary Approach to Peasant Agricultural Development.
The underlying philosophy in this move to develop peasant 
agriculture .Was., thet; the ..African'waq a.bad agriculturalist. What 
was needed was to revolutionize his supposedly irrational 
agricultural system. Emphasis was therefore placed on good 
husbandry practices, such as soil, and fertility conservation (to 
counter the declining fertility brought about by the sudden 
change from a shifting to a more permanent system of cultivation), 
crop rotation, better spacing of crops, timely cultivation, etc. 
And,.as Kettlewell (1965) pointed out, the official policy was 
one of concentrating on the most progr essive individuals. The 
policy was rooted in the belief that the foundation of a prosper­
ous agricultural industry would eventually depend upon the
individual "Yeoman" farmer with a secure heritable title over ,
( 5 (’ )
sufficient land to enable him enjoy an improved level of living, 
thereby, neglecting the bulk of the peasant population.
(d) Labour Migration.
By far, the most serious threat to smallholder agricultural 
production appears to have come from labour shortage. The main 
consequence of the colonial policy of supporting settler ■ 
agriculture, was the emergence of a peasant labouring class, who 
given very, limited opportunities in cash crop production, v;as
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forced either to seek work on the settler estates, often at 
very low wages and unpleasant conditions, or to migrate and seek 
their fortunes in the mines of South Africa, Zambia or on settler 
farms in Zimbabwe. The available evidence tends to indicate 
that the majority of poeple preferred to take the latter 
alterative. The effect,of labour demands by the settlers ©n 
smallholder agriculture, have been considered above. It remains 
now to consider those of outward migration. The process of out­
ward migration from rural Malawi, of unskilled and semi-skilled 
labour which started at the beginning of the 20th Century, 
continued throughout the whole colonial period, well into the post* 
Independence era. This was despite various attempts to curb 
it at the beginning of the century. The effects of this process 
have been analysed from a number of stand points. Some analysts 
for example, have looked at it from the humanitarian point of 
view, which focuses on migrants* conditions at the places of 
employment. Others have taken a Marxist stand looking at the 
process o'f proletarianization of the migrants, also in the 
place of work. The only study whic^ focuses on the adverse 
effects of the process on the MalaWiàn society emphasizes the 
social c o n s e qu en c es .^ Da ta  limitations and imperfections 
have so far prevented any useful examinations of the effects of 
this outward migration on peasant agricultural production.
However, there is. reason to speculate that labour migration 
dealt a severe blow to peasant agricultural development prospects. 
The exodus' of able boc/ied males was appalling.
During the post-war years, the annual average level of 
migration was about 35,000 persons, v/hich rose to a yearly 
average of about 65,000 in the 1950 s. The upward trend only 
ceased in the mid 1970 s due to official policy. Table 2 ,.4 gives 
the magnitude of the proportion of the labour force which was 
outside the country at various times.
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Table 2.4 Malawians Abroad as Percentage of Estimated de-facto 
Population of Malawi - 1902-1972.
Y ear Percentage
1903 1.1
1911 2.5
1924 2.5
1938 6.8
1948 5.6
1958 6.2
1972 10.3
Source; Calculated from Boeder (1974), see Kydd and Christiansen 
(1982), _0£. cit. PS.
Given the labour intensive nature of peasant agriculture
(especially shifting agriculture which depended on a lot on the
initial clearing of the bushes by the male-folk), it cannot be
doubted that the absence of such a substantial proportion of the
labour force from the rural areas, did have a negative impact on
rural output. Although it is arguable that given the limited
opportunities for productive work in the rural areas, at the
time, earnings from migration did provide a positive contribution
( 59)to household income. Consequently, this may have helped to
' raise peasant agricultural productivity (by providing funds for 
agricultural inputs), evidence to support this view is not 
available. The evidence which one comes across is that most of 
the migrants spent their money on consumer durables such as 
radios , bicycles, blankets, clothes and the like, either in the 
countries of employment or immediately upon return to Malawi - 
most of them only to migrate again after a short spell at home.
The few v/ho invested their money usually went into the retail 
trade (opening groceries, canteens etc.) in local areael^*^^
Hardly any invested in agriculture.
Several reasons may be advanced for the failure of peasant 
agriculture to attract migrant remittances. Firstly, the peasants 
were prevented from growing those crops in which the European 
settlers had a stake, thereby limiting their agricultural 
opportunities. Secondly, marketing of peasant crops was controlled
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by the Government. Prices were therefore deliberately depressed, 
either for purposes of extracting a surplus for the administration 
and/or in line with the policy of forcing the peasants onto wage 
labour on the European e s t a t e s . T h i s  acted as a disincentive 
to many would-be cash-crop producers. Thirdly, most of the 
migrants were male. The dependents left behind (women and child­
ren) were more concerned with meeting basic subsistence food 
requirements in their agricultural operations, while using 
migrant remittances to meet their other requirements such as 
school fees, etc. Besides, the absence of the male member from 
the household meant that the women folk, faced with domestic 
chores and sometimes involved in forced labour on the estates 
(to pay the tax for their huts in the absence of their male r 
spouces), could not find adequate labour to engage in surplus 
agriculture production.^
(e) Summary.
Thus, in summary, it can be said that colonial agricultural 
policy in Malawi (as was the case in Kenya also up to the late 
1950s), was basically one of encouraging European farmers
by giving them access to the best lands (eg. the Shire Highlands) 
facilitating them with a steady supply of cheap labour, providing 
them with the best veterinary and agricultural services and 
protecting them from competition from African farmers. The 
. attempts at revolutionizing peasant agriculture, which were taken 
after the fallibility of European agriculture was exposed during 
the depression, did not v/ork. This was largely because the 
administration failed to realize that the advancement of African 
agriculture was not constrained by the bebavioural characteristics 
of the Africans, which it sought to revolutionize, but as 
Chanock pointed out, by the restrictions which the colonial 
structure had placed on the peasant population, such as restrict­
ions on cash crop production, unfavourable agricultural prices 
and inadequate marketing facilities mentioned above.
The coercive methods used to enforce the new agricultural methods 
(which were actually caused by the sudden imposition of permanent 
cultivation by the land alienation policies) proved more harmful 
than helpful to peasant production.
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The only option open to most people to improve their lot 
was to migrate. By the 1930s, the Government began to 
positively encourage outward migration. As Vail (1977) points 
out, it was decided that in lieu of agricultural produce, the 
country would export human beings. For example, the official 
restrictions on labour recruitment in Malawi for work outside, 
imposed in 1909, were lifted in 1934, when a Rhodesian firm was 
allowed to recruit in M a l a w i . A s  Tapela (1979) puts it, a 
quasi-Government machinery was established to channel the 
emigration in a way that would enhance the protectorate's 
r e v e n u e . F o r  example, WNLA (Witwatersrand Native Labour 
Association), the recruiting agent for the South African mines 
of Witwatersrand made an agreement with the Government that 
they would pay, en bloc for each recruit, a capitation fee of 
10'shillings (later raised to 15 shillings), and an annual tax 
of 6 shillings. In addition, 2/3 of the migrants earnings were 
deferred and sent to Malawi. These proved to be a valuable 
source of foreign exchange for the country, and in 
addition, such monies boosted local retail trade. Furthermore, 
the Protectorate.'s products of cotton goods, entered South 
Africa free of charge.
As a result,.the country eventually came to be looked 
upon by its neighbours as a labour rederve. This meant that 
there were very few activities in terms of industrial develop­
ment taking place in the country that would have stimulated 
agricultural production, and therefore induced the use of 
productivity raising invest>.pents in agriculture (to counter 
the loss of labour and declining soil fertility). It is there­
fore not surprising to find claims that colonialism created 
rural poverty in the country, by destroying self-sufficiency in 
peasant production through its policies of forcing the peasants 
onto the labour market, and inducing outward m i g r a t i o n . I t  
was in this state of affairs, that Malawi was reluctantly drag­
ged into the now defunct Federation of Rhodesia and Nyasaland 
in 1953.
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B. The Federal Period. 1953-1964»
I. Introduction.
In this section the main argument is that the Federation 
had a disruptive effect on whatever little progress had been 
achieved during the colonial period in the field of peasant 
agriculture. This was due to two main things:
(i) The coeicive approach used by the Federal regime to 
improve African agriculture.
(ii) The bias in federal agricultural policies tov/ards 
European agriculture.
The Federation of Rhodesia and Nyasaland (comprising of 
present day Malawi, Zambia and Zimbabwe), was established in 
1953. Although most of the underlying factors behind the move 
were political, it was largely economic arguments which were 
orchestrated by its proponents.
These issues will not be taken up here, suffice it to say 
that most of the arguments were superficial and were merely 
accepted at their face value at the time. It was only after 
the Federation was established that some serious analyses of 
the a^rgiyiients became available and exposed the weaknesses in­
herent in many of them. For example, the traditional common 
market argument, seems to have carried more weight at the time.
But as Hazelwood has pointed out, the creation of a wider 
market does not necessitate political unity. After all, all the 
countries concerned belonged to the Congo Basin Free trade area.^ 
And, such bodies as the EEC, EFTA, ECOWAS, etc, which are prima­
rily free trade areas, have been in operation for a considerable 
period, while the participating countries have maintained their 
political autonomy. It appears that the existence of good will 
and commitment on .the part of the participants is all that is 
required to make the arrangement work. More important, it is 
widely recognised that, although a free trade area, or a common 
market (or any similar arrangement), may be advantageous, to a 
whole region's industrial development, it does not imply that all 
the participants will necessarily benefit equally from the arrange­
ment. In actual fact, some of the participants can become worse 
off at least in a relative, if not in an absolute sense within
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the Union than outside it, due to such aspects as trade diver-.
sion, e t c . u n l e s s  special and appropriate compensatory
mechanisms are provided. But, as Hazelwood (1967) pointed out,
the Federal development strategy was biased towards Zimbabwe.
This was because territorial distribution of Federal funds was
based on the pattern of territorial distribution of the white
(71)population in the Federation. Zimbambwe, had in 1954, a
white populittion of about 158,000 (some 3% of its total 
population). In contrast, Zambia and Malawi, each with a total 
population of about million, had white populations of 53,000 
and 5,000, which represented 2% and 0.2% of their respective 
populations. As such, Zimbabwe got the lion's share of federal
funds 3  ■^ 2)
11. Consequences of Federal Agricultural Policies in Malawi.
The. entrance of Malawi into the federation did not improve 
matters for the peasant population in Malawi. If anything, the 
situation seems to have deteriorated.
For Malawian agriculture, the federal period was character­
ised by a number of aspects, viz:-
(i) The move to modernize-peasant agriculture.
(ii) Bias of agricultural research and extension towards 
settler agriculture.
(iii) Continuation of outward labour migration.
(a) Attempts to modernize peasant agriculture.
In the previous section, the attempts made by the colonial 
administration to improve African agriculture were considered, 
and how these backfired, leading to a subsequent deterioration 
on peasant agricultural production. During the Federal period, 
the need to improve peasant agriculture was also realised. The 
basic Federal agricultural policy was to increase crop product­
ion by use of good farming practices. This was to be achieved 
through more effective instruction and supervision of peasant 
cultivation - rather than by specific schemes - as was the 
previous case. Two main approaches were taken in this direction, 
namely, land reform and stepping up of extension efforts.
Land reform - Worried about declining soil fertility, due to 
excessive soil erosion (the result of rising population pressure
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on 1^ he land), the Federal Government initiated a land reform 
programme (which featured in the 1957-61 Plan). This re­
form took largely the form of land consolidation. The idea 
was to introduce sound land use methods at the village, or 
preferably larger unit, that is,.land use was to be reorganised 
by providing grazing, forest and arable,areas in the most 
appropriate enviroment. Ahable land had to be planned and 
conserved, and each individual within the planning unit would 
be allocated a holding of approximately the same hectarage as 
the total of the previous holding(s). It was anticipated that 
security of tenure would be granted on such holdings (as was the
{ 7 A ^
case in Kenya under the Swynnerton Plan). Assistance was also
to be provided to consolidated land holders. By I960, a number
(75)of villages were established under this scheme. In addition
to the land consolidation scheme, a land resettlement scheme was
initiated, whereby the Government acquired land from unused or
underdeveloped eeteito land and re-allocated it to rent paying
Africans on estates and to African Urban workers who could not
afford to live in urban areas.
Both schemes met with very little success. For one thing,
they involved a very small proportion of the peasant population.
Secondly, the resources available for the programme (barely 10%
of the planned expenditure) were not adequate to produce any
significant impact.
The main thrust of this development effort was on the highly
selective Master Farmers scheme. Farmers were chosen on the
basis of their willingness to adopt innovations and given
incentives of various types (including cash) to consolidate
their land into a unit of not less than 3.2 hectares (8 acres),
to conserve soil, rotate crops and adopt high standards of 
( 77)management. But as the table below indicates, the scheme
only covered a very tiny proportion of the smallholding 
community, and suffered the same fate as that suffered by the 
two schemes mentioned above.
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Table 2 Master Farmers 1934-1960
Year Number of farmers Hectarage
1954 53 .202
1955 129 851
1956 180 1219
1957 282 1410
1958 407 1910
1959 459 2023
I960 745 2546
Source; Nyasaland Report, 1934-1960, cited in Kettlewell, op cit.
Extension Services - In an attempt to foster good agricultural 
practices among the African farmers, three research projects 
were included in the 1957-61 Plan. These were for the purposes 
of investigating cash crop disease (eg. the Lower Shire River 
Farm Institute investigated cotton, diseases). In addition, 
steps were taken to «tren^then the extension services, by open­
ing up agricultural schools (eg Colby School of Agriculture in 
Lilongwe) to train Africans for the agricultural and veterinary 
branches of the civil service.
However, these, worthy efforts were undermined by the 
coercive approach taken by the Agricultural department to spread 
modern methods of agriculture. By concentrating efforts at 
changing the social institutions (land tenure) and enforcing 
new agricultural practices, rather than initiating gradual 
changes within the existing system, the Federal Government's 
attention, like that of its predecessor, missed the real economic 
issues that hampered African agriculture and therefore tended to 
introduce elements that made the situation worse. For example, 
in the face of the labour shortage in the peasant sector, already 
mentioned above, the new labour intensive practices made no 
economic sense. It is seen that apart from bunding, considerable 
routine effort was directed towards encouraging well made plant­
ing ridges, box ridging, stream bank protection, gully control 
and the protection of roads, garden paths and boundaries.
Although those measures may have brought long term advantages.
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in the short run, they caused a lot of hardships to many 
families, leaving them very little time to perform vital far­
ming processes (such as weeding) and to attend to household 
chores. The imposition of fines, prison sentences and other 
penalties for non-observance of these regulations destroyed any 
good intentions the extension staff might have had. The result 
was widespread peasant defiance to any agricultural regulations 
despite whatever merits these had. This could only lead to 
decline in agricultural output in the peasant sector.
It must be mentioned that the.over-emphasis on physical 
means of soil conservation, were much to the neglect of other 
alternatives, such as biological methods like crop rotation, 
use of compost and^ther manures, and so on. From an economic 
point of view, it appears that the costs associated with the 
labour demands arising from the strategy were far in excess of 
economic returns realised on the small farm, especially in the 
short run-period. The misunderstanding or neglect of farm 
labour requirements and economics of smallholder agriculture 
coupled with the.harshness with which it was enforced, meant 
that the revolutionary policy was seen, at a time of great 
political awarer^ess, as a manifestation of the oppressiveness 
of the Federal regime. It was bWtrefore greatly resented and 
opposed, despite any long term advantages it may have brought 
to the small farm community. Coulson (1981) observes similar 
peasant dislike for colonial agricultural policies, during a 
contemporary period, in Tanzania, where he records that some 
peasants went as far as planting cassava upside down as a 
passive resistance against the compulsory planting of cassava 
as an anti-famine measure. (78)
(b) Bias Toward Settler Agriculture.
Within the Federal arrangement, in Zambia and Zimbabwe,
non-African agriculture was under Federal jurisdiction, while
African agriculture, and all types of agriculture in Malawi,
were under territorial jurisdiction. This meant the non-
African farmers in Zambia and Zimbabwe were serviced by the
resource rich Federal Government, and therefore, enjoyed more
( 79)privileges than their counterparts in Malawi.
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Although, development of agriculture was given plenty of 
"Lip service" at the time, the available evidence suggests . 
that the situation was diffirent in practice. For example, 
in the 1957-61 Development Plan, the agricultural sector was 
allocated a mere 1% of the budgeted expenditure.^ ^  To make 
matters worse for the African farmer, the bulk of the funds 
allocated to agriculture went into provision of research 
services for improving production of crops grown exclusively 
by the European settlers, such as tea, coffee, tung, etc.
Very little research attention was given to African cash crops 
(except cotton mentioned above). Up to the
mid-sixties, use of fertilizer or improved seeds, was almost 
absent on the African farm. The result was that there was a 
wide gap between the technologies used in European agriculture 
and African agriculture,^ w i t h  the likely consequence that 
productivity (both land and labour) fell in the latter sector.
(c) Labour Migration.
As already indicated above, at the time when the Federation 
was being established, labour migration from Malawi was already 
substantial. During the Federation migration tended to
..increase. This was largely for two reasons. The first is that 
membership of Malawi in the Federation tended to depress the 
development of domestic industry as most of the industrial invest­
ments took place in Zimbabwe. This meant that there were limited
( 82 )employment opportunities at home, for the growing labour force. 
Secondly, the coercive approach to African agricultural develop­
ment adopted by the Federal Governement left the African population 
with very little incentives to take agricultural production serious­
ly. The result was that for the able bodied males, their best 
chance was to migrate. As Hazlewood (1967) pointed out, during 
the Federation there were as many Malawian -wag© workers abroad as 
there were working within the country - with about 75% of those 
migrants working in Zimbabwe, where they were exempt from the
( 83 )
restrictions on employment of migrant labour in the territory.
It therefore appears that due to the poor economic prospects 
at home, both in industry and agriculture, Malawian labour had no 
option but to migrate - thus the country .came to be continually 
regarded as a labour reserve by her Federal partners, as Humphrey
44
(1973) 'has remarked.^^ And this state of affairs did not 
improve the prospects of improving African agriculture.
C. POST-INDEPENDEWOE DEVELOPMENT STRATEGY
At Independence (1964), as Humphrey (1973), has pointed 
out, the new Government of Malawi was faced with a legacy from 
the colonial Government, that was largely characterised by its 
neglect of economic development, the economy being predominantly 
based on low productivity a g r i c u l t u r e . ^ T h e  foremost task of 
the new Government was therefore to embark on a programme of 
rapidly increasing agricultural productivity in order to;
(a) improve the welfare of the people, and
(b) to generate investible funds for overall economic 
development.
However, the main question was how to achieve this dual 
objective with a reasonable degree of balance.
1. The Dual Approach to Agricultural Development.
As has already been indicated.in the previous sections, 
Malawi's agricultural industry was characterised by an export 
oriented estate sector (European owned) heavily dependent on 
cheap labour for its survival; and a basically subsistence 
oriented and largely neglected smallholder sector.
Thus at Indepen,dence, it was recognis'ed that continuation of
development on the basis of the structure inherited v/ould, as
Chanock (1977) put it, have led to the expropriation of the
African peasantry by settler or company estates and the creation
of landless rural class forced by circumstances into colonial
towns e t c . ^ F o r  this reason, some of the politicians advocated
a populist approach to agricultural development, whereby the major
concern was to improve the performance of the average farmer (as
( 87 )opposed to the Master Farmers scheme advocated earlier). This
approach was ref .lected in the 1962-65 Development Plan, which 
although it was drawn during the Federal period, it embodied most 
of the elements contained in the Malawi Congress Party Manifesto 
of 1961.^ T h i s  plan, among other things, emphasized the need 
to stimulate production within agriculture and industry, with the 
requirement to provide income ' io> the masses, and so reduce in­
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equalities "in the distribution of income, wealth and economic 
p o w e r . I n  other words, the plan advocated total commitment 
to a rural development strategy based on mass participation, 
with a major expansion of the cooperative movement as a key 
element. However, evidence indicates that during the early years 
of Independence, there was hesitation about following this path, 
which as Chanock (1977), remarked, was regarded as a line of 
development by which no society had yet succeeded in enriching 
itself.( As such the strategy was never implemented as stated. 
This hesitation .ias apparent in the lack of a distinct commitment 
to a particular development path between*1964 and 1970.
Because of the predominant position of the agricultural 
sector in the economy, it was inevitable that if any growth was 
to take place in the economy, the impetus had to be provided by 
this sector. The immediate reaction was therefore to emphasize 
export production. Because of^^neglect and disarray suffered by 
the smallholder sector prior to Independence, the decision to 
boost export production, in effect, meant propping up the estate 
sector so that it could continue with its traditional role of 
export p r o d u c t i o n . ^ W i t h i n  the smallholder sector, the main 
concern was to gain the confidence of the peasant population, 
regarding the intensions of the agricultural department. This 
confidence had been badly damaged by the coercive and P^ i^iitA.ye 
measures employed by the Federal and colonial regimes in an 
attempt to inculcate modern farming practices in the peasantry.
The tendency was therefore to let this sector develop by itself 
aided by the provision of extension advice to those willing to 
accept it and improving the marketing and delivery systems.
The philosophy behind this approach was that, contrary to the 
previous strategy of coercing peasants to adopt better farming 
practices, they had to be taught by education and persuasion.^
Under this approach, the Governments role, as far as small­
holder agricultural development was concerned, was largely 
confined to the provision of an enviroment conducive to small­
holder agricultural production (through provision of infra­
structure and other facilities) and to let the spirit of individual 
self-determination play its role. It was envisaged that adoption 
of new husbandry methods would be rewarded by higher farm outputs
4,6
while non-adoption would show itself through poor results. The 
demonstration effect provided by the adopting farmers would 
eventually work itself through the whole economy and improve 
agricultural productivity.
It is very important to recognise the fact that direct 
Government intervention on smallholder agricultural production 
in the form of regulations etc, 3during the Federal and Colonial 
eras, had produced a traumatic effect on the peasants. This had 
been used by the politicians to gain massive rural support. Thus 
after Independence, any development strategy that would have 
meant the Government taking a strong interventionist role, such 
as the Villagisation Scheme introduced in Tanzania soon after 
Independence, or the establishment of state farms in Nkrumah's 
Ghana, was likely to arouse new suspicions among the rural people, 
and therefore may have proved, counter productive, as seems to have 
been the case with the two examples quoted a b o v e . T h i s  meant 
that the Government had to take a low profile (at least in the 
initial period), in the field of smallholder agricultural develop­
ment, with the extension services (which was trying to acquire a 
new image), taking the "take it" or "leavelit" approach. This 
fact appears to have been ignored by earlier, analysts (eg. 
Humphrey, 1973, Thomas, 1975), in their analysis of the reasons 
why Malawi opted for a smallholder agricultural development 
strategy that placed emphasis on individual betterment as opposed 
to say a co-operative or collective approach.
Thus while the need to improve the lot of the rural masses, 
in a situation where agricultural production provided the only 
means to earn a livelihood for the majority of the people, 
dictated the use of a populist approach to agricultural develop­
ment the need to generate investible savings cautioned against a 
wholesale transformation of the economy from its predominantly 
export oriented estate sector to a predominantly peasant one.
A balance was therefore arrived at by following a dual 
approach, whereby the estate sector would spearhead the country's 
economic development, through export expansion, while the" small­
holder sector would ensure the country's self-sufficiency in 
basic foodstuffs. While it is recognised that a proper under­
standing of how the Malawian agricultural strategy has performed
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over the years, requires an analysis of both the estate and 
smallholder subsectors, this study, with its emphasis on rural 
development', concentrates mostly on the smallholder sector. It 
is hoped that this will in no way dilute the importance of the 
findings emerging from the study, especially as they relate to 
rural development through smallholder agriculture.
11, Smallholder Development Strategy.
From what has been stated above, it^can-^be said that 
agricultural development in Malawi is viewed in terms of provid­
ing investible finances for overall economic development 
(through export expansion) and raising the general level of living 
of the rural masses by increasing rural output of both food and 
cash crops. This imposes a "double bind" on agriculture, which 
has resulted in the dual approach mentioned above which is said 
to emphasize jthe achievement of a sustained rise in productivity 
per unit of land, and to provide a growth climate for both small­
holder and estate production.
In the field of smallholder agricultural development, three 
main approaches to improving smallholder productivity have been 
tried. Two of them were attempted simultaneously as a "twin 
strategy", between mid 1960s and mid 1970s, viz:-
Ci) The Integrated Programme Approach, and
(ii) the more General Approach.
Since mid 1970s, the "twin strategy" has been replaced by
the;-
(iii)National Rural Development Programme (NRDP).
(a) The Integrated Rural Development Package (IRDP).
Its main objective was to provide focal growth points in the 
form of high productivity projects, such as land development; 
and irrigation projects and settlement schemes. The approach was 
mostly capital and management intensive, and largely externally 
finaced, aimed at raising marketable produce (both food and non 
food), among the smallholding community in selected high potential 
agricultural areas where integrated rural development projects 
were established., ^he major features of these projects were: ^
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(i) Provision of infrastructure, (roads, markets, water and 
health facilities, etc).
(ii) Provision of land improvement and conservation measures,
(iii) Irrigation development
(iv) Improved extension and other facilities 
(v) Provision of credit facilities.
Pour projects were established under this approach,, ie:
(1) The Lilongwe Land Development Programme (LLDP).
(2) The Shire Valley Agricultural Development Project (SVADP)»
(3) The Karonga-Chitipa Rural Development Project (KRDP), and 
3 (4) The Lakeshore Rural Development Project (LRDP).
In addition, several settlement schemes were established to 
supplement the large scale projects, but dealing with specific 
crops, eg;
(1) The Kasungu Flue-cured Tobacco Authority,
(2) The Smallholder Tea Authority.
(3) The Smallholder Sugar Authority.
(4) The Smallholder Coffee Authority.^
The major Projects formed the main thrust of this approach. 
Between them they were meant to cater for about 20% of the 
Malawian smallholder population (at full development). By 1973/74 
they were accounting for about 57% of the funds committed to 
agriculture, as table 2 indicates.
Table 2.A Government Agricultural Expenditure.
(K millions)
1964 1967 1970-71 1973-74
Total
Large
Agricultural Development 
projects
0.51
Nil
2.24
0.70
5.61
2.76
8.24 
4.66
Source: Malawi Government Development Estimates. Cited in 
Thomas (1975), op cit, P38.
(b) The More General Approach.
This approach was applied in those areas not covered by the 
major Projects or Crop Authorities and Settlement Schemes. It
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relied on gradual improvements in extension, land husbandry and
farm training,, supported by minor rural development projects to
improve smallholder productivity, such as ox-training (for draft
power), dairy and poultry improvements and tea development, plus
(97)agro-support facilities and marketing,
(c) The National Rural Development Programme (HRDP)
Results tend to indicate that the "twin strategy" represented
by the two approaches outlined above, did not prove particularly
successful in raising smallholder output. For example, little
growth seems to have taken place in smallholder output since the
late 1960s. The little evidence available, coming from the major
projects, tends to suggest that the approach of concentrating
resources on a limited number of people and geographical places
is neither cost effective not egalitarian. The more general
approach also proved ineffective in dealing with the whole rural
population (outside projects) and degenerated into a spotty and
selective programme that was limited to a few progressive elements
(98)
in the rural society.
By 1976, it was recognised that the strategy could not be 
relied upon to have a significant impact on the productivity of 
the majority of the Malawian smallholding community. Oj.^t of this 
realization was born the concept of the National Rural Development 
Programme (NRDP).(
The idea behind NRDP is to stimulate rural development in a 
manner that will produce balanced development between rural and 
urban areas, while also generating growth in all geographical 
areas throughout the country. It is stated that the programme 
intends to achieve as rapid an increase as possible in local 
production along existing cropping lines, by utilization of mini­
mal inputs. At the same time, the programme aims at a gradual 
transformation of the farming system from its traditional pattern 
to one with a larger proportion of the farmer's resources being 
devoted to production of cash crops. The emphasis of this programme 
is on producing a fairly immediate impact on smallholder production, 
ie, improving production efficiency on small farms through provision 
of inputs and better services to smallholders. As such the develop­
ment period for ©ach of NRDP projects is said to be 5 years (after
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which each project is expected to become self-financing) as 
opposed to the earlier projects under IRDP, that had, on 
average 10-11 years of development. The whole programme is 
supposed to cover the whole of rural Malawi within a 20 year 
period.(^
The development process is said to be in two phases. The 
first phase involves an intensive campaign by the extension 
services, both on an individual and group basis. During this 
phase, farmers are advised to follow recommended practices of 
cultivation. At the same time, an attempt is to be made to 
encourage the farmers to form local clubs (at village level) 
and action committees through which they are supposed to concert 
their response to information reaching them from the extension 
and other development agents. The main idea here being to 
promote a spirit of togetherness and self-help among the rural 
population and involve them in the decision making process 
concerning local affairs.
The next phase involves the provision of credit facilities 
for necessary inputs to interested farmers (provided they belong 
to recognised farmers' clubs)., Prom this point, subsequent 
efforts will be taken to help the adopting farmers to become 
predominantly cash croppers.
NRDP is said to mark a significant shift in rural develop­
ment philosophy in Malawi. The previous strategy laid emphhsis 
on the use of improved seeds and other output raising inputs. 
Credit was used as the main weapon (both within and outside the 
projects) for encouraging the use of husbandry practices 
recommended by the extension personnel. However, as pointed 
out above, the strategy did not produce broadly based improve­
ments in smallholder prductivity; which is the prime objective 
of rural development strategy. If this objective is to be 
attained under NRDP, then it must be ensured that those elements 
which prevented its attainment in the previous strategy do not 
recur in the present one.
I II - Smallholder Productivity Since Independence-
Analyses of the economic performance of Malawi since 
Independence indicate that the economy did extremely well in 
terms of overall growth (Humphrey, 1973: Thomas, 1975; Ghai and
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Radwan, 1980; and Achanya, 1981). The main source of this
growth is said to he rapid expansion of crop production for
export especially in the estate sector. However, all these
studies (except Acharya) have expressed concern over the
pattern of income distribution which has resulted from the
growth. Thomas (1975) and Ghai and Radwan (1980), have noted
the poor performance of the smallholder sector, resulting
mainly from the policy bias in favour of large scale
agriculture and progressive elements ("Achikumbi" - a recent
equivalent of Master Farmers) among the rural community. A
more recent study (Kydd and Christiansen, 1982), has expressed
pessimism over the future performance of the smallholder sector
under the current agricultural development strategy which is
essentially biased towards the estate sector, especially in its
(101)
allocation of land and financial resources.
From those studies, it is apparent that the dual strategy 
of agricultural development, which necessitated the encouragement 
of both estate and smallholder development has not been success­
ful in achieving a balanced course in that estate development, 
has been viewed more favourably. This is supported by Ghai and 
Radwan*s observation that the estate sector doubled its share of 
total agricultural' output and increased its share of monetary 
output from just over 25% to 37% over 1 9 6 4 - 7 8 ,  ^ However, 
the above studies (apart from that by Ghai and Radwan) do not 
give an indication of what the results of the smallholder 
agricultural development strategy have been within the small­
holding community. No attempt has been made to evaluate the 
constraints to higher productivity faced by the smallholders. 
While the previous studies provide valuable information on the 
imbalance between tho estate and smallholder sectors, there is 
need for more information about the state of affairs in the 
smallholder sector, to enable formulation of more appropriate 
smallholder agricultural development strategy. This study 
therefore, intends to provide a step towards filling that gap, 
by examining adoption behaviour in the Lilongwe Land Develop­
ment Programme, and how the programme has affected rural . .  
welfare.
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CHAPTER III
MALAWI'S RURAL DEVELOPMENT STRATEGY
1• The Concept of Rural Development
A, The Case for Rural Development
Rural development as a specific strategy of development 
has found general acceptance in the developing world. This
seems to be for two main reasons :-
(a) The apparent failure of the industrialisation or
it
"modernization strategy t'o spread the benefits of
development to the majority of the population in
( 1 )the.developing countries.
(b) The need to raise resources for overall development
(especially industrial development) in these 
countries where the rural sector predominates in 
the economy.(^)
It has been claimed that the pursuit of the "industrializa­
tion" strategy in the developing countries over the past two 
decades or so (1950-1970), has been characterised by:^
(a) A slow rate of transfer of people out of low pro­
ductivity agriculture and related activities into 
more rewarding activities.
(b) A vast majority of people in the rural areas 
experiencing poverty.
(c) Existence of underutilized resources in rural areas 
which could be used to improve rural welfare.
Because of the observation that a vast majority of the
poor people in the developing world(especially Asia and Africa)
live in rural areas, there has been an increasing demand for an
approach to development planning in the third world which
emphasizes the improvement of the standard of living of rural
people. Thus rural development has become a strategy designed
to improve the economic and social life of a specific group of
"th
(5)
people, e rural pcor"^^^ Its aims are said to be, among other
things:-
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(a) To create the long term economic social and political 
viability of rural communities whose existence is 
based on a principle of self reliance.
(b) To expand opportunities for productive v/ork in rural
areas, ie. diversification of the rural economy.
(c) Continued up grading and improvement of the natural
environment of rural communities,
(d) Providing for the satisfaction of locally determined
needs.
(e) Achieving balanced rural-urban development.
It has been suggested that since rural development is intended
to reduce poverty, it must be clearly designed to increase
production and increase productivityBecause agriculture
is the predominant activity among rural populations, in most
developing countries, agricultural development has become a
(7)"sine qua non" of rural development, although such aspects 
as health, education, improved nutrition, etc., are recognised 
as being not only necessary for improving physical well being 
and quality of life of rural people, but also as indirectly 
enhancing the productivity of rural people and improving their 
ability^ to contribute to the national economy,
From the above, it could be said that the concept of 
rural development attempts to integrate growth and welfare 
economics concepts for the purposes of the development of the 
third world whose development problems and circumstances are 
viewed to be different from those which the present day 
developed countries faced at the time they were embarking on 
the development path.^
B, Critique of the Rural Development Strategy,
The strategy of rural development is not without criticism. 
Although its exponents ( the World Bank in particular) have 
stressed the above reasons for its pursuit, the critics have 
not entirely accepted all of them as genuine.
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(a) External Intervention."
Heyer et al (1981), for example,argue that rural develop­
ment tends to imply "planned change by public agencies based 
outside the rural areas", who represent development of the 
rural sector as an impossibility without their intervention. ^
They also allege that rural development agencies tend to regard 
themselves as developing or emancipating the rural poor whorn 
they accuse of being obstacles to their own development, or 
unable to grasp the benefits of development until exposed to 
persuasion that it is indeed in their interest. Due to this 
interventionist tendency, it is argued that the idea that rural 
people can in fact initiate rural development is not considered, 
nor are the efforts of the rural poor to do so always welcomed. 
Such conceptions, according to the critics , are not justifiable 
as they in fact contradict historical evidence, and are only 
used to mask the real motive behind the need for this 
external intervention. According to this group of critics, 
the intervention is necessary to fulfil the need for govern­
ments and international companies, etc, to control the conditions
under which peasants sell and produce their crops, in an attempt
(11)to replace peasant production by capitalist production.
(b) Incompatibility Between Means and Objectives.
It is argued that, with some exceptions, it has always been 
observed that the strategy of rural development does not achieve 
its objectives. This failure to achieve objectives has been 
largely attributed to incompatibility, first between the object­
ives themselves , and secondly between the objectives and the
(12)means used to promote rural development.
(c) Assumption that Improved Peasant Production for the Market 
will Improve Peasant Welfare.
It is further argued that in the rural development strategy 
is implied the assumption that increasing peasant production for 
the market will:(1
(i) Improve the welfare of the rural people.
(ii) Increase their contribution to the national economy 
(supposedly restricted by isolation), and hence aid 
the task of national development.
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The critics point out that such an assumption implies that
(14)
poverty is the consequence of isolation, which is not valid.
They cite evidence of persistent or Increasing rural poverty in
some circumstances despite substantial increases in productivity
(15)and production for the market# It is therefore argued that
in fact, enhancing the contribution of the rural poor to the 
national economy becomes the means by which rural development is 
to be achieved, ie. :
"Thus those involved in rural development are concerned 
to increase agricultural production to supply urban and 
international markets* They are concerned to earn foreign 
exchange and to extract revenue to finance public and pri­
vate consumption and investments. This is not necessarily 
compatible with the interests of rural producers."(16)
According to this line of argument, there is a form of collusion
between national Governments and international agencies who
finance rural development, against the rural poor. As such,
the rural poor may not necessarily be the beneficiaries of
(17)rural development. In other words, rural development
becomes a means through which peasants are made to finance 
industrial development to serve the needs of the domestic elite 
as well as those of the capitalist world,
(d) Other Criticisms.
Other people view the rural development drive as a deliberate 
,attempt by the "Western" or "industrialized" world to pre-occupy 
the developing nations with agricultural production in order to 
fend off competition for their manufactured products.^^
By far the most serious criticism of rural development (in 
this author.'s view), is the implied assumption that once an area 
has been designated as a rural development area, and a rural 
development project put under way, then all the inhabitants 
of that particular area will benefit from the rural development 
effort,^Aut as Stewart(1975)t rightly points out, the "net 
discounted rates of return", which are meant to measure the bene­
fits of the development effort to the whole community, ignore 
the fact that the costs and benefits do not necessarily refer to 
the same people. Poor peasants are not usually among the benefi­
ciaries, ^ ^^^his is the theme picked up by this study in analysing 
rural development in Malawi*
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Despite these strong criticisms of the rural development strategy,
this study takes the view that a rural development strategy, if
properly planned, implemented and monitored, can go a long way
towards meeting the development needs of the rural poor. A
review of the rural development literature indicates that while
the basic objective of the strategy is to promote increased
agricultural productivity among the rural poor, what has happened
is that resources (such as modern inputs, farm credit,etc,),
have been channeled towards the relatively better off, leaving
(21)the poor unaffected, or in some cases, worse off. To say
that because the rural development strategy has not always 
benefitted the rural poor as anticipated, then it must be a 
bad strategy and should be abandoned, is certainly an overe- 
action akin to throwing away the dirty water together with the 
baby. What is needed is to ask the question similar to the one 
posed by Dele(1975)# ie., if the aim of promoting peasant agricul­
tural productivity is to alleviate rural poverty, then how can
the development effort be extended to the low income subsistence 
(2 2 )population.
It is today generally agreed that for agricultural develop-
(23)
ment to stimulate overall development, it must be broadly based.
This means that it should^hot'1)e used to ensure only that agricul­
ture fulfils its traditional functions in the development process 
(provision Of food and raw materials for industrial expansion, 
provision of labour and capital to industry-and provision of 
a market for industrial g o o d s ) , a l t h o u g h  these functions 
are still important. In addition, agriculture should provide a 
vehicle through which the majority of the rural population can 
participate in the, development process. Kotter ( 1974 ), has 
argued that the main problem of rural poverty is that the 
majority of the rural poor do not participate in the development 
process, whether passively as. recipients of goods and cervices
or ,actively as producers;, la particular,. they do not participate
(25)
in the decision.making,process. Chinn(1979), seems to echo 
Kotter*s argument when he points out that a common diagnosis of 
rural poverty appears to be that agricultural productivity is 
low on the small farms- because of the limited access to inputs
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by these small farmers. The main reason for this is said to 
be that farm households find it impossible to generate sufficient 
surplus funds over and above consumption needs to purchase
/ pg )
productivity raising inputs.
What emerges from the above analyses is that most of the 
rural development efforts fail to enlist the participation of 
the rural poor. Such a finding suggests that if the participation 
of the rural poor in the development efforts is to be enhanced, 
their purchasing power mu:^ t be raised so as to facilitate their 
access to productive resources and essential services. This is 
the issue to which this study will address itself in analysing 
the rural development effort in LLDP.
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2. Smallholder Agriculture and Rural Development in Malawi 
' ' A. The Rural Development Policy Outlined
At the attainment of Independence in 1964* or to be more 
exact, at the attainment of internal self-government in 1962, the 
foremost task of the Malawi Government was to launch a Development 
Plan (the 1962-65 Development Plan), which for all practical 
purposes, was committed to rapid agricultural development, with 
the aims of:
(a) improving rural welfare.
(b) generating investible funds for overall economic develop­
ment .
In the previous chapter, a brief outline of the strategies 
adopted to pursue these objectives, was presented. In this chapter, 
a detailed examination of the current smallholder agricultural 
development strategy (which forms the basis of Malawi's rural 
development strategy) will be attempted. Particular emphasis will 
be placed on examining the impact of the smallholder agricultural 
development strategy on the elimination of rural poverty. How­
ever, before doing this, it will be usefull to examine the aims 
and objectives of both rural development and smallholder 
agricultural development in Malawi. For it is only after these 
two issues have been clearly understood (from the Malawian point 
of view) that a proper appreciation of the Malawian strategy of 
development can be made.
I. Aims and n h o f  Rural Development in Malawi.
In Malawi, like in most of the developing world, rural 
development occupies a prominent position in the national develop­
ment plans. But, although every Development Plan for Malawi since 
the 1962-65 Plan, has stressed the priority of and need for rural 
development, it is only in 1978 that the aims and objectives of 
the country's rural development strategy were spelled out.
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According to the National Rural Development Programme; 
Policies. Strategy and General Features (1978), rural 
development is said to be:
. "....the primary social and economic objective of 
Government. Beyond the aim of raising agricultural 
productivity, it is also conceived as an effective 
vehicle for Government's objective of redistributing 
incomes in favour of the rural poor", (28)
Thus rural development is considered to have both growth 
and redistribution objectives. However, from the stated 
objectives of NRDP, which represents the current rural develop­
ment strategy, this conceptualization does not appear to come 
through. The main objectives of NRDP, are said to be;
(1) " To increase the general level of the Malawian smallholder 
production, in particular to increase the production of 
cash crops for export and to feed the growing urban popula­
tion.
(2) To provide inputs and services necessary to allow small­
holder production increases, with particular emphasis on 
productivity per unit area.
(3) To preserve natural resources........." ^
The striking feature about the objectives of NRDP is that, 
although it is stated that the redistribution of income in 
favour of "the rural poor" is part and parcel of the overall 
objective of rural development (which NRDP is meant to serve), 
it does not feature in the specific objectives of NRDP. At the 
same time, no definition of the rural poor is provided, nor is 
an outline of how NRDP intends to carry out the redistrik>uW(Ve 
function given. This omission of the definition of the target 
group and the absence of a clearly defined strategy for achieving 
an egalitarian income distribution in the rural sector can be 
interpreted in two ways. In the first place, it can be interpreted 
to mean that overall low productivity in the rural areas is taken 
to be synonymous with rural poverty in the Malawian context, and 
that raising overall agricultural productivity is an aspect of 
■ primary concern while the distributional aspect occupies a sub­
sidiary position. This view is supported by a number of official 
statements eg:
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"The vast majority of Malawi's population depends for its 
livelihood on peasant farming. Out of an economically 
active population of aproximately 1.5 million, less than
150,000 are in paid employment in Malawi and about 250,000 
are working in neighbouring countries. This leaves over 
one million workers and their dependents - whose only 
income is derived from small scale agriculture. It is in 
this sector that the national development,qffort is being, 
and must continue to be, concentrated.” (30)
In addition, it is stated that:
"A statement of more detailed objectives must therefore be 
concerned primarily with increasing agricultural product­
ivity. " (31)
These statements imply that in the situation under review, 
the whole smallholder sector was the target of the development 
effort, and that raising overall smallholder productivity was 
seen as the main way to combat rural poverty. Considering the 
state of affairs in the•smallholder sector at the time the above 
statements were made (1971), there can be very little disagree­
ment with this view. At the time, the whole smallholding 
community was an impoverished mass (as the historical review 
has suggested), and therefore the objective of raising overall 
smallholder productivity was foremost in the rural development 
strategy.
The World Bank (1975a) defines the "rural poor" as the 
group which
( 32 )
"includes small scale farmers, tenants and the landless".
In Malawi, it is seen that due to the abolition of Thangata 
in 1962, and the prevalence of the costomary land tenure system 
(covering about 80% of arable land), there was hardly any land­
lessness in the rural sector during the early years after 
Independence. At the same time, there was no tenancy arrange­
ment which could be said to have been causally linked with rural 
poverty. Thus it seems quite plausible to suggest that in Malawi, 
at the time, the "rural ^oor," were exclusively small scale farmers
(even agricultural workers were heavily dependent on their family 
plots, for most of their livelihood ). Hence the whole smallholding 
community, which up to the time was hardly undifferentiated (apart
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from a few elements who were the rèmnants of the colonial Master
Farmers' Scheme), was'the target group of the rural development
effort. This tallies with the populist approach to agricultural
(33)development emphasized in the 1962-67 Development Plan.
Secondly, the above omissions could be interpreted, as implied 
by critics of the Malawian development strategy, as a clear mani­
festation of the lack of intention, on the part of the development 
planners to initiate broad based development. The country is 
alleged to have deliberately promoted an "elitist" approach to
agricultural development, which emphasizes the provision of
(34)resources to a few selected individuals. This view is advocated
mostly with regard to the pattern of development that has emerged 
in the country.
However, this author is of the opinion that the situation 
warrants a more careful analysis. The fact that a particular 
pattern of development has emerged does not necessarily mean that 
it was willed right from the beginning. It could be due to a 
number of reasons. For example, initiating broad based develop­
ment, among the then undifferentiated rural sector within a 
growth context may have been the genuine aim of the Government. 
However, studies of the "green revolution" have indicated that
innovation adoption, by its very nature spreads differentially
(35)•among the rural people. This is largely due to the fact that,
although the rural sector may seem to be economically undifferent­
iated, there are bound to be interhousehold differences in such 
aspects as say labour availability, soil fertility, proximity to 
commodity and input markets etc. These differences imply that 
some households will have an advantage in innovation adoption over 
others. And, if the programme which fosters the innovation 
adoption is not properly monitored ©r implemented, rural different­
iation is likely to occurras it is alleged to have done in the 
situation under review. Thus the end result of a policy need not
be due to the policy itself, it could be the result of implement­
ation or monitoring f a i l u r e s . I n  Chapter VI we shall attempt,
with the help of a number of models, to indicate how interhousehold 
differences in labour availability could have affected the adoption
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behaviour of various household categories, and hence their income 
and welfare positions.
B. NRDP and its Iwiollcations for Rural Poverty Elimination
I. NRDP and IRDP Compared.
Although it is stated in the policy statement that NRDP is
less capital intensive than the IRDP which preceded it, in terns
of total development costs, the available data does not bear this 
(37)out. Afi table 3.1 indicates , the costs per farm family, per
year, for the four earlier (IRDP) projects - excluding LLDP Phase
iv, range from K22 to K30 (1978 prices), assuming that all
families within the project areas participate. The corresponding 
figures for NRDP - phase I projects fall within the range. K17-59 
(also 1978 prices), here again, assuming that everybody partici­
pates. However, in reality the participation rate in the IRDP 
projects was very far from 100%. The appraisal estimates of 
participating households ranged from 11.6% of households in 
KRDP to 38.5% in iRDP, giving annual development costs per 
participating family that ranged from K67 in SVADP to K219 
in KRDP.
Thus unless NRDP achieves a much higher participation rate 
(say in excess of 50% of households in the project area), the 
development costs per participating farm family may not be signi­
ficantly lower than those for the IRDP projects- as is indicated 
in tables 3.1 and 3.2. This means that NRDP * s success will very 
much depend on the extent to which it will embrace the farm 
population. This iîi turn , will depend on the system of input 
distribution and the type of agricultural activities being 
supported. The importance of these two aspects on the extent 
of farmer participation will be illustrated in chapter VI wi.ih 
the experience of LLDP.
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Table 3.1 The Four Major Integrated Rural Development Projects
Name Total No. of 
costs Years 
at Dev­
elopment 
(K.Mn.)
Estimated 
No. of 
Farm
Families
Cost/Farm 
Family 
Per Year
(K. )
Estimated 
No. of 
Adopters
Estimated 
Cost per 
Adopter
(K.)
LLDP.
(I-III) 23.3 10 103,600 22.2 31,000 
(30%)
74.1
SVADP 106.4 14 72,700 26.1 28,000
(38.5%)
67.3
IRDP 22.9 14 54,645 30.0 21,000 
(38.4%)
77.9
KRDP 12.6 12 41,350 25.4 4,800
(11.6%)
218,7
Source: NRDP. Working Pauer No. 38. P.2
Table 3.2 NRDP Projects (Phase 1)
Name No. of Years Estimated Cost/Farm Estimated costs 
Total Cost Family per per Adopting 
at Develops Year Family
With 40% With 60% 
Adoption Adoption
(K.Mn) (K.) (K.) (K.)
LLDP.-IV 5 8.4 104.4 260.0 175.5
Htcheu
Thiwi-
Lifidzi
5
5
3.5
2.9
17.0
17.0
42.5
43.1
28.3
28.8
Mzimba 5 2.9 37.3 93.3 62.2
Henga 5 3.2 59.0 147.6 98.4
Ntchisi 5 3.7 36.9 92.4 6l. 6
Phalombe 5 6.0 27.0 67.6 45.0
Mwanza 5 3.1 48.0 120.8 80.5
Kawinga 5 .... . 28.2 70.4 46.9
Source: NRDP, Working Papers No. 38, Table 3*
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II. A Critical Review of Rural Development Strategy in Malawi.
NRDP is said to mark a significant shift in rural develop­
ment philosophy in Malawi, as pointed out earlier. Up to 1976, 
the main emphasis was on the integrated projects approach, whose 
main aim was to stimulate rapid production increases of part e- 
cular crops (eg cotton in SVADP, maize, groundnuts and tobacco 
in LLDP, and rice in KRDP), to meet the national objectives of 
food self-sufficiency and expansion of export production.
Emphasis was laid on the use of improved seeds and other out­
put raising inputs. Credit was used as the main weapon for 
enforcing recommended husbandry practices among the small­
holding community in.the project areas. Outside the project areas 
.the extension services were relied upon to disseminate infor­
mation on improved crop and animal husbandry practices.
However, due to insufficiency of extension personnel, and
' ■ c
the emphasis on rapid productivity increases, there was a 
tendency for the extension services to be concentrated on the 
more progressive elements of the rural population the aim being 
to bring about a demonstration effect. However, as already 
• indicated above, the available evidence tends to suggest that 
. smallholder production during this period was rather disappoint­
ing both on a national and project basis. For example, between 
1964 and 1978, smallholder production (at constant prices) is 
said to have grown at about 3*9% per annum, against a population 
growth rate of about 3%, thus giving a per capita growth rate in
( 39)
smallholder output of 1.0%. This compares with an annual
rate of growth of about 11.1% achieved in the estate sector, 
during the same p e r i o d . ^ O n e  important aspect is that the 
said growth in agricultural output (in both sectors) was more 
a result of hectarage expansion than rising labour and/or land 
productivities. This meant that hfe^population'Continued to 
grow, more and more marginal land was being brought into 
cultivation - therefore resulting in declining productivities.
This meant that there was limited scope for smallholder output 
growth being higher than population growth without a wide­
spread adoption of innovations in the smallholder sector.
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It was therefore necessary to broaden the base of smallholder 
development beyond that covered by the few projects and the 
selective general approach, to that envisaged by the scope 
of NRDP.
Although NRDP represents a new approach to smallholder 
agricultural development in Malawi, in terms of say, extent 
of geographical coverage and the intensity of activities, the 
overall agricultural strategy remains intact, that is, to 
increase the production of cash crops for export and meet 
growing urban food d e m a n d . T h i s  implies that small­
holder agricultural development in Malawi is strongly linked 
to the industrialisation strategy, with the further implication 
that rural welfare aspects occupy a secondary position. This 
.is reflected in other national policies that have a strong 
bearing on NRDP's success such as:
(1) The export promotion policy - to.boost foreign 
exchange earnings, and
(2) Farm output pricing policy.
All these have wider implications on rural welfare. The 
success of NRDP to improve rural welfare will very much depend 
on how well reconciled these other policies are to those of 
• NRDP.
C. The Impact of Other National Policies on NRDP.
1. Export Promotion Strategy: Its Implications on Smallholder 
Agricultural Development.
Table 3.4 indicate that between 1964 and 1977, Malawi's 
agricultural experts rose from K22.9 million to K178.6 million 
(at current market prices). However, it is seen that the small­
holders* share of agricultural exports declined from 53*4% of 
total exports in 1964 to 34.3% in 1977, and there was a corresp­
onding rise in the estate sector. This reflects, more than any­
thing else, the rapid expansion of the estate sector. .While it 
could be argued that at Independence the country had ample idle 
resources of both land and labour, and that the expansion of 
the estate sector had little or no effect on smallholder
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agricultural production, now more than 10 years later,a stage 
might have been reached (or is about to be reached ) whereby 
the two sectors compete for the same resources of land and 
labour, and to some extent, financial capital. For example, 
estate production of Burley and Flue-cured tobacco (under the 
visiting tenant system) has expanded considerably in the Centràl 
Region (including LLDP) and this is the traditional smallholder 
tobacco growing area. Such an expansion given the rising pressure 
on the land , is likely to have led to smallholder producers 
being pushed onto more marginal land, where productivity is low.
At the same time the technological gap between the two sectors 
brought about by colonial policy of favouring settler farmers 
and the current emphasis on increasing productivity per unit 
of land, has meant that the estate sector has had a lion's share 
of the available resources thus perpe>-tuating the gap in 
productivities between the two sectors. Unless the NRDP strategy 
does contain some elements of positive discrimination in resource 
allocation towards the smallholder sector , so as to redress the 
traditional technological bias, an export promotion strategy 
per se , which merely let’s the two sedtors operate side by 
side, may actually 'undermine the smallholder agricultural deve­
lopment strategy with the estate sector "crowding out" the 
smallholder sector from export production.^
It seems that the present bias in the field of export 
crop production in favour of the estate sector, apart from being 
a hangover from colonial legacy, has no economic justification, 
especially when we consider the type of crops involved. Tea, 
tobacco and sugar-cane, the main estate crops and leading 
exports of the country have all been seen to be produced 
successfully by smallholders in other countries. Kenya,which
shared the same colonial legacy as Malawi, has managed to res­
tructure a good deal of the export crop production from the 
estate sector to the smallholder sector, and is today hailed 
as one of the success stories of smallholder agricultural 
development in Africa. ^After all , evidence from Malawi,
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indicates that Burley tobacco,one of the country's leading
(45 )
export crops, was a smallholder crop from 1948 to 1952.
This implies that smallholder expertise for its production 
already exists, but it is only hindered by lack ^ of financial 
resources.
Table 3.3 Agricultural Exports 1964 - 1977^^^
( K. Million , Current Market Prices )
Sector / Year
1964 1970 1973 1974 1975 1976 1977
Smallholder 12.2 17.9 27.6 32.0 31.0 46.4 61.2
Estate 9.8 19.7 35.5 50.8 65.4 86 • 8 107.6
other Exports 0.9 3.1 5.7 6.7 7.6 8.9 9.8
22.9 40.6 68.8 85.5 104.0 141.0 178.6
(a) From 1978, the sectoral composition of the agricultural
exports is not available.
Source: Economic Reports, 1974-1977, EPD.
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11. Pricing and Marketing Policy and Smallholder Production
(a) The Role of Agricultural Marketing and Pricing Policy in the 
Development Process: The General Case.
Agricultural pricing and marketing policies, occupy a very 
prominent position in the development strategy of any developing 
country. This is for two main reasons*-
(i) The marketing system is the channel through which
agricultural surpluses are mobilised, largely for general 
economic development.
(ii) The price system determines the terms of trade, which are 
the means through which inter-sectoral transfers of 
resources take place.
These two aspects influence agricultural marketing and pricing 
policies in LDCs. In the first place, because agriculture 
occupies a prominent position in the economies of most LDCs, it 
is looked upon as the main source of growth. Experience from 
Western Europe has indicated that industrialization has provided 
the path towards rapid economic growth. This has led many 
developing countries to pursue policies which are aimed at ex­
tracting resources from the agricultural sector to finance 
industrial development, such as the use of extractive price 
policies (ie. very low producer prices as compared to world 
prices, high export taxes etc), so as to extract finances for 
investment in industry. In addition, the need for rapid 
industrial expansion has led to an emphasis on export crop 
production (to get the foreign exchange required for industrial 
development). This has led to the need to keep food prices 
low, both as a means to direct resources toward export crop 
production, as well as to ease' the pressure on the industrial 
wage bill,
On the other hand, because the npjoi’ity of the rural 
population in developing countries depend on agricultural 
production (either as own producers or as agricultural workers), 
and agricultural prices are subject to wide fluctuations, it is 
thought that stabilizing farm prices is one of the ways which 
could contribute to stable agricultural incomes.
(4 7)
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All these aspects have led to the widespread practice, in 
the developing world, of controlling the marketing of small­
holder crops, usually through the use of para-statal organisa­
tions. However, experience from the developing world tends to 
indicate that this control is mostly undertaken for surplus
4- 4-. (48)extraction.
There is a wide body of opinion which expresses the view 
that the significance of agriculture's contribution to the 
industrilization process in the industrialized world has been 
over-emphasized. Other factors such as access to growing 
markets (domestic and foreign), wealth from the colonial 
empire (in the case of Britain and Japan), etc, played a major 
role in the industrialization process of these c o u n t r i e s .  ^ 4  9 )
It is argued that present day developing countries lack these 
factors. In fact, the pursuit of an extractive price policy, 
may not succeed in initiating industrial expansion. Because 
of the proportion of the population dependent on agricultural ■ 
Incomes, depressing farm prices may reduce agriculture's 
contribution to industry by reducing the purchasing power of 
the farm population, thereby, retarding industrial expansion.^ 
In addition, it may also deter peasants from producing market­
able surpluses. This is where agricultural price policy becomes 
a very important component of the development strategy. While it 
is true that a number of the so called Newly Industrialized 
Countries (NICs) have achieved export led growth, it is equally
true that their internal markets also exf'îmded rapidly as a
C 51)result of improvements in rural incomes.
(b) Agricultural Marketing and Pricing of Smallholder Crops in 
Malawi.
As a general rule, marketing of agricultural produce in 
■Malawi is in two distinct categories, ie. estate crops and 
sraallhclder crops. Estate crops are marketed directly by the 
producers either to consumers (mostly industrial users) or at the 
auction floors. The marketing of smallholder crops, on the 
other hand, is largely the responsibility of the Agricultural 
Development and Marketing Corporation (ADMARC), which exercises 
control over the trade in commercial crops, and has a regulating 
function in the trade of food crops. That is, ADMARC has 
purchasing monopoly of smallholder export crops, such as tobacco
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cofton, coffee, rice etc., while it also buys surpluses of food 
crops, either directly (through bush and permanent markets) or 
indirectly through licensed traders. However, only a very small 
proportion (10 - 40%) of the food crops (maize, pulses etc) 
produced on the smallholder farms are , purchased by ADMARC, 
the bulk being disposed of through such channels as:
(!) barter 
(ii) unlicensed traders
(iii) local and district council markets 
(iv) Urban centre markets
(v) border trade (illegal).
This means that the marketing of non-export produce is more 
or less under free market conditions (with ADMARC acting as a 
floor price sett^ar) while the marketing of export produce is 
under the control of ADMARC.
Table 3.4 Ouantitv of Smallholder Agricultural Production and its
Destination in 1969.
Crops Destination of Net Production
Net Ov/n Total Sales
Production consumption Of which
( '000 S.Tons) at farm ('000 % of Exported
('000 S.tons) Satorf)N©t Prod. (s.tons)
Maize 1166 1002 3-64 14 52
pulses 141 113 28 20 18
Groundnuts 133 86 47 35 38
Cotton Seed 21 1 20 95 13
Paddy 19 8 11 58 —
Tobacco^ 15 - 15 100 16(b)
Notes: (a) includes estate tobacco
(b) includes previous year.'s stock.
Source: Table 8.3, Malawi Statistical Yearbook, 1972
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(i) Marketing of Smallholder Produce Through. ADtlARC.
The control of smallholder export crop marketing in Malawi 
dates hack to colonial times. During the early years of small­
holder participation in export production (see chapter 2), 
which was largely restricted to production of some varieties of 
tobacco, and cotton, the African producers could only sell their 
produce to the European settler farmers, who in turn, either 
re-sold it at the auction floors or exported it directly to the
(53)outside world. This was resented by the Africans.
In 1926, the Tobacco Marketing Board was set up, followed 
by the Cotton Marketing Board and Produce Marketing Board.
These were established for two main purposes:
(a)''"to encourage the production of better quality crops 
and to introduce marketing schemes with strict gre.ding 
of products purchased, inorder to ensure uniform 
standards of goods offered for sale;
'(b) to organise an export market for graded primary products 
which would bring in revenue for the country."
These Boards established rural markets in the export crop 
producing areas. It is pointed out that up to 1956, the policy 
of these Boards was to pay such producer prices which were 
considered to give the producer a "reasonable" return and no 
more. This policy, is said to have inhibited improvements in 
crop husbandry since it was realised by the farmer that moft of 
the profits of good farming were taken up by the Boards.
In 1956, the three Boards were amalgamated to form the 
Agricultural Production and Marketing Board (A.P.M.B.), which 
was later renamed the Farmers Marketing Board (PLffi) and given 
statutory powers, including monopoly rights for the marketing 
of smallholders' export crops. Among its price policies, 
featured aspects of guaranteed minimum prices and price 
stabilization (with the help of a reserve fund, from which price 
support was paid to farmers in bad years). After 1967, the 
Board was instructed to operate on a commercial basis. By 
operating on a "farmer prices plus marketing costs below sale 
price" basis, the Board was able to generate funds for other 
development efforts and subsidies on improved farmiinputs. In 
1971, the Agricultural Development and Marketing Corporation
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(ADKARC) came into being, taking over the responsibilities of 
PMB,
As already indicated above, ADMARC, has a purchasing 
monopoly of smallholder export crops, and buys surpluses of non­
export crops. In addition, it acts as a pace setter in the 
pricing of smallholder produce, while at the same time it has 
control over the issue of traders licences. As such ADMARC 
pricing policies have a very strong bearing on smallholder farm 
production. In addition ADMARC influences smallholder product­
ion through its function of distributing inputs to the small­
holders. ADMARCs buying and selling prices are controlled 
being set annually in consultation with the Governanent.^ ^ 6^  
ADMARC proposes the guaranteed minimum prices for each small­
holder crop, and these are announced by the Ministry of 
Agriculture, once agreement has been reached, at the beginning 
of the year. The prices are uniform throughout the country.
The traders are offered a higher price at the main depots than 
paid to farmers at the bush p.i\d permanent markets, to allow 
them a reasonable profit margin after meeting transport expenses,
In its formation of price policy, ADMARC seems to have 
inherited the extractive strategy pursued by its predecessors. 
This can be well illustrated by examining the aims and object­
ives of the price policy. The stated aims and objectives of 
ADMARC s price policy are said to be:-
(i) To ensure a "reasonable return" to the farmer.
(ii) To enable ADMARC to earn a surplus to support national 
development programmes.
A closer examination of these aims and objectives reveal a 
number of interesting aspects. In the first place, the first 
objective is an inoperative concept as it stands, in that it 
does not provide any basis on which a "reasonable return" to 
the farmer is calculated. All that is said is that ADDiARC aims 
at a gradual increase in farm prices over the years.
Whether it is real or nominal prices that are at issue, is not 
specified. The strategy is justified as a means to stabilize 
farm prices on a long term basis, with the view to stabilizing 
farm incomes. However, it appears that although the strategy 
may have succeeded in shielding farmers from fluctuations and
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Y-
(57)
uncertainties on the world commodity markets, its main effect 
has been a gradual fall in farmers real prices of most export crops 
As Tolley (1982), has pointed out, price stabilization alone, 
at the farm level, does not necessarily stabilize farm incomes, 
other factors such as price of inputs, cost of manufactured 
items, etc, also have an impact on the level of farm income.
For example, since 1973, ADMARC has withdrawn input subsidies 
from the smallholders. Table 3*5 below, indicates that the real 
price of maize paid by ADMARC to producers, has been more of 
less static between 1971 and 1978, while that for tobacco actually 
fell below its 1970 level between 1971 and 1974, and began to 
rise gradually in 1975. It was only in 1978 when it rose above 
its 1970 level.
Table 3.5 ADMARC Producer Price Indices For Maize and Tobacco 
1970 - 1978.
Year Maize Tobacco
Nominal
(Tambala/kg)
Real Nominal
(Tambala/kg)
Real
1970 100.0 100.0 100.0 ( 100.0
1971 142.5 131.6 133.0 122.8
1972 142.5 126.9 111.3 99.3
1973 142.5 120.7 102.3 87.1
1974 199.5 146.6 103.3 77.3
1975 199.5 126.9 127.2 80.7
1976 256.5 155.4 145.3 88.6
1977 256.5 150.0 164.8 96.4
1978 256.5 133.0 206.0 111.1
Notes: The Real prices are calculated by deflating the prices 
by the Low Income Consumer Price Index for Blantyre, 
which although not particularly appropriate, is used in 
the absence of any other better indicator of the cost of 
living of the rural households.
Sources: Malawi Statistical Yearbook, 1979, PP69 {Table 8,11)
and 137 (Table 16.3); and NRDP, Policies, Strategy and 
General Features, Annex 12, Table 2.12.
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The observation that the strategy of price stabilization 
has been accompanied by a decline in the peal prices of the 
smallholder questions the genuine concern of the strategy to 
farmers* wellbeing. This points to the overriding importance 
of the second objective, ie, that of accumulating investment 
funds, which is reflected in ADMARC*s annual trading accounts 
as indicated in the table below.
Table 3.6 ADMARC Crop Trading Accounts - Net Profit ^^^as a
%  of Farmers Receipts
Crop 1972 1973 1974 1975 1976 1977
Cotton 333 38 74 92 16 64
Tobacco 139 76 71 146 243 270
Groundnuts 54 48 48 24 24 106
Rice (15) (10) 9 36 (82) (46)
Maize (5) (3) 75 8 (49) (45)
Total Trading 62 38 57 65 49 98
Notes: (a) The bracketed figures represent losses.
Source: NRDP, Phase I. Selected working papers, 1978, Vol.l 
Table 1, P23* Adapted from ADMARC Reports.
Table 3-6 indicates that ADMARC has allowed itself a very
all
high profit margin on almost^he smallholder crops, while 
' occasionally making losses on the major food crops, mostly 
through subsidizing urban consumers. This overemphasis on the 
extractive function by ADMARC reflects the fact that it views 
itself as essentially fulfilling a developmental function, ie 
to use its price policy as an instrument for speeding up the 
process of development in the economy. Consequently, most of 
the surplus extracted from the smallholder sector has been 
invested in development activities such as providing loans for 
the development of estates by Malawian entrepreneurs (especially 
flue cured and burley tobacco), introduction of new crops like 
cashew and macadamia nuts on estates, managing small scale 
projects for evaluating the feasibility of other crops such as 
citrus, pyrethrum, etc., and mantaining a reserve supposedly 
for price s u p p o r t , a n d  investment in industrial activities.
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While it could be argued that the development function is 
worthwhile for the whole country, it should be pointed out that 
the high level of surplus extraction may have some adverse 
effects on the development process. In the first place, it 
could be counter . productive in that it could act as a dis­
incentive to higher smallholder production, thereby, reducing
( 59)the volume of smallholder exports. As already indicated
in the previous section, the share of smallholder exports 
declined from 53% of total exports in 1964 to 34% in 1977 (see 
Table 3.3). Although such a decline is partly explained by 
the rapid expansion of the estate sector, it nevertheless 
represents an underlying slowing down of the growth in small­
holder export production,
(ii) Smallholder Response to Price Incentives in Malawi.
The role of price policy in influencing smallholder 
agricultural production is largely an unresolved issue tin Malawi, 
The main issue at hand is to find out the exact nature of the 
relationship between agricultural prices and smallholder 
agricultural production. A number of studies have been under­
taken with the aim to establish whether smallholders in Malawi 
respond strongly to price changes. If this is proven to be the 
case, then prices provide a powerful policy instrument for 
influencing agricultural production in accordance with national 
priorities. On the other hand, should the response be found to 
be weak, this will imply that more emphasis should be placed on 
other factors that affect smallholder productivity, such as 
farmer education through extension services, and other incentive 
schemes such as input subsidization, etc.^^^^
Four main attempts at getting empirical evidence on the 
response of Malawian smallholders to price changes will be 
briefly reviewed here. The general appoach of these studies 
has been to examine crop production over a period and try to ; 
explain production variations by means of factors such as tech­
nological change, levels of experience with the crop, etc.
Dean (1965) focused his investigation on tobacco sales between 
1926 and 1960,^^^^ He found four main explanatory factors of 
variation in production (estimated by tobacco sales), namely;
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(i) The previous year’s tobacco prices (real).
(ii) A weighted index of the overseas wage rate in the 
previous year.
(iii) An index of the consumer prices in the previous year,
(iv) the weather.
He estimated a price elasticity of supply of 0.48.
Minford and Ohs (1968), examined the response of small­
holder total output to real price changes between 1949 and 
1968. They too found all the four variables identified by 
by Dean, plus an unofficial export variable (for border trade), 
as strongly related to the value of crop -sales. Their estimates 
of price elasticity of supply were around O.6O. The fact that 
total price elasticity of supply is positive signifies that 
during the period under review, the smallholder sector had 
ample idle resources of say land and surplus labour that a 
properly balanced price policy could achieve rises in output 
of almost all smallholder crops, as there was apparently no 
strong competition among the various crops for the available 
resources.
Coleman and Gatbertt(l973), dealt with the cotton supply 
response in the Lower Shire, between 1955/56 and 1970 ^
Producer price, deflated by the consumer price index and lagged 
by one year, and rainfall, were found to be strong determinants 
of supply (also as represented by sales figures), and a very 
high price elasticity of supply of 2.36 was obtained. In 
addition, the study also indicated that smallholders were more 
interested in maximising net revenue per labour unit rather 
than per unit of land, suggesting that labour was a more critical 
constraint in the circumstances, than land.
Gordon (1971), focused his study on investigating the supply 
response of groundnuts, by looking at the changes in acreage 
planted with the crop in response to changes in real producer 
prices, also lagged by one year.^^^^ His estimate indicated 
that the price responsiveness of the supply of groundnuts was as 
high as 2.3-
All the above studies indicate high price elasticities 
of supply in the Malawian smallholder agricultural sector. One
. )
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limitation of the above studies is that they all used crop 
sales to ADMARC (except that by Gordon which used changes in 
area planted to groundnuts) as a proxy for the supply of the 
marketed output of the crop concerned. As indicated earlier, 
ADMARC purchases represent a small proportion of the marketed 
output of smallholder crops, especially those which happen to 
be both food crops and cash crops. Thus although they may 
give a close indication of total marketed output of the export 
crops, for which ADMARC has a purchasing monopoly, eg cotton, 
tobacco and say, sunflower seeds, they may not do so for the 
other crops. More important., the rigidity of ADMARC producer 
prices (see table 3*5) does not allow for a proper examination 
of smallholder response to price changes.
These few positive results of smallholder response to
producer prices, coupled with ample evidence from other
countries which has indicated that smallholders do respond
(65 )
positively to price incentives , are indicative of a number
things. First they indicate that price policy does indeed have 
a role to play in influencing smallholder agricultural product­
ion decisions. For example, a relaxation of the extractive 
price policy pursued by ADMARC with regard to export crops, 
would likely lead to higher output of export crops by small­
holders than is the case at present. This would lead to higher 
'rural liquidity and thus provide a market for industrial goods, 
thereby aiding the industrialization programme. Secondly, the 
aim of the smallholder agricultural development effort is to 
encourage farmers to adopt more profitable, high yielding crop 
enterprises, however, many smallholders have fixed amounts of 
resources .(land, labour, capital) etc,, at least in the .short 
run. .This implies that the new’.crops and old crops Represent 
competing ■ demands on these resources.. And, if indeed the 
Malawian smallholders respond positively to price changes, then 
variations in relative prices will play a very important role 
deciding how farmers allocate their resources between the 
various crops. This is an area in which price policy could be 
particularly useful in achieving a desired product mix.
Tolly et al (1982), give the example of Korea as a country
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which has achieved self-sefficiency in rice partly due to
Government price policy (ie. provision of price support to paddy
rice g r o w e r s ) I n  a way, it can be said that price policy in
Malawi has contributed towards the apparent self-sufficiency
in foodstuffs* As already pointed out, smallholder export crop
marketing is under the monopoly of ADMARC price policy. On the
other hand, the bulk of smallholder non-export crops, which are
largely food crops, such as maize, pulses, etc., are disposed of
( 67 )
on what may be termed a "free market". A survey in 1977, 
indicated that private traders offered prices which were on average 
40%, 30% and 60% above those offered by ADMARC for rice, maize and 
mix»d beans, respectively (see table3*7), thus partly accounting 
for the low share of ADfiîARC purchases of these crops. At the same 
time , table 3.6 has indicated that between 1972 and 1977, ADMARC 
extracted relatively lower surpluses from food crops than from 
export crops. This implies that considering actual prices, the 
barter terms of trade between food crops and cash crops turned in 
favour of food crop producers. As a result, more people tended to 
allocate more of their resources to the production of food crops 
than export crops, with the consequence that the production of 
such cash crops as cotton and groundnuts declined, while that of 
food crops such as maize and rice rose, thereby making the country 
more or less self-sufficient in food crops. This aspect is well 
supported by the evidence in LLDP which indicates that up to 1977/78, 
the hectarage under maize continued to rise in the project area, in 
contrast to say, that of groundnuts (the crop which was considered 
to be the main cash crop - unlike tobacco which w^a.s under quota 
controls) which declined over the same period.^^^^This point will be 
examined in more detail in chapters iv and v. But the above 
evidence clearly indicates that the price policy pursued with 
regard to smallholder export crops is at variance with the export 
promotion objective of IJRDP.
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Table 3.7 Compari'son of ADMARC Buying Prices With Mean Local 
Market Prices - 1977*
Crop Mean Local 
Market price 
(Tambala/kg)
(a)
ADMARC
buying price 
(Tambala/kg)
(b) (b/a) %
Rice Paddy 12.8 :7.’7 60
Shelled
groundnuts 47.7 15.4 32
unishelled
groundnuts 22.4 9.9 21
Beans 26.6 11.0 41
Pigeon
peas 11.9 6.6 56
Cow peas 16.9 5.5 32
Maize 7.0 5.1 70
Notes: These mean prices may not highlight the whole magnitude of 
the discrepancy between the ADMARC and local market 
prices as they are more likely to represent the prices 
obtainable during the ADMARC crop purchasing period 
(say June to October), and not a weighted average for 
the whole year.
Source: NRDP, Selected Working Papers, Vol. 1 1978, Table 13,
P 24.
Finally it should be emphasized that price policy has a 
vital role to play in encouraging the adoption of particular 
innovations. It is not enough to provide the smallholders 
with improved seeds, teach them good crop and animal husbandry 
methods and provide them with farm credit, without ensuring 
that the smallholders are actually going to derive financial 
benefits from the innovations.
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111. The Impact of the Incomes Policy on Smallholder 
Agricultural Production.
According to Ghai and Radwan (ILO, 1981), the incomes policy 
pursued in Malawi has three major objectives;
(a) To control rural - urban migration through reducing the 
incomes gap between peasant and urban unskilled workers.
(b) To promote wage employment, particularly in the 
agricultural sector.
(c) To maintain economic stability.
In order to achieve the first two objectives, the strategy 
has been to firmly control the statutory minimum wage rate, 
while the achievement of the third objective has necessitated 
a relaxation of control on higher wage incomes, and profits or 
dividends.
Table 3.8, indicates that between 1968 and 1972, the 
statutory minimum daily wage rate (in money terms) was constant; 
just to be increased by a mere 5% in 1973, and remained constant 
at that level up to 1978.(70) However, in real terms, the
minimum wage rate shows a decline of about 54% between 1968 and
(7l )
1978. It is mostly in the estate sector where most of this
decline in the real wage rate has been felt, because of the 
majority of the workers are employed on a seasonal basis and are 
therefore usually paid the minimum wage, unlike in the non- 
agricultural sector where employment tends to be more permanent 
and basic wages tend to rise with length of service.
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Table 3.8 Statutory Minimum Dally Wage Rate For Blantyre-Llmbe, 
as at 1st January. 1968 - 1978.
Year Nominal
Tambala/
Day Index
Real
Tambala/
Day Index
Price of 
maize Index
1968 38 100.0 38.0 100.0 100.0
1969 38 100.0 37.6 99.0 98.7
1970 38 100.0 34.2 90.0 137.2
1971 38 100.0 31.7 83.4 144.5
1972 38 100.0 30.6 80.5 158.5
1973 40 105.3 30.5 80.2 155.4
1974 40 105.3 26.7 70.2 171.3
1975 40 105.3 23.0 60.5 261.6
1976 40 105.3 22.1 58.2 282.3
1977 ' '40 105.3 21.2 55.8 251.8
1978 40 105.3 19.5 51.3 NA
Notes:
la)
(6)
The real daily wage rate has been calculated by deflating 
the nominal wage rate by the low income consumer price 
Index for Blantyre (shifted from 1970 to 1968).
Adapted from Ghai and Radwan (ILO. 1981), Table 5, F 14-
Source;'Malawi'Btatlstioal'Yearbook. 1979.PP 58 and 137
The conseqencès of this low wages policy have been mixed. 
In fhej first place, it has led to the encouragement of the use 
of labour intensive production techniques, both in agriculture 
(estate sector) and industry. This has led to the relatively 
fast rate of employment growth in the country already referred 
to in chapter 11. Secondly, it has contributed to keeping 
rural-urban migration at a moderate rate. According to World 
Bank (1981^ estimates, urban population grew by 6,6% and 6.8% 
between I960 and 1980, respectively. Most of the internal
migration in the countiy has been of the rural - rural type, 
rather a rural - urban type, as people have tended to move from 
those areas with little agricultural potential, say the Lower
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Shire, to those areas where a lot of estate development has 
been taking place, such as the Central Region.
On the other hand, the low wages policy has had an effect 
on ADMARC*B price policy. That is inorder to maintain the low 
wages, ADMARC has resorted to keeping food prices down, as 
table 3.5 indicates. And it could be argued that this low 
food prices policy had a bearing on the price ADMARC offered 
for export crops, as a relatively higher export prices would 
have had the. effect of reducing the production of food crops 
as farmers would tend to allocate most of their resources 
towards the more profitable export crops, thereby causing food 
prices to rise and thus putting pressure on the wage rate. In 
this case the low wages policy, had a negative impact on both 
smallholder export crop production and surplus food product­
ion, More important, the low wages policy was formulated with 
a view to encouraging the expansion of wage employment, as 
already indicated. Inorder for this to take place, the return 
to labour1 in wage employment had to be higher than that in 
smallholder production (otherwise the estates would not be able 
to attract labour), and this necessitated a lov/ farm prices 
policy. This particular point is ve;ry important for it explains 
the paradox observed in the Malawi economy (see Ghai and Radwan, 
110, 1981 ), whereby between 1968 and 1978, employment in
the estate sector continued to rise despite the apparent fall in 
the real wage rate. The explanation for this is that real in­
comes in the smallholder sector must have been more badly affected 
by the low farm prices policy. In actual fact the returns to 
labour in smallholder agriculture (using official ADMARC producer 
prices) were very close to those in the estate sector. For 
example, in 1978, the statutory minimum wage rate was 40 tambala 
per any, which if we assume -an 8 hour working day, works out to 
be 5 tambala per hour. This compares to returns to labour of
between 4 and '7>^obtaihable from smallholder crops, as indicated 
( 72 )
in table 6.10. Given the high risk associated with smallholder
agriculture as compared with estate employment, households with 
surplus labour over and above subsistence food production require­
ments, or facing acute problems with smallholder agricultural 
production( eg. lacking adequate land and/or labour), would opt 
for estate employment instead of trying to produce marketable
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surpluses. This tends to indicate that the prices and income 
policies in Malawi are closely linked up with the general 
objective of expanding estate production of export crops, thus 
accounting for the fast expansion in paid employment in the 
agricultural sector referred to above, to the detriment of 
smallholder production. It therefore appears that although 
efforts to encourage smallholder agricultural production are 
not lacking there are internal inconsistencies in the overall 
strategy, which tends to inhibit smallholder agricultural 
development.
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CHAPTER IV
SMALLHOLDER AGRICULTURAL DEVELOPMENT IN THE LILONGY/E LAND 
DEVELOPMENT PROGRAMME (LLDP).
This chapter addresses itself to two main issues.
(i) An investigation of the factors associated with raising 
small scale agricultural productivity in LLDP.
(ii) An examination of the impact of the smallholder agricultu­
ral development effort on rural welfare in the project 
area.
The analysis will begin with an examination of the aims and
objectives of LLDP, to find out how they compare with the generally 
proclaimed aims and objectives of rural development. This will be 
followed by an examination of the strategy that was employed in 
LLDP in an attempt to achieve the stated objectives, and how the 
strategy relates to the socio-economic conditions obtaining in the 
area.
1. BACKGROUND ON LLDP.
The Lilongwe Land Development Programme (LLDP), was launched 
in 1968/69, by the Malawi Government, with the help of the World 
Bank (at an estimated cost of K24.4* million). It was originally 
a three phase 13 year development programme. In 1979/80, it 
entered its 4th phase, in the 1st phase of the newly launched 
National Rural Development Programme.
As Kinsey (1974) has pointed out, LLDP typifies one of the 
World Bank's two principal strategies for integrated small­
holder development programmes, namely, that of focusing on a broad 
concept of development including a wide range of activities to 
support production for both subsistence and for the market.
(I) Aims and Objectives of LLDP
Although LLDP is classified as an integrated Riiral Develop­
ment Programme (IRDP), it was essentially a crop productivity 
project whose principal aim was to raise yields of maize, ground­
nuts and tobacco, (the principal crops in the area) on a large
(2)
enough scale to produce an impact on the National economy.
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Among the benefits which were originally expected to accrue from 
the project, were the following:
(i) An.incrèaae in-net family income (among the participating 
farm families) of about K52.0 million per year.
(ii) Production of an exportable surplus valued at K4.6 
million per year.
(iii) An increase in Government revenues from taxes and other 
; charges (e.g. interest on loans for inputs).
(iv) Establishment of a stable pattern of agriculture, comme­
rcially oriented, with built in incentives to greater 
production and investment by the farmers.
(v) Formation of a corps of particularly experienced agricu­
ltural development officers, some of whom could be avail­
able for the subsequent planning and execution of similar 
projects elsewhere in the country.
(vi) Realisation of an internal rate of return (IRR) to the 
national economy of about 16% over a 20 year period.
(vii) TransfoiTKtation of the 'attitudes of the farmers.
Over the years most of these objectives have been modified 
and revised, and the programme has evolved towards a more widely 
based integrated approach to rural transformation, although the 
emphasis on productivity still persists.
II. Natural Characteristics.
The project area surrounds the city of Lilongwe (Malav/i's 
capital) - except on the North Eastwhere'the Lilongwe North East 
Agricultural Development Project is in progress. It lies at an 
altitude of between 1,100 and 1,230 metres above sea level. It 
consists mostly of gently undulating plains with slopes seldom 
exceeding 2 to 3%. The annual rainfall ranges between 64O to 1090 
millimetres (falling between October and February), while its 
temperature is within the 15°C to 23°C range. Its soils, generally 
red clay to sandy loam are moderately rich and well suited to the 
growing of maize, tobacco and groundnuts.^^^ At the commencement 
of phase iv (1979/80), the total area covered by LLDP was
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approximately 485,000 hectares (about 5% of total land area of 
Malawi), of which some 348,000 hectares were available for small­
holder agriculture. Of the balance, some 65,000 hectares were 
devoted to the Dzalanyama ranch (an integral part of LLDP, 
intended to boost smallholder livestock production). By mid 1977 
it was estimated that a total of 103,600 farm families v/ith mean
household size of 4.8 persons , were within the project boundaries
( 5)(about 3% of the Malawian smallholder population).,
111. Development Strategy in LLDP.
Maize, groundnuts and tobacco (fire-cured), are the main 
peasant crops in the area. While maize (the local varieties), is 
predominantly, grown for food purposes, groundnuts and tobacco are 
the main cash crops. As already pointed out, the initial object­
ive of LLDP was to raise output of the main crops in the area.
The strategy to be employed with regard to each crop was as 
follows:
(i) Maize - to raise yields per hectare^ through intensive 
use of fertilizers, new and improved seeds (mainly hy­
brid varieties) and modern crop husbandry methods - 
while reducing hectaràge planted to maize.
(ii) Groundnuts - also raising output per hectare, through
use of improved seed varieties and modern farming methods 
as well as expanding hectarage,,
The experience of LLDP indicates that the strategy did not 
work out .exactly as intended. For example, the proportion of
maize hectarage did not decline as anticipated. This appears to
have been for two main reasons:
(i) The uptake of improved maize varieties did not reach
appraisal projections partly due to seed shortages and
partly as a result of the inappropriateness of the
improved maize varieties (especially the hybrids) for 
subsistence purposes.
(ii) The rapid growth of the city of Lilongwe - necessitated 
a higher growth in maize production (the staple food)' 
than could be sustained by the new technology being
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introduced - and the natural way to meet this rising 
demand for maize was through hectarage expansion.
This meant that a substantial number of farmers were increas­
ingly growing the local maize varieties (with lower yields) and 
therefore, not releasing land as anticipated.
On the other hand, groundnut yields and hectarages were 
declining, contrary to expectations. For example, the land 
cultivated with groundnuts fell from 21% (of total cultivated 
area) in 1969/70 t o '16,5%-in 1978/79. -The.reasons for this 
decline hâvè been'-lârgèly^attributed to"such factors as low farm 
prices, managerial.-.practices ..labour ' availability problems/and 
many others.p We shall-take .up'these ;issues in chapter 5*
Parallel to the developments in maize and groundnuts product­
ion, was the rising role of the tobacco enterprise. Between 
1969/70 and 1978/79, the proportion of land planted to tobacco . 
in LLDP more than doubled, increasing from 7.3% of total cultiva­
ted to 15.9%. Such developments in the land use pattern must 
have had a profound influence on the income distribution pattern 
that emerged in the area. However, lack of appropriate time- 
series household survey data prevents a more detailed analysis 
of the development model in LLDP. The present picture (from the 
survey results reported in chapter 5) indicates that those house­
holds who grew either tobacco and/or improved maize, have higher 
farm and total incomes than those that did not.
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and Tobacco in LLDP - 1969 to 1979
Year Crop (percentage)
Maize (all varieties) Groundnuts Tobacco
1969/70 63.6 20.8 7.3
1970/71 64.6 22.2 .6.6
1971/72 62.6 21.5 9.8
1972/73 69.6 21.7 9.0
1973/74 65.7 18.4 10.7
1974/75 60.0 24.4 12.0
1975/76 57.0 24.4 12.7
1976/77 63.1 21.6 11.0
1977/78 64.0 15.3 16.0
1978/79 64.0 16.5 15.9
Source; (i) Up to 1975/76, LLDP; Some Pacts and Figures, Lilongwe 
1977, P6.
(ii) From 1976/77, LLDP: Phase 111 Completion Report, P 20 
Table 5.1
IV. Innovation adoption Behaviour.
As pointed out above, the m-ain concern of this chapter is
to investigate the factors which were'associated with the adoption 
of particular innovations in the area. The main hypothesis being 
investigated is that labour availability could have been a crude] 
factor that affected the pattern of adoption of innovations in 
the area, implying that interhousehold differences in labour 
availability (family and/or hired), had profoundly affected the pattern 
of income distribution, through its influence on the land use 
pattern. More important, in this chapter, we raise the issue 
that, the innovation "packages" through v^hich higher farm output 
and incomes were expected to come from (such as adoption of 
modern crop husbandry methods, which include use of improved 
seed varieties, proper application of fertilizers end other in­
puts, etc), were of a labour intensive nature. Especially, as
the success of these innovation "packages" depended very much on 
timeliness of operations, in a rain fed agriculture, this meant
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that only those households which were able to provide the required 
labour at the appropriate time, either because they had large 
family labour forces, or could be able to hire labour were able 
to take on the innovations. But the issue will be discussed in 
detail in chapters 5 and 6.
2. Production Conditions in LLDP.
Level of Capital Stock and Availability of Capital Finance*
For well over 90% of the small scale farmers in LLDP, hoes,
axes and pangas are the only instruments used in farming
operations. In a survey conducted by the Evaluation Section of
LLDP, in the 1977/78 season, it was revealed that only 2.1% of
the households interviewed had ridgers, less than 1,5% had
cultivators and about the same proportion had ploughs. Only the
ox-cart (for farm transport) was relatively more popular with
about 8% of the sampled population owning o n e . T h i s  indicates
that the level of capital stock (in the form of farm implements)
( 12)available in the area is very low.
It is rather paradoxical that in^area with apparent labour 
shortages, the level of adoption of labour saving 
farm implements should be so low. How can this apparent paradox 
be explained?
1. Lumpiness of Mechanical Implements.
It is often argued that the size of the farm limits the use
(1 3)of mechanical implements. For example, the World Bank ( 1981'- b)
quotas GemmiR's study in Malawi which revealed that adopters of 
ox-cultivation cropped larger areas and significantly, larger 
farms.^^  Similar findings are reported for Gambia, by Weil
( 15 )(1970), However, experience has indicated that this problem
is not insurmountable. Again, the World Bank (1981 b), cites 
evidence from Green (1973), which indicates that in Thailand, 
smaller farms overcame an initial lag in use of tractors by 
using hired tractor s e r v i c e s , ^ T h e  present author observed 
that in Bimbi area (a rice growing area, along lake Chilv/a, in 
Southern Malawi) that this process of hiring out extra plough­
time by the wealthier farmers, to the smaller farmers, was going 
on with great success among rice growers, such that hand prépara-
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tion of the ground is almost a thing of the past for a majority 
of the farmers. This indicates that lumpiness of mechanical 
implements per se, need not account for a low level of adoption 
of mechanical implements by small farmers, as there is always 
scope for hiring out extra-time. Nevertheless, where timeliness 
of operations is crucial, such as in the weeding process, hiring 
in and out, of extra mechanical implement time has its limitations 
in reducing labour bottlenecks,
11. Lack of Financial Capital
Shortage of financial capital in the Malawian small scale
sector has been recognised for a long time by the agricultural
planners and various efforts have been made to rectify it. For
example, as early as 1958, the Nyasaland Loans Board (the first
body to grant agricultural credit to African Farmers), granted
loans for oxen and livestock, farm carts, items*of farm equip-
(17)ment, fencing and other farm requirements. Cash loans were
sometimes granted in connection with improvements and capital 
development.^ T h e  Central Farmers Loans Board, continued to 
provide supervised credit for purchase of oxen and ox-driven 
implements. However, all these loan schemes had a definite bias 
against small farmers. As such, they tended to affect only a 
very small proportion of the smallholding community, as table 4.2 
indicates.
Table 4.2 Loans Given to Farmers, 1958 - I960
Y ear Number of Total Value Average
Farmers of Loan Loan/farmer
(K) (K)
1958 57 8300' 146
1959 208 23700 114
I960 214 ■ 84000 112
Source : Nyasaland Reports - 1945 - i960. Cited in Kettl
(1965) "Agricultural Change in Nyasaland: 194 5-1960", 
Food Research Institute Studies, Vol. 5 No. 3 
PP229-285.
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. .' The launching of LLDP seems not to have altered the situation 
considerably for farmers within the project area. Although 
agricultural credit was regarded as vital and essential for the 
success of the programme, seasonal, rather than medium 4pr long 
term credit, was given priority (taking up over 90% of the 
resources available). The uptake of medium term credit, for 
farm equipment was very low, as table 4.3 indicates. This could 
have been due to two main problems:
(1) Low return on capital.
(2) Inappropriate technology.
Table 4.3 Seasonal and Medium Term Credit in LLDP - 1968/69 to
1976/77
Year Seasonal Credit Medium Credit
Total Amount Average/Parmer 
K ’OOO K.
K ’OOO
1968/69 5 7.4 NA
1969/70 7 \ 12.3 NA
1970/71 83 18.4 NA
1971/72 343 16,6 31
1972/73 392 18.6 36
1973/74 488 14.2 48
1974/75 736 29.1 28
1975/76 860 25.3 4
1976/77 1001 26.9 -
Source: LLDP, Some Pacts and Figures,1977, pp 10 and 15
(a) Low Returns on Capital
Medium term credit, because of the size of the loan 
(average loan per farmer between 1971/72 and 1973/74 was K430), 
carried with it rather stringent conditions. ?or example, 
a down payment of between 25-33% of loan value, plus some 
form of collateral of up to 150% of the loan was required
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(19)before the loan could be secured. This meant that if a house­
hold wanted to purchase say, an ox-cart, whose average price 
during the 1973/74 period was K400, it needed to raise a deposit 
of about KlOO - K120, and/or provide collateral of up to about 
K600. Livestock and other forms of rural wealth were accepted 
as a collateral, to make things easier for the farmers. But even 
then, the collateral required was in the region of up to 5 or 6 
head of cattle (needless to mention the countless head of goats, 
cheep or pigs), and as our survey (reported in chapter 5 - see 
table 5»5.b) indicated, only 5% of the sample owned cattle, 
implying that the majority of the farmers could not meet the 
collateral requirements. At the same time, the relatively short 
duration of the loan (up to 3 years),necessitated that borrowers 
undertook projects which yielded high returns within relatively 
short periods. As such, farm implememts like ploughs, groundnut 
lifters, etc, whose returns were relatively low due largely to 
the depressed farm prices mentioned in the previous chapter, were 
not considered good invest-.ment risks. For example, using the 
gross margin analysis data presented in the 1977/78 Project 
Completion Report a 1.8 ha farm (which is slightly above
the average farm size in the region), growing improved maize, 
improved groundnuts and improved tobacco, would provide a net 
revenue of K494 (at 1978 prices), in three years. Implying that 
at the given farm gate prices and production costs, if the house­
hold took say a K400 loan for a farm implement, all its farm 
revenue for three years.(net of cost for fertilizers, insecticides 
transport etc), would go towards meeting the loan and interest 
charges. As Kinsey (1974) observed, the majority of medium term
loans in LLDP were for maize hammer mills which yielded high profits
( 21 'Idue to the deliberate action of LLDP in restricting their supply .'
(b) Inappropriate technology.
Mechanical implements are generally used for substituting 
capital for labour, especially in labour scarce conditions. How­
ever, they are not a perfect substitute for labour, the degree of 
substitutability depending on several factors, such as the type 
of crops grown, type of operations being undertaken, etc, all of 
which depend on the type of farming system. If mechanical 
implements are to be adopted, they have to be suitable for the
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operations on which, labour availability is a binding constraint.
In the situation under review, weed control during the crop
establishment period (December/January) appears to be the most
labour demanding and time specific operation for all the crops
( 22 )
concerned (see the crop labour demand schedule in chapter 5).
If mechanical implements are to alleviate the labour bottleneck 
associated with this process, then they must be appropriate for 
this purpose. However, the majority of the mechanical implements 
which have been introduced in the area (eg the ox-ploughs, ridgers 
cultivators, groundnut lifters, etc), do not appear to tackle the 
binding labour constraint. In actual fact, use of mechanical 
implements for ground preparation has tended to increase cultivated 
area thereby increasing the labour demands for weeding.
Thus, it appears that not only is the unavailability of 
capital finance to the majority of the smallholder farmers that 
is responsible for the low level of use of mechanical implements 
in LLDP, but also the relatively low returns to capital, brought 
about by the output price structure and the inappropriateness of 
the available range of farm implements to operation(s) on which 
labour availability is a binding constraint. However, due to 
the overall low level of mechanical implements in the area, they 
do not constitute a significant source of interhousehold differ­
ences in farm incQmes. As such, they will not feature in our 
analysis of interhousehold differences in incomes in LLDP.
B . Impact of LLDP Strategy on Farm Productivities.
Yield studies conducted in Lilongwe District, before LLDP was
launched indicate that average maize yields in the area were around
7 bags (about 740 kg) per hectare, while groundnut yields averaged
about 750 kg of kernels per hectare. Timeliness of planting and
(23)
weed control were said to be the main determinants of output. .
When LLDP was launched in 1967/68, it sought to improve yields
mostly through the introduction of improved seed vanities and the
use of non-farm inputs (fertilizers, etc). Evidence indicates
that between 1969/70 and 1972/73, average maize yields were
consistently higher in the developed area, while groundnut yields
were higher on the developed areas only for two out of the four
(24)years.
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Table 4.4 Maize and Groundnuts Yields in Developed and 
Undeveloped Areas in LLDP. 1969/70 - 1972/73*
Year Maize Groundnuts
Developed
Units
Undeveloped
Units
Developed
Units
Undeveloped
Units
1969/70 1226 1116 534 651
1970/71 1437 1281 469 600
1971/72 1636 1225 463 456
1972/73 1314 1139 298 254
Source: LLDP, Yield Reports and Data supplied by the Evaluation
Unit. - cited in Kinsey (1974), op. cit., Table 31, P 152
Although the above data tends to indicate a positive contri­
bution of the project to yields in the area, there is some need 
for caution. As Kinsey (1974) has pointed out, the apparent 
increase in the maize yields over the years, within the project 
area, seem to have been enhanced more by the incorporation of 
more productive areas into the project, during the later years, 
than mere project impact as such. He goes on to add. that there 
was no significant evidence to support the view that yields were 
significantly higher within the developed units than outside, as 
bivariate regression models indicated that inclusion or non­
inclusion of an area in LLDP explained only some 2 to 3 percent
(25)
of the variation in yields. Thus up to the end of phase 1
(1967/68 to 1972/73), the available data do not provide any 
conclusive evidence that smallholder productivity within the 
project arpa whs higher with project support than without.
Ten years after the launching of the project, an interesting 
pattern of development seems to have emerged in the area. The 
1977/78 Sample Survey of Smallholder Agriculture conducted by 
LLDP (Evaluation Section), indicated that the mean yield of maize 
(all varieties) was 1206 kg/hectare., which was lov/er than 
the average annual yields obtained during the 1969/70 to 1972/73 
period, in the "developed"-areas of LLDP, However, as table 4.5 
indicates there was a great deal of variation in the mean yields
110
obtained for each of the varieties èrowh in the area.
The table indicates that the productivity improvement 
enjoyed by a farm operator was very much dependent upon the 
variety of maize grown. For instance, those farmers growing 
hybrid maize, obtained on average, a yield level which was 
about 3 times higher than that achieved by those grov/ing local 
maize. This means that the mean yield figures presented in 
the earlier studies (which lump together all varieties) do not 
provide us with any helpful indication of how the alleged 
productivity improvements were distributed among the farmers.
Table 4,5 A Comparison of Mean Yields of Different Maize 
Varieties in LLDP.
Variety Mean Yield (kg/ha
Local maize 1075
Synthetic maize 1436
Hybrid maize (SR52) 2998
Composite maize (UCA) 1227
Mixtures 1367
All varieties 1206
A recent study by Kydd (1982), indicates that adoption of 
improved maize varieties (the major improvement introduced in 
LLDP), although initially high (in the 1969/70 season), has since 
declined, being mostly confined to two groups of farmers, viz, 
the "commercial maize farmers" and the ^richer tobacco farmers'.'^  
This indicates that although yields per hectare obtainable from 
improved maize varieties were quite high, they were only attain­
able by a limited number of people, v/hile productivity per hectare 
on the majority of small scale farms was still low.
3. The Problem of Labour Availability and its Consequenc es on 
Smallholder Agricultural Development.
A. Labour Availability and Farm Size.
It is generally agreed that the World's rural poor (apart 
from the landless) are mostly small-scale farmers whose very
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smallholdings (less than 1 hectare per family in most cases),
cannot provide enough to sustain their basic subsistence
( 28)needs. With evidence obtained mostly from Latin America
and Asian experiences, it has been inferred that lack of land, 
mostly due to either, inequalities in land distribution or high 
population pressures on the land, is at the heart of the rural 
poverty problem in the Third W o r l d . (^9) The improvements in 
rural productivity and welfare that have taken place in countries 
like Japan, Taiwan and Korea, after egalitarian land reforms were 
undertaken, are cited as examples that support this view.(
Hence the question of access to land has been at the centre of 
rural development discussions.
It is thus perhaps surprising to see that lov/ smallholder
productivity has been experienced in countries with or without
acute population pressures as well as in those countries with
or without land tenure arrangements that restrict access to 
( 31 )land. This observation serves as a cautionary note against
the universal applicability of the popular belief that the 
correlation between low farm output and small farms observed 
throughout the Third World suggests a direct causal lihk 
between farm size and poverty resulting from limited access to 
land. In sub-Saharan Africa, for example, there is a prevalence 
of customary land tenure arrangements (which safegurd against 
landlessness), and population pressures, even in the most densely 
populated countries, are not as acute as those obtaining in most 
of Asia, In circumstances like these, farm size, which is a 
measure of worked land rather than available land, is more likely 
to be a manifestation of poverty than a cause of it. Recent 
studies in Africa tend to indicate that African farms achieve 
lower productivities per unit of land largely because they 
organise their production activities in such a way that they 
maxim] se returns to labour, v/hich is often scarce relative to
land.0 2 )
Such findings tend to suggest that in order to understand 
the causes of rural poverty in situations where arable land can 
be said to be more of less universally accessible, there is need 
to seek alterative causes other than land availability per se.
In Malawi for example, the general agreement among researchers,
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is that there are no significant barriers to access to land, 
such as restrictive land tenure systems that favour land 
concentration,(33) This is because the customary land tenure 
system (under which about 80% of the land falls)0^^ tends to 
favour even distribution of land. Even in LLDP, where most of 
the land has been demeireated and certificates of claim issued 
to family heads (on behalf of their families), the basic 
principle of allocating land for individial use remains un­
altered within the family structure. Thus overall, it could be 
said that in Malawi, the land tenure system operates against 
land concentration per se, as farm size is largely determined 
by the households’ ability to work the land.  ^ Although 
there is very little evidence to support this claim , that avail­
able seems to be affirmative. Kydd (1979, for example, in his 
study of Namwera (an area in Southern Malawi), investigated the 
distribution of cultivated land among the rural households. He 
obtained Gini-Coeffients of the order 0.36 - 0.38 and 0.29 to 
0,32 for Lorenz curves constructed on per-capita and per-adult 
basis of distribution, r e s p e c t i v e l y B o t h  measures indicate 
that t’r.e cultivated land is fairly evenly distributed in the 
area. But the fact that the per-adult measure depicted a more 
even distribution of cultivated land among the households than 
the per-capita one, suggests that cultivated land was distributed 
more according to a household’s ability to use it (as expressed 
by household's potential workforce, ie number of adults) than 
mere land availability per se.
Further evidence of land distribution among smallholders, in
accordance to ability to farm it, is provided by the National
Sample Survey of Agriculture, 1968/69. This survey indicated
that only 1.38 million hectares of the 5.3 million hectares
of arable land (representing 26%) were being cultivated then,
and yet the majority (63%) cultivated areaiof under 1.6 
(37)
hectares. At the same time, the average cultivated area
per household in the sparsely populated Northern Region 
(24 persons per sq.km) was 1.4 hectares, while that in the 
densely populated southern Region (87 persons/km) was 1.3 
h e c t a r e s M o r e  interestingly, this survey indicated that
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32% of the holdings in the Northern Region and 36% in the
Southern Region were under 0.8 hectares, and in both cases, the
average number of persons living and working on such holdings 
(39)
was 2.3 ,
B. Labour Availability and Smallholder Credit.
There is general.support to the Schultzian hypothesis that, 
the small farmer responds to his opportunities with considerable 
economic r a t i o n a l i t y H o w e v e r ,  it is felt that small farmers 
have not shown an impressive response to technical opportunities 
in production that promise high economic rewards. As such, it 
is pointed out that most traditional small farmers are producing 
close to their capacity ceiling given the level of technology
(41 )they have access to (Goyoso, 1973)» According to Chinn
(1979) a common diagnosis of the problem is that
"agricultural productivity is low on small farms because of 
limited access to controlled water supplies, chemical 
fertilizers, pesticides, mechanical implements and other 
inputs..." (42)
It is felt that credit can be the facilitating input that 
allows effective access to new inputs and technology. Thus
most smallholder development projects have tended to incorporate 
a credit programme as part and parcel of the whole development 
effort. In such circumstances, the issue of smallholder credit 
' becomes central in the discussion of input use by the small 
scale farm community.
1. Smallholder Credit in Malawi
In Malawi, the agricultural sector is composed of two main 
sectors , as already indicated, ie the smallholder sector, and 
the estate sector. The former which consists of some 1.1 million 
smallholdings (most of them below 2 hectares) accounts for over 
85% of the agricultural production and supports over 90% of the 
.population, while the latter exports over 60% of the total
agricultural exports(NRDP, Policies,Strategy . op. cit. Pi)
Prior to Independence (I964), institutional agricultural 
credit was almost exclusively available to the estate sector, 
which was predominantly European owned. It was not until 1958 
that institutional agricultural credit became available to
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African f a i m i e r s , w h e n  the Nyasaland Loans Board (operating 
through Local District Committees) started to issue loans of up 
to K500 (£250) with a minimum of K40 (£2Ç>) at an interest rate 
of 5*5% per a n n u m . S u c h  credit was available mostly for 
agriculture, housing, commercial and industrial purposes.
These loans which were in cash for improvement and capital 
or in kind, for seeds, fertilizer, oxen and other livestock, 
farm carts etc, were mainly short-term, as they depended on the 
character of the farmer for collateral. In 1964» the Central 
Farmers' Loans Board (CFLB) was established as a supervised 
agricultural credit programme, which in addition to seasonal 
loans, also provided medium and long-term loans for specific 
purposes related to capital development of farms.
However, these facilities only benefited a small proportion 
of the smallholding majority. In the first place, before a 
farmer could get a loan he had to satisfy the Loans Board that 
he had a farm enterprise capable of benefiting from the invest­
ment and that he had experience and ability to utiliz-e the loan 
effecively - to increase productivity and efficiency. In other 
words, a farm plan, was a prerequisite to obtaining a loan. In the 
second place, short-term credit to individual^for fertilizers, 
seeds, etc., were not favoured because of the administrative 
difficulties associated with them. As Kinspy (1974) pointed 
out, there was a definite bias against small farms, as it was 
felt that small farm units would be unable to support the burden 
of loan repayment.(46) such, pp to the introduction of Inte­
grated Projects in the country (1968/69), agricultural credit 
was only available to a handful of farmers (mostly Master 
Farmers), for oxen and carts.
11. Types of Credit
During the late 1960's and early 1970's, three main types 
of agricultural credit operated in Malawi.
(a) Supervised Credit - this was largely provided to
■ farmers in the projects, crop authorities and settlement schemes 
and administered by the authorities running the particular 
projects.
(b) Unsupervised Credit - provided outside the project 
areas and administered by the Government Loans Board.
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(c) Commercial Bank Credit - only available to large
farmers on leasehold land.
It is only (a) and (b) which are of direct relevance to 
smallholder agricultural development. The seriousness with which 
the question of providing credit for smallholder development was 
taken during the post-Independence era, is reflected in the 
general principles - oû,tlined in the 1972 "proposal for the for­
mulation of Agricultural Supply and Credit Organisation of 
Malawi (ASCOM)". It was thus stated;
(i) The needs of smallholder and estate agriculture in 
respect of credit and input supply are different - 
suitable arrangements for each should be considered 
separately.
(li), The provision of credit to farmers is not an end in it­
self - but only one of a number of means toward increas­
ing the value of farm production.
(iii) The usefulness of credit in achieving this end depends 
on the availability of other complementary factors, in 
particular- extension advice, ready availability of 
farm inputs and crop marketing opportunities.
(iv) As a general rule, therefore, credit will normally be 
restricted to small farmers falling within the orbit 
of projects and settlement schemes, or those otherwise 
recommended by the extension service as being credit­
worthy,
(v) The provision of credit to farmers should as far as 
possible aim to avoid any element of hidden subsidy, 
unless specifically intended, the restriction of credit 
in general, to farmers in projects will help to lessen 
costs and hence keep credit charges down to an accept­
able level to the farmer.
(vi) Since virtually all credit is and will continue to be 
provided to the farmer in kind and not in cash, the 
question of arrangements for credit cannot be divorced 
from procurement, stocking and supply of farm inputs.
It is therefore désirable that credit and inputs be 
handled by the same organisation.
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Several developments have emerged from these guidelines; 
a major one being the Vpabkage" approach of smallholder credit. 
That is credit is offered in the form of input "packages" which 
are supported by "extension advice". This linking of credit» 
input supply and extension has both its advantages and dis­
advantages. On the positive side, it could be argued that such 
an arrangement takes advantage of the complementary nature of 
three services. On the other hand, it can result in cumbersome 
procedures in assessing credit worthiness, as will be discussed 
later on. In addition, the multiplicity of objectives (as each 
service has its prime objective) may lead to difficulties in 
arriving at an optimal strategy. We shall demonstrate this 
point with reference to the experience of LLDP in the next 
chapter,
111. Performance of the Credit Programme in LLDP.
(a) - Objective of Credit Programme.
At the commencement of LLDP it was envisaged that within the 
existing structure of smallholder farming, the anticipated 
improvements in productivity could not be realised unless specific 
inputs were used. This was based on several assumptions;
(1) That farmers in the programme area would not otherwise 
use the recommended inputs, either at all or in the 
prescribed manner, or
(2) that credit would enable a larger group of farmers to
participate in the programme than would otherwise be
.. (48)
the case,
(3) that the necessary credit was not available from the
(49)private sector.
Provision of inputs on credit was therefore used as an 
incentive for farmers to use inputs and follow recommended 
husbandry practices, as the extension staff were able to use 
the leverage created by the farmers' indebtedness to ensure that 
extension approved techniques were used.^^^^ What was the 
strategy used to achieve this objective, and how successful v/as 
it?
(b) - LLDP Credit Strategy and its results.
According to Goyoso (1973), smallholder credit programmes 
can be usefully assessed on two main criteria;
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(1) Has the programme been successful in improving the 
economic viability and degree of participation of 
those individuals it has reached?
(2) Has the programme succeeded in improving the economic 
viability and degree of political participation of a 
substantial proportion of the small farm population 
sufficient to make a difference in the make up of 
society? ^51)
In other words Goyoso suggests that we can usefully 
evaluate a credit programme on v/hether or not it has led to high 
farm productivity (and incomes) among the credit recepients, 
and on its coverage of small scale farming community. This 
approach will be adopted here in trying to evaluate the credit 
programme in LLDP,
(i ) Impact of Credit on Smallholder Farm Productivity and
Incomes.
The impact of credit on smallholder farm productivity and 
incomes is very difficult to determine mostly because many 
factors determine the level of these variables. Such factors 
include farm size, land quality, level of technology used, 
administrative skills of the farm operator, etc. While credit 
can enhance access to technology, its effectiveness in raising 
productivity will also depend on the other factors.
It is very important to recognise that different small­
holdings are at different levels of economic viability. While 
credit can usefully enhance the economic position of some 
categories of farmers, it may not do so for others.^^^) ^n 
such circumstances, a useful way to assess the impact of credit 
would be to disaggregate the smallholding community into several 
categories (using one criterion or the other, which represents 
the levels of economic viability of the differnt groups) and 
then examine the role of credit on each of these categories.
Goyoso (1973, op cit), suggested that a useful way of 
evaluating the farm households would be to divide them into the 
following categories:
(l) Those households which are already operating as profit­
able enterprises.
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(2) Those which have the potential to operate profitably 
but lack inputs.
(3) Those with such poor resources that improved technology 
would not mean anything.^
Such a breakdown would clearly show the policy measures 
appropriate for each group. For example, Goyoso argued that the 
above breakdown of the smallholding community would indicate 
that if the aim of a rural development effort, in such circum­
stances, was to attain economic viability of the small scale 
farmers, then the appropriate strategy would be to aim at:
(1) Maintaining the viability of the first group.
(2) minimising the time period needed for farmers in the 
second group to become viable, and
(3) designing special programmes such as rural employment 
programmes, resettlement schemes, etc, for the last 
group - as credit alone would not solve its problem.
It is the opinion of the present writer that, the way the 
credit programme has operated so far in LLDP, tends to assume :' 
that those who have not been able to benefit from the "packages" 
offered, were at fault (eg. uncredit worthy , ladk of enterprise, 
etc.) and therefore have themselves to blame. As such the 
programme is mostly geared to help those who can help themselves 
with little of no effort being made to meet the special needs of 
the very needy farmers. This issue will be highlighted when v/e 
discuss the survey results in the next chapter.
C. Distribution of Seasonal Credit in LLDP.
Up to the 1979/80 cropping season, seasonal credit in LLDP 
was distributed via. two channels;
(i) Individual credit.
(ii) Group credit.
While individual credit was the norm in the standard units, 
group credit (introduced in 1973) was initially restricted to 
what were referred to as the Modified Input Areas (MIA - ie areas 
with low agricultural potential - within LLDP). It eventually 
spread to other areas, becoming the only form of credit avail­
able to farmers, outside the projects, settlement schemes and
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crop authorities, where it was administered by the Government 
Loans Board. However, the high administrative costs associated 
with individual credit, coupled with the willingness of farmers 
outside the project areas to "gang up" (with the encouragement 
of ADMARC) and act as a group in order to get input's on bulk at 
a discount, has led to the adoption of the group credit approach 
in the entire programme area from the 1980/81 season.
(i) Individual Credit.
For a person to qualify for seasonal credit he/she had to 
satisfy two basic criteria.
(1) Managerial ability criterion.
(2) Credit worthiness criterion.
Managerial Ability - the person had to possess a certain 
standard of managerial ability in order to achieve the potential 
benefits and high returns from "packages" of new non-farm inputs. 
That is, he/she was judged on individual ability of cultivation 
practices and such husbandry aspects as ridging, planting, 
spacing, fertilizer use, weeding and harvesting. Each of these 
were rated by the Extension personnel as poor, average, good 
and excèllènt. Any farmer with more than 3 poor ratings was 
considered ineligible for credit.
Credit worthiness - had to be established before an indivi­
dual could be issued with credit. The rating was based on a risk 
criteria related to five farmer typologies, as indicated belov/:
(1) Men, born-, living and farming in the village or else­
where in LLDP.
(2) Women born, living and farming in the village but whose 
husbands (if married) were living elsewhere.
(3) Men born outside the village but married and farming in 
the village.
(4) People with farms outside the programme area.
(5) People with farms in the programme area but living out­
side it.
These five typologies of farmers clearly indicate that the 
risk factor was related to the personas tenurial position with 
regard to the piece of land he v/as farming. Only groups 1 to 3
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which had reasonably secure tenure on their lands (within the 
customary tenure system) were considered reasonable credit 
risks - and not the last two groups.
(ii) Group Credit
The main objective for the introduction of group credit in
LLDP v/as to reduce lending costs, by transfering most of the
administrative, accounting, and collection responsibilities from
project - management to the groups. Each member of the credit
group had to satisfy the above criteria for individual credit.
In addition, the credit group (with a membership of 10-30
farmers) must have been approved by LLDP, A dov/n payment of
11% was required (10% as security plus 1% administrative
charges), before the group loan could be secured. Interest on
group credit was 10% per annum, while that on individual credit
(55)
was 15% per year.
The performance of group credit in LLDP seems to indicate 
that the scheme had been a major success from the point of
view of the Project Administration. For example, the scheme had
maintained an almost 100% repayment record (as against 
an average of 98% between 1972/3 and 1977/78, for individual 
credit). This high repayment rate^had been achieved because 
of the sanction placed on the group, ie, the group could not 
secure input credit if any of its members defaulted the previous 
season. Thus any defaults were made good from the 10% security 
fund, which was replenished once the defaulter had been 
pressurized by his fellow members, who were eager to secure 
credit - and in most cases, such defaulters were expelled from 
the group.
However, the problem with this tendency was that the credit 
groups, because of their keenness to preserve their credit- 
wothiness, seemed to be highly selective, accepting only those 
who were very likely to repay credit, to the exclusion of the 
poorer and needy farmers. Perhaps it was a realisation of this 
aspect by the planners, that a new philosophy in group lending
has emerged in LLDP. This philosophy involves the replacing of 
credit groups by farmers clubs, which are supposed to perform 
other development functions other than being mere channels for
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credit. These farmers clubs are discussed in more detail in 
the next chapter.
Table 4.6 Individual and Group Credit in LLDP
Year Individual Credit
No, of Amount of Loan/
Borrowers Loans Borrower
('000) (K'OOO) (K)
1972/3 21.1 382 18
1973/4 23.9 460 19
1974/5 20.5 601 29
1975/6 24.6 624 25
1976/7 23.5 627 27
1977/8 14.6 453 31
1978/9 23.1 656 28
Table 4 .6 Individual and Group Credit (continued)
Year Group credit
No. of No. of Borrowers Amount of Loans/
Borrowers Groups Per Group Loans Borrower
('000) (K '000) (K.)
1972/3 - - - - -
1973/4 1.8 94 19 21 12
1974/5 4.6 242 19 136 30
1975/6 7.6 410 19 235 31
1976/7 13.3 670 20 385 29
1977/8 27.9 1267 22 839 30
1978/9 28.4 1217 23 805 28
Source : Schaefer-Kehnert (1980) , P. 333, Tables 1 and 2.
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(d) Coverage of Credit Programme in LLDP .
Within LLDP, the initial programme policy was to issue as 
much credit as possible, since credit v/as used as a weapon to 
ensure a widespread of adoption of t e c h n o l o g y / C r e d i t  rose 
from K4,826 in 1967/68 to K390,991 in 1972/73, with average 
loan per borrower rising from K7-4 to K17.3 during the same 
period. Von Pischke (1973), cites evidence of how in some
units in LLDP (3, 4 and 5), the number of borrowers in 1967/69 
ranged from 68 to 133 but increased by more than 10 times by 
1972/73. The result of this rapid expansion was that some
non-creditworthy farmers were included in the programme, with 
the consequence that the credit repayment rate fell from 100% 
in 1967/68 to about 56% in 1972/73, and this was despite the 
fact that all credit was provided in kind (to minimise diversion) 
and was supervised (to ensure effective use.)
This seems to indicate that while wide coverage of the 
credit programme (in terms of number of borrowers involved) can 
be a useful measure of the impact of the credit scheme, on the 
smallholder community, it may have some undesirable effects.
In the case of LLDP, it led to a high default rate. The project 
officials, concerned about the economic viability of the credit 
programme had to resort to harsh measures (eg legal proceedings) 
to enforce repayment and this dealt a severe blow to the credit- 
lity of the programme.(59)
In addition, an increase in the number of borrowers per se, 
may not necessarily indicate the extent of coverage, in terms of 
the different categories and/or needs of the farmers. The small­
holding community does not constitute a homogeneous group in 
terms of say, land resources, managerial ability, labour resources 
etc. As such different types of farmers have different needs.
And this applies to credit as well. A credit programme that aims 
to enhance the access of a substantial proportion of the small­
holding community to modern production inputs, should therefore 
begin by assessing the credit requirements of the various typo­
logies of farmers so that the different categories can be 
catered for according to their needs. It appears that LLDP, in 
its initial attempt to facilitate a widespread adoption of 
technology, interpreted coverage in terms of absolute numbers.
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As a result there was no attempt to tailor the credit "packages" 
offered to the needs and resources of the recipients, with the 
consequence that for people whom the "packages" offered were 
inappropriate, the desired productivity results did not mater- 
ilise and this led to their inability to repay cxredit.
Results from a survey conducted by the Evaluation Section 
of LLDP in 1 9 7 1 / 7 2 ^ indicated that there were significant 
relationships between;
(1) default rate and type of package taken, and
(2) defaulting and the mean labour units available to the 
household.
Growers who included groundnuts in their credit "packages" 
for example, although they constituted less than 10% of the : 
sample, made up over 20% of the defaulters. At the same time, 
the mean labour unit per defaulter was found to be about 20% 
less than that of the non-defaulters as table 4.7 indicates.
Table 4*7 Borrowers Labour Units and Dependent Food Units.
Category Average Dependent 'Average Labour
Food Unit Units
Defaulter 4.28 2.44
non-defaulter 4.70 :.2.98
All households 4.64 2.84
Source: LLDP (1972) Survey Credit Borrowers 1971/72 Cropping 
season, p8 Table 2.8.
These results suggest that some households were offered 
packages which were not appropriate to their resource endow­
ments. For example, it could be argued that some labour 
deficient households were offered labour intensive packages, 
which they were unable to attend to adequately, leading to 
poor yields. These poor yields, coupled with low farm prices 
(discussed in chapterl'H) led such households to default.
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C . Labour Availability And Adoption of Innovations in LLDP.
j In the previous sections, it was pointed out that the 
main objective of the smallholder development^effobt :in 
LLDP, was to raise smallhouseholder productivity of the market­
able surplus. The production conditions within which this 
objective was to be achieved and the strategy to be employed 
were considered. Prom the above discussion, lack of modern 
productivity raising inputs was considered to be the main 
constraint to higher farm output among the households. This 
lack of inputs was presumed to be due to lack of purchasing 
power among the rural people. Credit was therefore used as 
the main instrument for encouraging innovation adoption in the 
aredL, However, the experience of LLDP indicates that not all 
households v/e re able to take up the innovations offered in the 
area (as will be indicated in the next chapter) and therefore, 
not all households were able to raise their farm outputs and 
farm incomes as a result of the innovations introduced in the 
area.
In this section the main argument;to be considered is that 
labour availability was very important factor that affected 
the pattern of innovation adoption among the households in 
LLDP, and that interhousehold differences in labour avail­
ability profoundly affected the pattern of income distribut­
ion that emerged in the area.
(I) Labour and Peasant Production
Chayanov (1966), argued that in a y pur èj.y ' p e a sant " situation 
because peasant production was the most predominant economic 
activity, differences in household incomes were mostly a result 
of hov/ each household allocated its most important resource, 
family labour. Hence income distribution in peasant societies 
followed from the determinants of household family labour.(^1)
He further argued that labour (number of workers in a family) 
proportionate to the size of the family was the stable element 
which determined changes in land area used by the farm family. 
This implies that larger families.(in terms of active labour 
force) cultivated more land and implicitly ^ot more farm out­
put than smaller ones. In such a situation, the size of the
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farm'was not so much the determining factor of peasant activity 
but rather an expression of it* He produced empirical evidence 
that showed that in the observed correlation between farm size 
and family size, the direction of causality was from family 
size to farm size - ie* labour availability and not land avail­
ability was the main constraining factor to household incomes*
The Chayanovian model of peasant production has been sub­
jected to many criticisms, among which are:-
(i) Lack of Universality- It is generally argued that the
model addresses itself to peasant conditions in 19th Century
Russia, and that these conditions no longer obtain in many of the
( 63 )peasant societies today. As such any conclusions or predictions
emerging from the model cannot apply to these circumstances.
While it is true that present day peasant societies are not a 
replica of Chayanov*s "pure peasant economy" it is important to 
realise that Chayanov presents a theoretical model and that the 
usefulness of a model does not lie in the fact that it should 
accurately describe every case to which it is applied, but rather 
that it should be able to illuminate differences and similarities 
between the case in question'and that represented by the model.
This should provide a basis for a search for alternative 
explanations. In addition, Hunt (1978 and 1979), showed that 
where the main assumptions of the Chayanovian model hold (universal 
access to farm-land, dominance of non-wage family economic units, 
universal access to a given level of technology, and predominance 
of subsistence production, etc.), the model did accurately 
describe family resource allocation.
(ii) Economic Differentiation among Peasant Households - 
Harrison (1975 and 1979), criticises Chayanov on the issue of 
economic differentiation.Harrison's main concern is what 
happens to peasant production under a capitalist structure.
He is of the view that the peasant system (or smallholder 
production) is vulnerable to capitalist expansion, and that 
Chayanov and his colleagues were not able to perceive this problem 
because of their obsession with the "small is beautiful" vision 
of the peasant institutional framework. Harrison took the Marxist 
stand that "the peasant who produces with his own means of
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production, will either gradually be" transformed into a small 
capitalist who also exploits the labour of others, or he v/ill
suffer the loss of his means of production........ and be
transformed into a wage worker". By excluding his "pure peasant" 
family from employing labour, Harrison argues, Chayanov fore 
closed this p o s s i b i l i t y T h i s  is a very valid argument which 
is backed by many examples of smallholder development (including 
that in LLDP) which has been accompanied by an increasing tendency 
for the progressing farmers to hire labour.
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CHAPTER V
S ^ MPEE SURVEY OF SMALLHOLDER AGRICULTURAL HOLDINGS IN LLDP 
A Description of the Survey Results
The main instrument of the study was a survey questionnaire 
administered to a sample of smallholder households in LLDP 
between April and June 1981. This was supplemented by informa­
tion officially published by the following main bodies;
1. The Ministry of Agriculture and Natural Resources 
(MAHR).
2. The Lilongwe Land Development Programme (LLDP).
3. The National Statistical Office (NSO).
4* The Agricultural Development and Marketing Corporation 
(ADMARC).
In addition, informal discussions\were held with officers 
of various departments of the Lilongwe Agricultural Develop­
ment Division (LADD) under which LLDP now falls, as part of the 
National Rural Development Programme, and with local and 
traditional leaders within LLDP. The researcher had also the 
opportunity to attend a number of farmers' meetings organised 
by LLAD ' officials.
1. SURVEY METHODOLOGY
A. Sampling Procedure
The aim of the survey was to collect information regarding 
the characteristics of farm household that are associated with 
innovation adoption. The "household", was the basic unit of 
s a m p l i n g . A s  already indicated, the population of LLDP 
at the time of the survey was approximately 104,000 households 
(with a mean household size of 4.8 persons per household) 
occupying an area of about 6159 square kilometres. Because of the 
sheer size of the population and area involved, a multistage 
cluster sampling design was used. Two main considerations were 
borne in mind in the design procedure:
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(a) to minimise expenses ahd time so that the survey could 
be completed within 8 to 10 weeks.
(b) to reduce the variation of the observed sample results 
from the true population results to an acceptably 
small level, so that inferences from the sample stati­
stics could be made about the survey population with
a reliable degree of confidence.
Due to the above stated reasons, the sample size was
limited to 160 households. This represented about 1 in every
720 households in the survey area being selected for the sample.
Although this is a very small proportion of the total population
involved (about 0.14%), because of the observed homogeneity of
ah
the survey area, in terms^ecological factors, farming systems, 
level of technology, etc., and the use of the cluster sampling 
techniquey the selected sample can be taken to be reasonably;- 
representative of the survey population.
For,administrative purposes, the programme area is divided
into 40 units. These served as our primary selection units.
Four units were selécted using the "probability of selection
( 2)proportional to size" (PPS) method, in the first stage.
The second stage involved the selection of 4 villages from each 
of the selected 4 units, again using the PPS procedure. From 
the lists of farm families in each village, maintained by the 
Unit Centres, and updated annually (in most cases), a list of 
ten households was selected, using the help of a table of 
random numbers.
Advance notices v/ere sent, through the village headmen of
the selected villages, to each of the selected households,
requesting the head of the households (or their representatives -
( 3 )who were to be members of the household), to make themselves 
available at their homes at a pre-arranged date and time for 
the interview. This arrangement greatly minimised the extent 
of non-response. Only on a very few occasions was it necessary 
to make callbacks or replacements (by picking another household
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from the village family listing, with the help of a random 
numbers table).
All interviews were conducted in the vernacular language 
(with the help of a standard translation of the English 
questionnaire), at the homes of the interviewees. The degree of 
co-operation from the respondents was very impressive, making 
it possible for the survey to be completed in 9 weeks.
B. Data Analysis
The completed questionnaire which contained information 
on various household characteristics, were analysed on the 
Glasgow University computer, using the Statistical Package for 
Social Sciences (SPSS).
Th% data contained on the questionnaires were both of a 
qualitative and quantitative nature. However, due to the 
absence of any records regarding smallholder use of say inputs, 
labour allocation to various activities, cash outlays on inputs 
and labour, etc , even the quantitative data could only at 
best, be presented as grouped data. This imposed a serious 
limitation on the type of data analysis that could be under­
taken. It meant that greater reliance had to be placed on 
non-parametric analysis techniques, such as frequency distri­
butions and crosstabulations. However, in a few cases, where 
a more rigorous analysis was required inorder to gain a deeper 
understanding of the relationship between some variables, some 
transformations had to be made on the grouped (quantitative) 
data to make them ratio variables which could be subjected to 
such statistical techniques as contingency tables analysis, 
regression and correlation analyses, etc. This was done by 
multiplying the group means by the frequencies associated with 
those groups. It is therefore very important to bear in mind 
that these more advanced analytical techniques were improvised 
(due to the nature of the data), thus their results, which 
alt.hhough they usefully exposed the relationships between the 
various variables, should be interpreted within this limitation.
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C, Household Typologies.
(i) Criteria of Classification
The main improvements in household income in the project
area, were supposed to come from the adoption , by the farmers,
of the various innovation packages introduced in the area, and
the improved crop husbandry practices advocated by the extension
services. Thus the extent to which a farm household would
benefit from the project depended very much on its extent of
adoption. Experiences elsewhere have indicated that there
are a lot of factors that determine whether a particular
household will adopt a particular type of innovation or not
at any one given point in time. The World bank(1981b), for
example, lists the following factors among those that inhibit
(5)adoption of innovations:
(a) Lack of credit.
(b) Limited access to information.
(c) Inadequate farm size.
(d). Inadequate incentives associated v/ith farm tenure 
arrangements.
(e) Insufficient human capital.
(f) Absence of equipment to relieve labour shortage (thus 
preventing timeliness of operations).
(g) Chaotic supply of complementary inputs and inappropriate 
transportation infrastructure.
The World Bank points out that removal of such constraints 
by introducing facilities to provide credit, information, 
orderly supply of inputs, infrastructure investment, etc., with 
the expectation that greater adoption would result, leading to 
improved farming practices and consequently higher farm incomes, 
has not been borne out by the results. This is largely attributed 
to différenciées in adoption behaviour across socio-economic groups 
and overtimed^^It therefore appears that there is no way 
of knowing a priori what the impact of introducing a 
certain innovation in the area will be among the people, 
without a comprehensive knowledge of the socio-economic set
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up of the place." That is, there is need to know the chara­
cteristics of the various Viousc . Here an
attempt will be made to present a theoretical model of the 
smallholdings in LLDP (based on our survey results), to 
try to explain the current pattern of innovation adoption in 
the area.
As already pointed out, our argument is that the likely 
benefits accruing to a household (from the development effort) 
will depend a great deal on the type of crop enterprise(s) the 
household engages in. This in turn depends on the labour 
availability situation in the household. From these two 
aspects, it could be argued that the households in LLDP can 
be usefully categorised on two main criteria:
(a) Labour availability
(b) Crop enterprise.
Using the labour availability criterion, the households 
could be,subdivided into two broad categories, viz:
(a) Female-headed households
(b) Male-heq,ded households.
And, using the crop enterprise .criterion, three main groups 
could be identified;
(a) Those predominantly growing tobacco, - - % .
(b) Those predominantly growing improved maize varieties.
(c) Those not growing the two above crops but also engaged 
in agricultural production as own operators.
The idea behind the stratification emerged during the 
process of the survey, and was thus applied to the survey data 
after the survey was completed, and not before, since it was 
not contemplated at the time. It is very important to recognise 
this fact, since the resulting typologies were not affected in 
any way through any deliberate manipulations of the sample 
design by the researcher, but were inferred from the survey 
results. Their analysis therefore is very revealing of the
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circumstances in the area. The result of this post-survey 
stratification was 4 more or less clearly cut typologies of 
households as follows;
1. Female-headed Households (Typology l) - ie where^ the 
female head is either widowed, divorced, separated or v. 
unmarried. Or where the husband has migrated abroad or 
elsewhere in Malawi, and does not make regular remittances 
to the household.
2. Male-headed Households Growing neither tobacco nor 
Improved Maize (Typology 11) - but engaged in agricultural 
production as an own operator either fulltime or part-time.
3. Tobacco Growers (Typology 111) - ie where the male housëhold 
- head was afnlltime farmer with an established tobacco growing 
tradition (ie. grown tobacco for at least 3 years prior to the 
survey).
4. Improved Maize Growers (Typology IV) - that is, where the 
male-headed household predominantly grew improved maize varieties 
(where this took up the largest proportion of cultivated land), 
but no tobacco.
These typologies were not perfectly closed categories, 
nevertheless, each typology had certain recognisable chara­
cteristics as Table 5.0 indicates. The following section 
will be devoted to a description of the survey results, while 
the next chapter will provide a more detailed analysis of the 
results, especially with regard to sources of inter-household 
differencetin incomes.
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Table 5*0 Summary Characteristics of Household Typologies 
in LLDP 1980/81.
Characteristics Household Typology
I II III IV All
Average Farm 
Size(ha.)
0.87 1.18 2.03 1.97 1.66
Average Household 
Size 3.31 4.18 6.23 4.74 4.80
Average Family 
Labour Force 
(AEs) 1.36 1.85 2.65 2.03 2.05
Average Total 
Maize Output (Kg.) 480 600 1780 1940 1390
Average Total 
Household 
Reported Cash 
Income (K). 54.20 57.50 251.20 227.50 171.6
II. A Summary of the Main Characteristics of the Household 
Typologies.
Before describing the survey results in full, a brief descri­
ption of the characteristics of the various household typologies 
will be given, as they were observed.
(a) Typology I (Female-headed Households)
The survey included 26 households (16.5% of sample), which 
were headed by females. These households were mainly composed of 
elderly women (over 45 years) either living alone or with their 
unmarried children. These households are at the bottom end of the 
income scale for a number of reasons. Firstly, their main handicap 
appears to be the absence of the traditional male head,which 
means that they have less family workers (as the average family 
workforce is made up of an adult male and an adult female plus 
say one or two children of working age (over 15 years). This
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results in these households having lower cultivated areas. As 
Table 5.0 indicates, the survey results show that this category 
of households had a mean cultivated area of 0.9 hectares, and 
an average family workforce.of 1#36 adult equivalents, as against 
an average cultivated area of 1.6 hectares and average workforce 
of 2.05 adult equivalents.
Secondly, the main pre-occupation of this group was sub­
sistence food production to meet their family food requirements. 
None of the 26 female-headed households interviewed grew tobacco, 
and only 2 participated in growing improved maize varieties.
The survey indicated that this group cropped an average of 
5.3 bags(about 480 kg.) of maize- the staple crop in the area. 
With an average household size of 3.31 persons, and assuming 
that each person requ"^ -res about 230 kg. of maize grain per 
year to subsist on, the total food requirements of an average 
household in this category come to about 760 kilograms of maize 
grain, which exceeds the average food supply available. This 
implies that quite a considerable number of households in this 
category may be having food deficits for a considerable part of 
the year. The consequence of this is that most of these 
households are likely to hire out labour to other households 
or seek non-farm sources of income (during the food deficit 
period - which happens to be the time when farm labour is in 
greatest demand) and this is likely to aggravate their labour 
problems.
Not surprisingly, this category had the second lowest share 
of household income coming from crop sales (58.8%) with 25% 
coming from business (mostly beer brewing),10% from sale of 
livestock and their products and 6% from employment (largely 
casual labour - ganyu. on other’s farms, see table 5^ 1
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Table 5.i Reported Cash Income per Household by 
Household Typology and Source
Source Household Typology
I II III IV All
Crop Sales (K.) 31-76 20.48 240.17 140.59 126.0
Livestock/Poultry (K) 5-30 18.29 9.57 17.97 13.6
Business,etc.(K) 13-84 11.39 2.o1 58.46 26.0
Employment[^2tc.(K) 3-40 7.71 • 10.46 6.0
Total ^(K) 54.3 57.53 251.75 227.49 171.6
Average Income 
For Group as %  
of Overall Total 5*2 6.7 40.6 47.5 ' 100.0
No. of Respondents 
as a percentage of 
Total (%) 16.5 20.2 27.8 35.8 100.(
f
Notes: (a) Includes Transfers.
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The likelihood of this group improving its farm output 
and farm income is limited first by the labour deficiency, 
which tends to restrict cultivated areas- as is indicated by the 
very low hectarages associated with it. . Secondly, the low 
bultivated areas, as already pointed out, mean that the credit 
rating of this group, on the "ability to repay" criterion was 
very low, thereby restricting its access to inputs. As a 
matter of fact, only 2 out of the 26 female-headed households 
included in our survey, reported to have taken credit in the 
1980/81 season, and in both cases it was for groundnuts seeds. 
The majority of the female-headed households, when queried 
about their low use of farm inputs, replied^ that it was not 
because they were refused credit as such, but that they them­
selves felt that given their labour constraint and small 
hectarages, their ability to produce a surplus over and above 
their family requirements, and therefore be able to repay 
credit, was minimal. Hence, they were afraid to take credit 
because of the high risk involved if they failed to meet 
repayment (such as having their livestock or some other 
possession impounded by the project officials). The end 
result was that t6is category of households hardly took up 
any of the innovation "packages" offered, and therefore their 
farm output and farm incomes remained low.
During the survey, it was noted that most of the crop 
sales reported by this category came from groundnuts. This 
was very puzzling given the fact that the groundnut enterprise 
was labour intensive,(twice as many hours /ha/year) and provided 
the least returns to labour, and that the female-headed house­
holds had the lowest family labour forces. At first glance, 
there seems to be little economic sense for a labour deficient 
household to grow groundnuts. However, this paradox can be 
explained in several ways. First, by considering the product­
ion options available to these households. As already pointed 
out, none of these households participated in the tobacco 
enterprise. This may be partly because of the long established 
tradition in the area of regarding tobacco production as a male 
enterprise, which brings in an element of bias towards male 
growers when it comes to quota allocations, but more importantly
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the labour demands associated with this enterprise are far 
beyond the labour supply capacities of these households as 
implied in the linear programming model to be presented latter 
in this paper. In addition, it could be argued that
hybrid maize (as a cash crop), represents a more risky 
innovation as well as being outlay intensive (in terms of 
seed and fertilizer) so that in the absence of extra resources 
to cover it, is best left alone. Secondly, and more important, 
it could be argued that although the groundnut enterprise is 
relatively labour intensive, in terms of total annual labour 
requirements, its labour profile (see table 6«il) suggests 
that those labour requirements are fairly evenly spread 
throughout raos-£ of the year, with no sharp peak requirements. 
For example, thinning and weeding, the most time specific 
operations, take up only 18% of the labour requirements, while 
for maize these operations take up about 37% of the total 
labour requirements. This implies that for groundnuts, a 
greater proportion of the labour required goes into operations 
such as harvesting (lifting from the ground), shelling, grading 
etc, operations where timeliness is not absolutely crucial, and 
can therefore be done over a fairly long period. Women farmers 
due to their heavy commitment to domestic chores, are inclined 
to minimise peak demands on their labour time from non-domestic 
activities. Hence they tend to take on enterprises which if 
combined with the more or less compulsory maize enterprise, 
will minimise the labour peaks. Groundnuts production, due 
to its relative flexibility in labour allocation, as opposed 
to say, hybrid maize, whose most time specific operations are 
labour intensive, becomes the favourite crop. This is 
supported by the LP model.
Typology 11 (Male-headed households growing neither tobacco nor 
improved maize).
This group of farmers (20% of sample) resembled the female 
headed households in its "non-adoption" of the packages offered 
in LLDP. This group had a slightly higher average family 
labour force (1.85 adult equivalents as against 1.36 for the 
female-headed one), due to the presence of the adult male.
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It appears that these growers did not grow tobacco mostly due 
to the labour constraint as was pointed out for the former 
group. This labour deficiency, as in the former case, imposes 
a double bind on the households. First, it limits their ability 
to engage in either tobacco or say, hybrid maize production and 
meet subsistence food requirements at the same time, as will be 
illustrated later by the, LP model. Secondly., the labour 
deficiency results in smaller cultivated area (an average of 
1.18 hectares for this group, compared to 2.0^^for the tobacco 
growers.
The survey indicated that this group of households had 
average total reported cash income of K57.5 per household, 
which was 22.9% and 25.3% of that of the tobacco growers and 
improved maize growers respectively. Less than 25% of the 
average cash income for this group came from sale of 
crops - especially minor crops such as sugar cane, tomatoes 
^nd other vegetables, etc., and not from sale of maize, as 
quite q .Tdumber of these households indicated that they usually 
had food deficits. About 32% of their cash receipts came 
from livestock and poultry sales. The implication of this is 
that their limited opportunities to earn income from crops 
made them resort to selling chicken, goats, etc, which , it
could be argued, was net without adverse nutritional effects 
on their members. This group had the highest proportion of 
its reported cash income coming from employment. This was 
largely casual agricultural employment either on other house­
holds* farms or on agricultural estates, signifying that this 
group was the main, supplier of the hired labour required by 
groups 111 and IV. Just like the female-headed households, 
these households expressed the view that they did not have 
confidence in their ability to repay credit associated with 
the **packages" offered in the project. Tbey therefore 
opted to meet their food deficits by hiring out labour, rather 
than taking high yielding innovations with all the risks 
associated with them.
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Typology 111 (Tobacco Growers)
This group consisted mainly of farmers who had been growing 
tobacco (mainly dark fire-cured) as their main cash crop for 
some time. One main characteristics of this group was the large 
cultivated areas. The survey results indicated that they farmed 
on average, 2.03 hectares per household, some times that of 
the average female-headed households. Naturally, such large 
hectarages required large labour forces, and the average family 
labour force (in adult equivalent) for this group was 2.7. That 
is , tobacco growers had on average 1.33 family workers per 
hectare as compared to 1.51 for the female-headed ones. Table 5-0 
also indicates that this category of households had the largest 
size, ie, 6.2 persons as compared to 4.8 persons per household 
for the whole survey.
It is quite interesting to note that despite the large 
family labour forces, the tobacco growers also made use of a 
substantial amount of hired labour in their farms. The 
average expenditure on hired labour of K15.88 per household 
for this group suggests that, at the average rural wage rate 
of KO.10 per hour, the average household used about l60 man 
hours of hired labour, for agricultural purposes.
The 1977/78 sample survey of smallholders in LLDP, 
indicated that credit in the project area was significantly 
biased towards tobacco growers. This was mostly because they 
were associated with the criterion of credit worthiness (ie, 
large hectarages). Our survey supported the same hypothesis
as already indicated. It appears that credit was deliberately 
channeled to tobacco growers in an attempt to boost its exports 
(as it is the foremost foreign exchange earner for the country). 
However, since its production is controlled by allocation of 
annual quotas - usually to existing producers who successfully 
met their quota requirements the previous season, or those 
who have indicated that they have adequate resources, ie, 
labour and land , and possess the required managerial ability 
there is an element of continued support of a particular 
clientele, with the result that only those few privileged to 
grow it are assured of the benefits.
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It is interesting to note that despite the relatively 
high gross margins associated with the tobacco enterprise 
(about 3 times those for local maize) farmers in the area 
have not specialized in its production. This appears to be 
for two main reasons. First, the crop has enjoyed a 
remarkable increase in its price on the world market, and 
some of this price increase (although not very much) has 
worked its way through the domestic prices. As a result, 
there has been a general rise in the number of producers 
within the last decade. The project authorities have reacted 
to this increasing demand from the farmers to grow the crop 
by reducing the level of quotas given to individual farmers 
from an average of between five and six thousand pounds 
(2270 kg to 2720 kg) to an average of one to two thousand 
pounds (450-900 kg) per grower - an aspect which has had 
some positive distributional effects. The second reason for 
this lack of specialization appears to be the high premium 
placed on own food production by the farmers, plus the fact 
that their privileged access to credit (on account of being 
tobacco producers), allows them to secure credit for improved 
maize as well, which boosts their subsistence food supplie s.
The tobacco growing households reported an average of 
K25I.75 in cash receipts for the 1980/81 season. Most of 
this (95.4%) came from crop sales, (especially tobacco), 
with only 3.8% coming from livestock and poultry sales and 
less than 1% from business enterprises. The fact that none 
of the tobacco growing households reported any income from 
employment, supports the earlier view that as the tobacco 
enterprise was very labour intensive and at the same time 
provided the highest revenue, it fully and gainfully occupied 
the households* available family labour on the family farm.
The high gross margins associated with the tobacco enterprise, 
coupled with heavy labour requirements, raises the opportunity 
cost of labour migration (or hiring out labour), thus resulting 
in the nil receipts from off-farm employment. This is reinforced
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by the advantageous position of this group with respect to 
farm crecit.
Typology IV - (Improved Maize Growers).
This group of households may be said to have emerged in 
the area over the past decade or so. It appears to be usually 
headed by say, businessmen, tradesmen, returned migrants, people 
who have retired from paid employment, and in some cases, 
ex-tobacco growers - all of whom are engaged in agricultural 
production either part-time or full time. There are two main 
varieties of improved maize grown in the area, ie the hybrids 
(eg, MK12) and the composites eg, (UCA). The composites give a 
higher yield per hectare than the local maize varieties 
(about 2 times) and are easily processed into Ufa (pounded 
maize flour) for nsima (hard maize flour porridge), the 
traditional dish in the area. The hybrids on the other hand, 
give much higher yields per hectare than the local varieties 
(about 3 times). However, in addition to storage problems 
associated with them, they are difficult to process for nsima.
As a result they are almost exclusively grown as a commercial 
crop to be hammer-milled to be used for commercial purposes 
(eg brewing beer) of for mass consumption in the urban areas. 
t h e  1977/78 sample survey (1979) indicated that few of the 
• farmers in the area grew the hybrid variety (8% of the sample).(?) 
A closer investigation indicated that improved maize growers, 
in general, are the more "progressive" in terms of following 
proper crop husbandry methods (eg correct fertilizer application, 
timely weeding, pest control etc). Our survey indicates that 
this group of farmers tends to have larger than average cultivated 
areas (although slightly lower than the tobacco growers.)
In terms of labour availability, the family labour forces for 
this category are more or less the same as those for the 
average household in the area. These households indicated the 
highest reliance on hired labour, as evidenced by their 
average expenditure on hired labour of Kl6.0O (an equivalent 
of about 170 man hours). This could be due to the fact that 
the improved maize varieties unlike the local varieties,
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require a close adherence to proper planting times and all 
round timeliness of operations. This means that the peak 
labour demands could well be beyond the capacities of the 
family workforces, requiring that they be supplemented by 
hired labour. Thus, although this group have on average, 
lower family workforces than the tobacco growers, their 
ability to hire labour (which is enhanced by their non-farm 
income) allows them to perform the timely operations 
associated with t e  improved maize enterprise.
The survey indicated that the improved maize growers 
(not growing tobacco) had more or less the same level of 
reported cash income per household as the tobacco growers. 
However, it is the composition of the incomes of those 
groups (in terms of sources) which was of great interest.
As table 0 , i  indicates, crop receipts accounted for 62% of 
the reported cash receipts for these people (compared to 95% 
for the tobacco growers). Receipts from business etc (which 
were almost nil for the tobacco growers) constituted 26% of 
the cash income for this group. As hinted earlier, most of 
the household heads in this group were men who either retired 
from paid employment, or returned migrants or business and 
tradesmen. As such they tended to have other sideline 
activities in addition to farming. Probably as a result of 
this, they displayed the highest cash expenditure on improved 
seeds and fertilizers, ie an average of K45.00 per household 
compared to K24.60 for the tobacco growers. This reflects 
the fact that while the tobacco growers were largely dependent 
on LLDP credit for inputs, the improved maize growers, probably 
duectorthe diversity in their cash income resources, used cash 
purchases to counter the imbalances.
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2. DESCRIPTION OF SURVEY RESULTS.
A. HouseholdrCharacterlcs
1.Household Size
The mean household size among the 158 households surveyed, 
was found to he 4.7 persons. While the mean household size did 
not differ very much among the administrative units covered by 
the survey £dee table 5*l(a)J it differed considerably among the 
various typologies of households as table 5.1(b) indicates.
Table 5.1(a) Mean Household Size by Administràtive Unit.
ADMINISTRATIVE UNIT IHJIffiER
4 14 29 . _33 .ALL
Number of Households 
interviewed <40 39 39 40 158
Mean Household Size 4.8 4.9 4.6 4.7 4.7
Table 5.1(b) Distribution of HouseholdsSize by Household Category
Number of Members Household Category
in Flousehold 1 11 111 IV ALL
(% of Households)
1-2 34.6 29.1 6.8 14.1 18.4
3-4 42.3 22.6 18.2 29.8 27.3
5-c 23.1 25.9 34.1 36.9 31.7
7-8
— 13.2 27.3 17.5 17.1
9-10 6.5 6.8 1.8 3.8
11 and over — — 6.8 1.3
100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0
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I II III IV All
Average for Category 3.3 4.6 6.2 4.7 A . l
n= 26 31 44 57 158
Table 5.1(b), clearly indicates that category 1 households 
(female-headed), with a mean household size of 3-3 persons per 
household, were the smallest, while category 111 (tobacco 
growers) were the largest, with a mean household size of 6.2 
persons per household. Less than 25% of category 1 households 
had more than 3-4 members in them, while about 75% of category 111 
hbùseholds had more than 3-4 members. Categories 11 and IV 
households had more or less the same mean size (4.6 and 4.7 persons» 
respectively).
11. Main Occupation of Household Head.
The survey results indicated that the various household 
typologies differed in their involvement with farming. Overall,
85% of the household, heads interviewed reported that they were 
full-time own-farm operators, while 13% combined farm activities 
with other non-farm activities, and 2% were engaged in full-time 
non-farm activities, relying entirely on the labour of bther 
family members and/or hired people to do the farm work (see table 
5.1(d). However, 98% of group 111 household heads claimed to be 
employed full time on their own farms - which tends to reflect 
both the labour intensive nature and the profitability of the 
tobacco enterprise.
81%, 87% and 77% of categories 1, 11, and IV also reported 
to be fully engaged in own farming. It is interesting to note 
that whilè part-time farmers in groups 1 and 11 mostly combined 
farming with casual employment on other peoples' farms and/or 
petty trading (such as brewing beer, selling handicrafts, etcj, 
the part-time farmers in group IV were largely engaged in 
business enterprises (such as transport, retail trading, etc) 
and other off-farm emplpyment activities.
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111. Age of Household Head.
The mean age of the household heads surveyed was 46.7 years 
(table 5,1c ). 55% of them were below 50 years old, 37% were
between 50 and 70 years and 8% were over 70 years old. There 
were marked differences in age distribution among the various 
typologies. For example, category 1 (female-headed) heads 
tended to be the most eldery (mean age 57.5 years), with over 
75% of them in the 50 and above age group. This reflected the 
fact that these households were mostly headed by elderly single 
women, most of them either widowed or divorced (constituting 
80% of the group) as table 5.1(f) indicates.
On the other hand, group IV (improved maize growers) comprised 
of the youngest farmers (mean age 40,6 years), 53% of these 
farmers were below 40 years old. The tobacco growers, though 
considerably older than the improved maize growers, tended to be 
a little younger than the group 11 farmers, although the age gap 
between the two groups was not very large. (table 5.1 (c).
Table 5.1(c) ?Age of Household Head.
(% of Households Category
AGE GROUP 1 11 111 IV TOTAL
Less than 20 years
20-29 years 16.1 11.4 24.6 15.8
30-39 22.6 20.5 28.1 20.2
40-49 23.1 6.5 20.5 22.8 19.0
50-59 42.3 22.6 27.3 10.5 22.8
6O-69 7.7 22.6 15.9 4.0 15.2
70 and over 26.9 9.7 4.5 — 7.6
100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0
Average 57.5 48.1 47.3 40.6 46.7
n= 26 44 .. 17. , 158
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Table 5.1(d) Main Occupation of Household Head,
(% of Households).
1 11 111 IV TOTAL
Own Farm Full-time 80.8 87 ;i 97.7 77.2 85.4
Others' Farm Fulltime
Part-time Farm 15.4 12.9 2.3 19.3 12.7
Other Non-farm 3.8 — — 3.5 1.9
100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0
n= 26 31 . 4.4 57 158
IV. T.evel of Formal Education.
'59% of the farmers surveyed had never attended any formal 
schooling, 39% had had some primary education and only 2% had 
completed primary education. It was mostly the younger farmers 
who had attended school. This is reflected in the way level of 
formal education attained by household head is distributed among 
the various household typologies, as table 5.1(e) indicates.
It was pointed out above that the improved maize growers 
(category IV), tended to be the youngest. Here the evidence 
indicates that, they also tend to be the relatively more 
educated, as 6l% of the farmers in this group attended some 
primary school leaving only 33% who had had no formal schooling. 
This compares with 15%, 16% and 41% of the groups 1, 11, and'111, 
respectively, who attended some primary school (there being none 
who completed primary in these groups).
V. Membership of Farmers' Club.
The survey results indicated that quite a respectable 
proportion of farmers (64%) belonged to farmers clubs. However 
the distribution of club membership among the household 
typologies was very uneven. In category IV (improved maize 
growers), 93% of the farmers belonged to farmers’ club and in 
group 111 (tobacco growers), the proportion was slightly lower 
(82%). For groups 1 and 11, only 12% and 29% of the farmers 
blaimed ito belong to farmers' club.
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It should be mentioned that, currently, farmers' clubs 
are considered by the majority of farmers as vehicles for 
farm credit, since the new credit policy in the whole bountry 
is to provide credit through farmers' clubs (or other recognised 
groups) rather than through individuals. This has meant two 
things. Firstly, those farmers, who for one reason or the other, 
do not intend to take farm credit do not bother to join the 
clubs. Secondly, as the responsibility of credit repayment, 
under this system, becomes a group responsibility (as any 
group which defaults is refused credit the following year), 
acceptance of club membership very much depends on an individuals* 
potential to repay credit. This potential is mostly based on 
the individuals' past success in producing a marketable surplus 
of those crops for which input credit is readily available, ie 
improved maize and tobacco (and to some extent groundnuts). It 
is therefore not surprising to see that it is mostly improved 
maize growers and tobacco producers (v/ho happen to be relatively 
young and educated) who gain access to these clubs.
It is only fair to mention that the project management is 
trying hard to change this image of the farmers' clubs, by 
encouraging the clubs to take up more diversified roles. For 
example, they are encouraged to take up welfare aspects, such 
as raising funds to help needy club members. They are also 
encouraged to take group approach to the agricultural develop­
ment problem, by considering the club as a vehicle through 
which farmers can learn from one another and teach each other 
better methods of agriculture. In other v/ords, the objective 
is to instil a spirit of self-help and togetherness among the 
club members. If this succeeds, a remarkable breakthrough will have 
been made in the smallholder development strategy of the country.
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Table 5.1(e) Level of Formal Education Attained by Household Head.
(% of Households)
1 11 111 IV Total
Never Attended School 84.6 83.9 59.1 33.3 58.9
Some Primary 15.4 16.1 40.9 61.4 39.2
Completed Primary — — 5.3 1..9
100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0
n= 26 _ 31 44 . 57 158
Table 5.1(f) Marital Status of Head of Household
(% of Households)
1 11 111 IV Total
Married - non-polygamist 3.8 74.2 65.9 77.2 61.4
Polygamist 11.5 9.7 29.5 15.8 17.7
Divorced 30.8 _ 2.3 5.7
Widowed 46.2 16.1 2.3 11.4
Never married 7.8 — — 7.0 3.8
100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0
n= 26 31 44 57 158
Table 5.1(g)* Membership of Farmers Club
(% of Household Heads)
1 11 111 IV ALL
YES 11.5 29.0 81.8 93.0 64.0
NO 88.5 71.0 18.2 7.0 36.0
100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0
n= 26 31 44 57 158
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B. -FARM CHARACTERISTICS.
1. Farm Size
The mean size of cultivated area among the households 
interviewed was 1.66 hectares. With a mean household size of 
4.7 persons, the above figure implies that the mean cultivated 
hectarage per capita among the sampled households was 0.35 
hectares. The size distribution of the farms indicate that well 
over 75% of the households' cultivated farms bf.leès- thân 2 
hectares; However, a more interesting picture emerges when we 
consider the size distribution of farms among the households.
It was observed that 96.2% of category 1 households had 
cultivated farms of less than 2 hectares, while the correspo­
nding proportions for the other groups were 90.3%, 65.9% and 
70.2% for categories 11, 111, and IV respectively (see table 
5.2(a). This implies that category 1 households, had on 
average, the smallest farms (average 0.9 ha), followed by 
category 11 (average 1.2 ha), while category 111 households 
had the largest farms (average 2.1 ha), followed by category 
IV households (average 2.0). A similar pattern was exhibited 
when average per capita hectarage was considered, except that 
category IV households had the highest per-capita hectarage 
(0.41 ha), followed by category 111 households (0.33 ha).
However, the size distribution of cultivated areas among 
the households does not necessarily reflect the access to land 
of the various households. Table 5.2(b) indicates that among 
category 1 households, who have the smallest farms, only 
69% of the households had cultivated all the land available 
to them. This constrasts with 84%, 93% and 86% for categories 
11, 111 and IV, respectively, suggesting that the size of the 
cultivated area is determined by other factors in addition to 
land availability per s_e. We shall examine this issue in 
Chapter 6.
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Table 5.2(a) Size . Distribution of Cultivated Land per
Household and Category - 1980/81.
FARM SIZE HOUSEHOLD CATEGORY
(% of Households)
1 11 111 IV Total
less than 0.4 ha. 23.1 9.7 2; 3 5.3 8.2
0.4 ha. 57.1 48.4 15.9 33.3 35.4
1.1 - 1.8 ha. 15.4: 32.2 47.7 31.6 33.5
1.9 - 2.6 ha. 3.8 6.4 15.9 15.8 12.0
2.7 “ 4.8 ha. 3.2 18.2 8.8 8.9
5.9 and over — — — 5:3 1.9
100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0
Mean hectarage/house­
hold (ha) 0.9 1.2 2.1 2.0 1.7
Mean hectarage/capita
(ha) 0.26 0.28 0.33 0.41 0.35
n= '■ 26 31 ...M 57 157
Table 5.2(b) Land Cultivated - as Proportion of Total Land
Available to Household.
' . - ' \ 1 : i 1 11 Ill IV Total
All the land 69.2 83.9 93.2 86.0 84.8
More than half the land 23.1 13.0 6.8 12.3 12.0
less than half the land 7.7 3.1 ■ '— 1.7 3.2
100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0
n= 26 _ .11. 44 ... 5.7 158
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^ablje 5*2_J^ c) Change in Amount of land Used by Household during 
the Past 5 years.
(% of Households)
1 11 Ill IV Total
NONE 30.8 61.3 61.4 73.7 60.8
YES - gave some av/ay 23.1 6.8 1.8 6.3
- lent some away 38.5 38.7 29.5 21.0 29.7
- acquired more land 7 i 7 “ 2.3 3.5 3.2
100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0
n- 26 31 44 . 57 158
Table 5.2(d) Adequacy of Land Available for Household Needs
HOUSEHOLD CATEGORY
1 11 111 IV ALL
YES 42.3 38.7 47.7 28.1 38.0
NO 57.7 61.3 52.3 71.9 62.0
100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0
n= 26 .. .5.1... .. 4..1.. 57 158
11. Land Availability.
The issue of land availability and its effect on farm size 
in LLDP is not clear from our survey results. Table 5.2(c) 
indicates that overall, 36% of the households interviewed had 
experienced a decline in the ^mount of land available to them 
during the previous 5 years, largely through giving some away 
to relatives and adult children (6%) and for lending it away 
usually to better-off relatives needing more land (30%)
Only 3% of the sample reported having augmented their land 
holdings, either by farming virgin land or acquiring it from 
relatives, etc, during the 5 year period. This strongly 
suggests that land pressure is eminent in the area.
V/hen availability of land to the various categories is
considered, it is seen that those households with the smallest
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cultivated areas (eg, category l) tended to have some considerable 
proportions of their available land holdings uncultivated (Table 
5.2(b), as mentioned above. At the same time table 5.2(c) 
indicates that most of category 1 households (62%) had experienced 
a decline in the amount of land available to them, during the 5 
year period, this compared with 39%» 36% and 23% for categories 
11, 111, and IV, This clearly indicates that the poorer house­
holds had less land available to them then, than five years past,
offer
The age structure of the household typologies seems to^a partial 
explanation for this aspect. Table 5.1(c) indicates that category 
1 households are in general headed by older people, followed by 
category 11 ones, while the household heads of categories 111 and 
IV tend to be relatively younger. This suggests that categories 
1 and 11 are at a point in the family cycle where the more energe­
tic members of the family (adult children) are leaving or have 
left the household to start their own households. This results 
in the high proportion of households in this category giving 
away land to others - hence leading to a decline in land availa­
bility to the category. Attthe same time, the link between 
availability of labour (family) and farm size is revealed. It 
is seen that as these categories lose their energetic members, 
their ability to cultivate land effectively declines, and this 
results in their tendency to lend their land away to relatives 
and friends (as opposed to outright giving away - as they intend 
keeping such land for younger children)'.
Table 5.2(d), which indicates the adequacy or inadequacy of 
land available to family needs, supports most of the points 
raised above. In the first place, the table shows that a conside­
rable proportion of the households surveyed (62%) considered the 
land available to them as inadequate for family needs - thus 
suggesting the rising pressure on the land. On the other hand, 
the fact that category 1 households (with the smallest cultivated 
area) had the second largest proportion of households v/ho conside­
red their land as adequate for household needs, supports the view 
that such households were at a point in time, in the family life 
cycle which represented both reduced workers and consumers. This 
suggests that their small cultivated area were a result of reduced 
labour availability as well as reduced consumption requirements.
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However, the data does not allow us to say which of the two 
factors is stronger^
Table 5.2(d) also provides a very interesting case. That is 
category 111 has the largest proportion of households who indica­
ted that they had adequate land for their needs (4-S%), while 
category IV, had the smallest proportion (28%). The family cycle 
aspect cannot be applied here as a full explanation of the obser-- 
ved pattern, largely because the difference in the mean ages of 
the household heads of the two categories is not that large - ie 
47 years for group 111 and 41 years for group IV. A more likely 
explanation appears to be the type of enterprises the two house­
hold categories engage in. As pointed out previously, category 
IV households are engaged in production of improved maize, and 
are the more commercially oriented households. As such, they 
tend to have a higher craving for land, so as to enhance their 
income positions further. On the other hand, category 111 house­
holds were predominantly engaged in production of tobacco. 
Although some of them grvvr improved maize, their engagement in 
this enterprise appeared to be largely for subsistence purposes. 
And, as tobacco production was subject to quota limitations, 
their cash income positions could not be substantially affected 
by the availability of extra land. More important, it appears 
that due to the heeyy labour demands associated with the tobacco 
enterprise, tobacco producing households had less spare labour 
than the hybrid maize producers (whose peak labour demands w^ ere 
more amenable to hired labour due to the associated sharp peak). 
As a result, most of the tobacco growing households (48%) felt
satisfied with the sizes of their farms.
It therefore appears that a household’s size of cultivated 
land was dependent upon three main factors, namely:
1. Labour availability.
2. Degree of commercialization (as determined by the type 
of crop enterprise undertaken).
3. Physical availability of land.
While it can be said that the third factor was largely 
outside the influence of the individual household, the other 
two were very much determined by the households’ resources.
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We shall return.to consider them in more detail ih Chapter 6.
C. LABOUR AVAILABILITY.
1. Family Labour
Family labour is the predominant source of labour for farin 
work among the smallholder households in LLDP, and indeed, for 
most of the smallholding community in Malawi. According to our 
survey, 68% of the households interviewed reported that they 
depended entirely on family labour for agricultural work during 
the 1980/81 season. The remaining 32% supplemented their family 
labour with hired labour. No household was found to be fully 
dependent on hired labour for farm work.
Household size is the main indicator of family labour 
availability. As indicated above, the mean household size was 
found to be 4.8 persons. However, while household size can be 
taken as a proxy to availability of family labour, it should be 
borne in mind that it does not give an indication of the quality 
of labour available as this depends on other factors. Age compo­
sition of the household labour force is one such factor. In 
table 5.3(a) household labour available is pfè sent éd.: in' adult 
equivalents - that is after adjusting the household size by 
the age composition of the members following the conversion 
table below:
Age group less than 10 years 10-14 15-19 20-59 60 +
Adult equivalent
coefficient NIL 0.25 0.75 1.0 0.50
Note that the coefficents do not distinguish quality of 
labour along sex lines. This is largely due to the fact that the 
present writer does not agree with the procedure of many researchers 
which upholds this d i s t i n c t i o n . T h e  author’s observation in 
LLDP indicated that in households where female and male workers 
were present, the men and women engaged themselves equally in 
the most labour demanding exercises, such as , weeding, banding, 
manure or fertilizer application, harvesting, etc. Gone seem 
to be the days when men felled trees and tilled the land while 
women tended, harvested and processed the crops. Today men and 
women are found working side by side, say in the tobacco barn, 
grading their crop, a job which was exclusively for men. As
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such, there seems no justification for grading agricultural 
labour along sex lines.
Household (in Adult Equivalents).
Adult Equivalents TYPOLOGY (%)
1 11' 111 IV ALL
0- 1.5 30.7 22.5 9.0 3.6 20.9
1.6 - 2.5 50.0 54.8 43.2 43.8 46.8
2.6 - 3.5 15.4 16.1 20.5 33.3 17.7
3.6 - 4.5 . 3.9 0.6 20.5 17.5 12.0
4.6 and over — 6.8 1.8 2.5
100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0
Average Af/household 1.4 1.9 2.7 2.0 2.1
n= 26 31 44 ... 57 . 158
Table 5.3(a) indicates that the average household had a work 
force of 2.1 adults equivalents. This implies that the typical 
family workforce comprised of the two spouses - plus one or two 
children of working age. However, about 20% of the sample had 
only li workers (AEs) or less, while only 14.5% had more than 3.5 
■workers. Almost half the sample had between 1-& and 2& workers.
The table clearly indicates that Group 1 households, because 
of the abse-n^-e of the male spouse, had the smallest family work­
forces (average of 1.4 ftJEs). It is evident that for this group, 
male absenteeism had a serious consequence on family labour 
availability. Groups 11 and IV had mean labour forces which 
were more or less equivalent to the mean available labour force 
for the whole sample, ie, 1.9 and 2.0 respectively - suggesting 
that in a majority of cases, such households had only the two 
spouses available to work. This implies that the children from 
such households did not usually stay to work on the household 
farm once they grew up. Discussions during the interviews 
suggested that for group 11 households, because of their weak
economic position, the grown up children either tended to break 
away from the nucleas family to start their own families, or go
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away from home in search of work - psually of the unskilled 
type. For group IV households, on the other hand, the 
children tended to be relatively better educated and therefore 
moved from the farm into urban employment. Group 111 house­
holds had the largest average family labour forces available 
(average 2.7 AEs), a direct result of the large family sizes 
associated with this group. Again discussions during the 
interview tended to suggest that migration of members from these 
households tended to be minimal due to the improved income pros­
pects offered by the tobacpo enterprise. However, as the 
survey did not specifically seek to explore the reasons why 
other households had fewer members in residence than others, an 
omission which is now deeply regretted, the above explanation 
should be interpreted as speculative. More research is defini­
tely needed in this very important area, before more forceful 
conclusions can be formed.
11, Hired Labour.
As indicated above, about & of the sample reported that 
they had used one type of hired labour or the other for 
agricultural purposes during 'the 1980/81 season. Due to lack 
of precise records regarding labour hiring, it was not possible 
to find out the exact duration for which labour was hired. But 
most of the labour was hired during December and January (the 
crop establishment period) for weeding purposes (reported by 
54% of the households hiring labour). Temporary labour (ganyu), 
of a piece work nature, was the most popular type of labour 
hired (reported by 68% of the households hiring labour), refle­
cting the seasonal nature of the type of work involved. 46% of 
those hiring labour reported paying cash for labour, 38% paid 
in kind while 16% paid for their hired labour for both in cash 
and in kind. The average expenditure on hired labour, for the 
labour hiring households was K32 per household.
Looking at the various household typologies, it is observed 
that only 15% of the households in category 1 reported hiring 
labour during the 1980/81 season for agricultural work, paying 
for it largely in kind. For group 11 only 13% reported to have 
hired labour also paying mostly in kind for it. Given that 
category 1 households had the smallest family forces (1.4 AEs),
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it would be expected that these households would tend to supple­
ment their family labour with hired labour. The fact that the 
available evidence suggests that this was not the case seems to 
indicate the very weak economic position of these households.
In addition, it gives a pointer to the fact that these house­
holds plus category 11 households are the main sources of hired 
labour in the area,and. evidence provided in table 6. 1
indicates that temporary employment is very important 
source of cash income for these households.
Group 111 households had the highest proportion of labour 
hiring households (52%), despite their very large family labour 
forces as indicated in table 5, (3a). This is partly due to the 
large cultivated areas; assodihtedv.Mththis group and partly 
due to the fact that the tobacco enterprise is very labour 
intensive.
It is interesting to note that quite a substantial propo­
rtion of households in this category 27.4% paid their labour 
either in kind, or both in cash and kind, with 25% having paid 
in cash. This could largely be due to the fact that this 
group of farmers does grow a substantial amount of maize in 
addition to tobacco, and obtains higher output levels than the 
average farmer, due to their privileged access to input credit.
As they consider tobacco to be their main cash earner, they tend 
to use maize as payment for such needed labour on their tobacco 
plotè which the marginal farmers, usually with food deficits 
at the particular time of the year, prefer to cash. This is 
supported by the evidence provided by Kydd (1982) which indicates 
that a very small proportion of farm cash income for tobacco 
growers (less than 10% of total farm, receipts) came from maize. ( 9)
Group IV households have the second largest proportion of 
labour hiring households (32%), and the majority of them ( 72% 
of the labour hirers) paid for their hired labour in cash. This 
strongly suggests their diversified cash earning opportunities 
and their greater degree of commercialization.
Unfortunately, the only indicator available from our survey 
which gives a measure of the extent of use of hired labour by the 
various household categories is'the total expenditure on hired 
labour, presented in table 5.3(d). Given that different types 
of hired labour (say child labour as opposed to adult labour)
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command different prices at different times of the year (due 
to the differences in activities performed), total expendi­
ture on hired labour may not provide a very satisfactory 
measure of amount of hired labour used by a household. However, 
due to the time and financial limitations on our study this 
short coming could not be helped, suffice it to say that any 
tentative conclusions emerging from such a measure should be 
viewed within those limitations.
From table 5.3(d), it is quite evident that categories 
1 and 11 made the least use of hired labour. Those who hired 
labour in these two categories spent on average K7.1 and K5»2 
per cultivated hectare, respectively, to supplement their 
family labour, forces, which for the two categories averaged
1.6 workers per cultivated hectare. This contrasts with 
average expenditures on hired labour of K12.9 and K23-4 per 
cultivated hectare, to supplement average workforces of 1.2 
and 1.1 workers per cultivated hectare, for categories 111 and 
IV, respectively. Such evidence strongly suggests that the 
ability of those households in categories 111 and IV to hire 
labour had a very strong bearing on their cultivated hectara- 
ges and farm incomes. We shall take up this issue in more 
detail in the next chapter.
Table 5.3(b) Types ofï’Labour Hired.
Types of Labour Employed (% of Households)
1 11 111 IV Total
None Hired 84.6 83.9 47.7 68.4 68.4
Temporary labour hired 11.5 12.9 38.6 17.5 21.5
Permanent labour 
(more than 6 months) 6.8 1.8 2,5
Customery labour hired 3.9 2.3 8.8 4.4
Mixture — 3.2 4.5 3.5 3.2
100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100,0
n- 26 31 44 57 158
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Table 5.3(c) Form of Payment For Hired Labour.
Form of Payment Household Typology (% of households
1 11 111 IV All
Nil (no labour hired) 84.6 83.9 47.7 68,4 68,4
Cash 7.7 20.4 22,8 14.4
In kind 7.7 9.7 24.9 3.5 12.2
Both — _  .3.2 _ 7.0 5.3 5.0
100.0 100.0 100.0 100,0 100.0
n= 26 31 44 57 158
Table 5.3(d) Household Expenditure on Hired Labour.
EXPENDITURE % of Households
1 11 111 IV All
Nil 84.6 83.9 47.7 68.4 68,4
Less than K5 3.8 :3.2 3.8
K5 - 10 3.8 9.7 37.5 20,5 11.4
Kll - 20 7.6 25.0 t 6.8 7.0
K21 - 50 16.7 9.1 5.1
K51,- 100 12.5 6.8 3.8
KlOl and over — — 4.2 6.8 5.1
100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0
Average cost/household 
(K) '6.38 ..6:25 27.80 46.80' 31.50
Average Expenditure 
per cultivated ha(K) 7.1 5.2 12.9 23.4 18.6
n= 26 31 44 57 158
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D. INPUT USE AND FARM CREDIT.
I* • Farm Inputs Applied on Crops.
The most widely used inputs in LLDP in the 1980/81 seasop 
were fertilizers and farm manure (on maize and tobacco), sulphur 
dust (on groundnuts) and pesticides (on maize and tobacco).
Table 5.4(a) indicates that 40% of the households sampled reported 
to have used fertilizers during the year, 24% used both manures 
and fertilizers, 4% used manures only while 31% reported that 
they had not applied any farm input to their crops. On the whole, 
a reasonably high proportion of households in the sample (69%), 
used farm inputs of one type or the other. The distribution of 
input use among the various typologies highlights the typical 
problem for groups 1 and 11. As table 5.4(a) indicates, 65% 
and 61% of category 1 and 11 households, respectively reported 
that they had not used any inputs. This contrasts with 2% and 
21% for categories 111 and IV, respectively.
Table 5.4(a) Types of Inputs Used by Household Typologies.
TYPE OF INPUT HOUSEHOLD TYPOLOGY (%)
I 11 111 IV All
None 65.4 61.3 2.3 21.1 31.0
Fertilizers 26.9 25.8 43.2 50.9 39.9
Manure s 7.7 6. 5 3.5 3.8
Fertilizers & Manures 6.5 52.3 22.8 24.1
Other — — 2.3 1.7 1.3
100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0
n= 26 31 44 57 158
Table 5.4(b) indicates that 33% of those interviev/ed expret- 
ssed the view that they felt that they were using adequate 
amounts of inputs on their crops. Of those who felt dissatisfied 
with their level of input use, 26% said the price of inputs was 
too high, 18% said they were not given enough credit and 22%' 
cited other reasons, the commonest - one being that they were afraid
165
either to take credit or to increase their level of credit for 
fear of the likely consequences to befall them if they failed 
to meet their credit commitments. Groups 1 and 11 g^.d the 
largest proportion of households blaming high prices (50% and 
39% respectively) and expressing unease with taking credit 
(27% and 36% respectively). Most of groups 111 (55%) and IV 
(39%) households expressed satisfaction with the levels of 
inputs they were applying to their crops. Of those who did not, 
the main complaint was inadequacy of credit (54%).
Table 5.4(b) Reasons for Using Less Inputs than Required^
Reason Hc^usehold TypPlogy .(%)
1 11 111 IV ALT,
None • 50.0 38.7 15.9 15.8 25.9
Prices too high 15.4 12.9 18.2 22.8 18.4
Inadequate credit 7.7 12.9 54.5 38.6 32.9
Other 26.9 35.5 11.4 22.8 22.8
100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0
n= 26 ._11.. 44 57 158
II. Credit
The results of the survey indicated that LLDP was the 
only source of input credit for the smallholder community in 
the project area. However, the author is of the opinion that 
some of the poorer farmers who did not qualify for LLDP credit 
were able in some circumstances, to obtain input credit via 
their wealthier friends and / or Relatives. It is possible 
for example that some better off farmers with access to input 
credit might have taken inputs on credit , over and above 
their requirements and chanelled the rest to their poorer 
relations. Such secondary credit could not be recorded by 
our survey as both recipients and donors were not keen to 
divulge such information for fear of reprisals from the 
project credit staff.
166
,, , Table^5.4(c) shows that 57% of the households interviewed 
got farm credit from LLDP during the 1980/81 season. Hovæver, 
the table indicates that this credit was very unevenly distribu­
ted among the household typologies. For example, only 2 of the 
26 category 1 households (8%) got credit, while the corresponding 
proportion for category 11 households was 22.6%. This compares 
with 77% and 88%, for categories 111 and IV, respectively. This 
clearly indicates that typologies 1 and 11 farmers got very 
little credit, accounting for less than 10% of the credit 
recipients. This bias in credit allocation towards categories
III and IV households is quite evident in table 5.4(f).
According to this table, 65% and 45% of categories 1 and 11 
households, respectively, had never received any credit from 
LLDP (at least for the five consecutive years prior to our 
survey). This compares to only 7% and 5% for categories 111 and
IV households, respectively. On the other hand, the table 
indicates that 5% and 25% of Categories 111 and IV households, 
respectively, had been in receipt of LLDP credit for each of 
the previous 5 years prior to the survey.
Table 5.4(c) Source of Farm Credit
Source Household Typology (%)
1 11 111 IV All
None 92.3 77.4 22.7 12.3 41.1
LLDP 7.7 22.6 77.3 87.7 58.9
Other — — — — —
100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0
n= 26 . 31 44 57 150
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Table 5.4(d) Type of Inputs Obtained on Credit
Household Typology (%)
1 11 111 IV All
None 92.4 77.4 22.7 12.3 41.1
Fertilizers 13.0 40.9 17.5 23.4
Improved seeds 3.8 6.4 21.1 7.6
seeds/fertilizers 3.8 3.2 36.4 47.4 27.2
others — 1.7 0.7
100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0
n= 26 31 . 44 50 . -93.
Table 5.4(e) Size Distribution of Credit Among the Households
taking credit.
Amount of Credit Household Typology (%)
1 11 111 IV Total
K5 - KIO 2.9 10.0 6.5
Kll - K20 100.0 71.4 17.6 24.0 26.9
K21 -::k 50 __ 28.6 52.9 42.0 44.1
K51 - KlOO 14.7 16.0 14.0
KIOC- and over — — 11.8 8.0 8. 6
100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0
K15.5 K21.2 K47.0 K41.1 K41.2
n= 2 7 34 50 ....
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Household Typology (%)
Number of Times 1 11 111 IV Total
0 65.4 45.2 6.8 5.3 23.4
1 11.5 9.7' 2.3 5.3 ::6;3
2 11.5 16.1 6.8 24.6 15.8
3 3.8 16.1 11.4 26.3 16.5
4 3.8 9.7 15.9 14.0 12.0
5 3.8 3.2 56.8 24.6 25.9
n=
100.0
26
100.0 
___11
100.0
44
100.0
57
100.0
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I Most of the credit was used for either seed/fertilizer
(reported by 48% of the households) or fertilizer packages 
(reported by 39% of the sample). Only 13% of the households 
reported to have used credit for purchasing improved seeds (and 
that was mostly groundnut seeds). No other inputs were reported 
to have been obtained on credit. The average amount of laan per 
credit jbaking’ .-hôusehold was -H41.2 [see table 5.4(e)J- In 
general terms, the distribution of credit (terms of loan size) 
among the credit recipients was more or less a normal one, with 
the majority of households (44>i%) having loans which fell 
within the K21 - K50 range. This reflects the fact that during the 
1980/81 season, there was an element of credit rationing 
aihonfe the-apÿlicahtsÿ '.which arese out of an increasing desire 
by LLDP to increase the credit clientele and at the same time to 
reduce the dependence of the better-off farmers on credit, thereby 
inducing them to increasingly rely on purchasing inputs on cash. 
This aspect is supported by the evidence presented in table 5.4(b) 
which shows that 55% and 39% of categories 111 and IV households 
(the most credit worthy ones) expressed the feeling that LLDP was 
giving them " less input credit than their credit needs.
During the interviews, quite a number of these households said 
that they had been given less inputs on credit than they had 
applied for. In view of the evidence presented in table 5.4(f), 
this is a very welcome development in the project area. It is 
hoped that more and more of the wealthier farmers, will not only 
be subjected to some form of credit rationing, but will eventually
169
be weaned off, to give chance to the more needy farmers to get 
inputs on credit. However, this author does not pretend that 
this is an easy task, for there are many obstacles. For 
example, most of these better-off farmers, represent the power­
ful and more enlightened rural people. As such, they are the 
likely people to hold offices in the various local groups
(such as farmers clubs and Village Planning Committees) through
(1 0)
which LLDP works to enhance local participation. Access to
credit and other facilities offered by LLDP, are the main 
incentives which ensures their co-operation in the Project's 
efforts. Therefore reducing the amount of benefits accruing 
to them may not be without some repurcusions to the project 
success, but if this results in greater participation among the 
poorer households, it will have been a worthy price to pay, and 
its long term benefits may well outweigh the short term dis­
advantages.
111. Cash Purchases of Inputs.
Our survey results indicate that not all farm inputs used 
in LLDP were obtained on credit. A subbtantial number of house­
holds (comprising 38% of the sample), bought inputs for cash.
50% of those who made cash purchases of inputs bought fertilizers, 
32% bought both fertilizers and improved seeds and 15% spent cash 
on farm implements (especially the ox-cart - for farm transport). 
Cash purohaeesc of'improvedr seeds" were negligible. This,- appears 
to have been due to two reasons. The first is that, improved 
seeds were available mostly as seed/fertilizer packages 
(either on credit or for cash), to ensure their success. The 
second is that, there were usually supply problems involved, 
which prevented availability of improved seeds on cash. Those 
that were available were usually provided as seed/fertilizer 
packages, to give the extension personnel a leverage on the 
farmers.
170
Table 5.4(g) Type of Inputs Purchased on Cash
Inputs Household Typology (%) . .
1 11 111 IV All
Fertilizers 100.0 100.0 63.0 16.7 50.0
Insecticides/pesticides _ 4.2 1.7
Improved seeds 4.2 1.7
Farm Implements 3.7 33.3 15.0
Fertilizers and Improved
seeds — — 33.3 41.6 31.6
100.0 100.0 100:0 100.0 100.0
n= 4 5 27 24 60
As expected, categories 1 and 11 households participated 
least in buying inputs on cash, as they comprised only 15% of the 
households making cash purchases of inputs, and the average cash 
outlay per household (purchasing inputs) in these two categories 
was KIO.2, the equivalent of 1^ bags (50 kg/bag) of say Sulphate 
of Ammonia fertilizer. On the other hand, category 111 house­
holds comprised the largest proportion (45%) of cash purchasers 
of inputs, spending most of their cash on fertilizers. The 
average cash outlay per household (purchasing inputs on cash) for 
this typology was K37.7. Category IV households tended to buy 
mostly seed/fertilizer packages [see table 5.4(g)].
Overall, it can be said that the proportion of households 
using inputs is quite high (69%). Credit was the main source of 
these inputs (reported by 59% of sample), supplemented by cash 
purchases (reported by 38% of sample). However, the survey 
results have indicated that categories 1 and 11 households 
participate minimally in the use of inputs, with only 16% of 
them getting credit and the same proportion buying inputs on 
cash. In the next chapter, we shall examine in more detail the 
factors that might be responsible for this state of affairs.
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Table 5.4(h) Cash Outlays on Farm Inputs
Amount of Cash Household Category (%)
1 11 Ill IV Total
Nil 84.6 83.8 38.6 57.9 62.0
Less than K5 1.9 0.6
K5 - KIO 11.5 9.8 2.3 5.3 6.3
Kll - K20 3.9 6.4 29.5 14.0 13.9
K21 4- K50 8.2 12.3 9.5
K51 - KlOO 2.3 1.9 1.3
KlOl and over — 9.1 7.0 5.1
100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0
n= 26 1 1 . 44 57 158
Main Constraints to Farming Operations.
Each of the households interviewed was asked to state what 
was considered as the most limiting conètràiÈitcontthe''.housëhbîd*s 
prospect from farming. The largest proportion of the households 
(37%) claimed that land shortage was their main problem. This 
was followed by lack of funds for farm inputs' (28.5%), labour 
shortage (19%) and other (10%), The prominence of the land short­
age factor highlights the eminence of the rising pressure on the 
land in the area. However, it needs some careful consideration. 
At fhce value, this finding is at variance with the hypothesis 
advanced in this study, ie, that land availability per se, is not 
the main limiting factor to most households, for increasing their 
farm incomes, but rather that labour is. Nevertheless, when the 
main constraints faced by each of the categories are examined, 
the predominance of the labour factor can be established. For 
example, although land shortage features predominantly among the 
better-off households (categories 111 and IV), the labour 
availability problem is still relevant. to these households. As 
indicated earlier on, these two groups are associated with a 
high level of labour hiring. This implies that the availability 
of cheap labour (from the poorer households) masks the labour 
a-vailability problem of those households (especially since
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it was assumed in the appraisal projection of ILDP .that households 
would use family labour for farm work). More important, this 
aspect of hiring labour merely transfers the labour problem from 
the better-off households to the poorer ones, making the situation 
of the latter group more serious. At the same time, table 5*4(1) 
Indicates that labour shortage and lack of farm inputs predominate 
among the poorer households. A closer investigation reveals that 
these two factors (labour availability, and lack of inputs) are 
closely causally linked, with the direction of causality running 
from labour availability to lack of inputs (especially those 
provided on credit). This implies that even those households
who said lack of farm inputs was their main constraint, it was 
actually lack of adequate labour (through its link to availability 
of inputs on credit), which was at the centre of the matter.
It therefore appears that the labour availability situation in the 
area, warrants more attention. It is for this reason that most 
of the next chapter will be devoted to a discussion of this issue.
Table 5.4(i) Major Constraints on Households* Farming Activities.
Constraint Household Typology (%)
1 11 111 IV All
Land shortage 26.9 32.3 40.9 40.4 36.7
Shortage of funds for input 34.6 38.7 25.0 22.8 28.5
Labour shortage 38.5 19.4 11.4 15.8 19.0
Inadequate extension __ _ 3.5 1.3
Low farm prices 
Other
'3.2 2.3 1.8 1.9
— 6. 5 20.5 15.8 12.7
100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0
26 31 44 57 158
(a) includes those who said they faced no constraints at all.
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E. Household Incomes
The estimation of incomes for rural households in most 
rural societies present many difficulties mostly due to the 
preddminance of subsistence production. Most of the rural 
households produce and consume goods and services that do not 
pass through formal marketing channels. This presents a 
problem of valuing such commodities. Even where the
commodities are marketed, or where "imputed values" are agreed 
upon, for the non-marketed output, the records to establish 
precisely how much of say commodity w^s produced, marketed and/or 
consumed by the household during a given period, do not exist. 
Besides, the goods and services involved are not homogeneous in 
terms of quality. - thereby rendering any attempts at valuation, 
using "imputed values", more or less useless. As such, any 
estimates of rural household incomes, in such circumstances, are 
at best, mere indicators of what the prevailing income position 
might have been.
This study faced precisely the same problems in trying to 
provide an estimate, of the existing pattern of income distri­
bution in LLDP (which is necessary in order to evaluate the 
inpact of the programme in the area). As such, the results 
presented below, should be regarded as a mere indicator of the 
situation, and should be interpreted cautiously. Three main 
indicators of household income were selected, namely:
(a) Subsistence income - ie estimated total output of 
maize (the main staiple food in the area)^ er 
household, for the year 1979/80.
(b) Farm-\ncome -r Estimated sales from crops and livestock 
(including poultry), for the 1979/80 season.
(c) Non Farm Income - Estimated cash receipts from non-farm 
sources such as off-farm employment, business and 
transfers.
1. Subsistence Income.
In LLDP, and indeed, for most of rural Malawi, it is the 
pride and wish of every household head to be self-sufficient
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in basic foodstuffs. As such, it could be said that it is 
the primary objective of all farm households in LLDP to 
provide themselves with adequate maize (the main staple), for 
the year. This proposition is strengthened b y ,the fact that all 
farm households in the area grew maize for own consumption.
While it is recognised that other minor crops such as cassava, 
sv/eet potatoes, finger millet, etc, are used for subsistence 
purposes (usually to supplement maize), because they were not 
grown by all the households, they were left out, from the food 
self-sufficiency indicator. Their absence, therefore, under­
estimates the food self-sufficiency position, especially of 
those households using them substantially. However, as 
indicated in chapter 2, these minor crops form a very insigni­
ficant proportion of the farming system in the area. Table 
5.5(a), therefore, presents the size distribution of total 
maize output levels per household, according to household 
typology.
season'.
Total maize output 
(200: lb bags) Household Typology (%)
1 11 111 IV All
Less than 2.5 19.2 16.1 1.8 7.0
2.5 - 5 30.B 22.6 15.9 19.3 20.9
6 - 7.5 34.6 12.9 4.5 21.1 17.1
8 - 10 11.5 38.7 25.0 12.3 20.9
11 - 20 3.8 6.5 15.9 7.0 8.9
Over 20 — 3.2 38.7 38.5 25.2
100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100,0
Average output 
per household (kg) 480 600 1780 ] 940 1390
26 31 44 57 158
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Table 5.5(b) Types of Livestock and Poultry Kept
Type Household Category (%)
1 11 111 IV All
None 19.2 32.3 2.3 14.0 15.2
Local cattle 3.8 13.8 1.8 5.1
Goats/sheep/pigs etc 26.9 19.4 11.4 12.3 15.8
Chicken, ducks, etc 34.6 16.1 15.9 31.6 24.7
Goats & chicken etc 11.5 19.4 20.5 19.3 18.3
Lppal cattle, goats, 
chickens etc 4.0 6.4 22.7 5.2 10.1
Other 6.4 13.6 15.8 10.8
100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0
n= 26 31 44 57 158
(a) includes dairy cattle - owned by only 1 .household.
Table 5.5(c) Reported Cash Receipts Prom Livestock and Poultry 
Sales.
Receipts Household" Typology (%)
1 11 111 IV All
Nil 69.2 74.2 56.8 71.9 67.8
Less than K5 15.4 13.6 8.8 9.5
K5 - KIO 7.8 11.4 3.5 5.7
Kll - K20 9.7 9.1 3.5 5.7
K21 - K30 3.8 6.4 2.3 2.5
K31 - K50 2.3 3.5 1.9
Over K50 3.8 9.7 4.5 8.8 6.9
100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0
Average per household 
in each category (K) ' 5.3 18.3 9.6 18.0 13.6
n= 26 31 44 57 15s
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Table 5.3(d) Reported Cash Receipts From Crop Sales 1979/80 
season.
Receipts Household Typology (%)
1 11 111 IV All
Nil 38.5 38.7 4.5 8.8 18.4
Less than K5 3.8 0.6
K5 " KIO 3.8 9.7 1.8 3.2
Kll - K20 11.5 12.9 _ 7.0 7.0
K21 - K30 3.8 6.5 6*8 14.0 8.9
K31 - K50 11.5 16.1 11.4 12.3 12.6
K51 and over 27.1 16.1 77.3 56.1 49.3
100.0 100.0 100.0 100,0 100.0
Average/household (K) 31.7 20.5 240.2 140.6 126.0
26 31 44 57 158
Table 5.5(e) Reported Cash Receipts From Business and Self- 
Employment.
Receipts Household Typology (%)
1 11 111 IV All
Nil 42.3 64.5 90.9 61.4 67.1
Less than K5
K5 - KIO 7.7 9.7 3.5 4.4
K]1 - K20 15.4 6.5 2.3 5.3 6.3
K21 - K30 26.9 6.5 6.8 8.8 10.8
K31 - K50 3.8 9.7 3.5 3.8
K51 and over 3.8 3.2 20.8 7.6
100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0
Average/household (K) 13.0 11.4 2.0 58.5 26.1
n= 26 31 44 57 158
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Table 5.5(f) Receipts From Fermant and Temporary Employment
Household Typology (%)
1 11 111 IV All
Nil 69.2 64.5 95.5 87.7 82.3
Less than K5 _ _
K5 - KIO 26.9 12,9 5.3 8.9
Kll - K20 3.8 12.9 1.8 3.8
K21 - K30 3.2 1.8 1.3
K31 - K50 6. 5 1.8 1.9
K51 and over — 4.5 1.8 3.8
■ 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0
Average/household (K) 3.4 7.7 10.5 6.0
n= 21 31 44 57 158
11. Reported .Cash Income.
The pattern of income distribution, emerging from the - 
survey results [tables 5.5 (a) to 5.5(e)JJ will be discussed in 
detail in chapter 6, suffice it to say at the time that the 
income differential (reported cash income) between the better- 
off households and the poorer households in the region, is of 
the order of about 4:1. Although this does not represent a 
very acute distributional problem in the area, it still 
indicates that after a decade of the development effort in the
area, about 2/5 of the /farmers are getting incomes which are 
lower than they might have been getting if they participated 
and benefitted fully from the programme.
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Notes- Chapter V*
1* A Household is defined as a group of people who usually
take all their: food from a common pot, ie. a group of people 
who eat together. (They do not have to sleep in the same 
dwelling unit but in a majority of cases they do).
2. The following table illustrates how each of the 4 units was
selected at random from the 40 units within LLDP.
Unit Number of Households in 
Unit.
Range of Random 
Numbers assigned.
A 450 1 - 450
B 276 451- 726
C 1054 727- 1780
D 848 1781- 2628
E 561 2629- 3189
To select two units from units A to E, using the 
PPS method and an appropriate table of random numbers, tvtro 
random numbers between 1 and 3189 are selected. If say 
the numbers selected are 8 and 1945, then the units selected 
are A and D. In this way each unit has a chance of’ 
selection proportional to its size(as measured by number of 
households )•
The same procedure was used for selecting the villages. As 
for the individual households, all the households in a 
seleited village were numbered consecutively, from 1 and 
. the 10 households whose numbers corresponded to the first 
10 random numbers drawn, were selected.
3. The head of the household is defined as that member of the 
household, male or female, upon whom the major decisions 
regarding resource allocation fell. In the cases where an 
adult male was resident in the household he was assumed to 
be the, household head in keeping with the local tradition of 
letting the adult male make such decisions. However, it 
is recognised that in some cases such an assumption may not 
be right, especially where the male and female members of 
the household specialize in different crop enterprises, such 
as tobacco production for the males and groundnuts or food 
production for the females, although such a tendency seems 
to be on the decline in LLDP.
4. See, Nie, N. et al (1970), statistical Package For the 
Social Sciences, McGraw-Hill, New York.
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5. See, World Bank (1981 b), op. clt. PI#
6
6. Ibid. P4.
7 See, LLDP, Sample Survey of Smallholder Agriculture.
1977/78. op. cit.
8. Previous work ©n this tends to value male labour higher than 
that of women (see, for example Collinson, M.P. (1972),
Farm Management in Peasant Agriculture. Praeger, New York.
9. Kydd (1982), op. cit. P215.
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CHAPTER VI'
AN ANALYSIS OF THE SURVEY RESULTS.
In the previous chapter, we looked at the main 
characteristics of the survey population. It was found that 
despite the apparent homogeneity of the rural households, 
there were basic differences in their farming systems which 
were reflected in their income positions. It was also found 
that certain household characteristics regarding such factors 
as labour availability, access to credit, access to non-farm 
income sources, etc, could be associated with particular crop 
enterprises and total Income positions. This facilitated the 
grouping of the survey population households into a limited 
number of typologies which could be subjected to a more 
penetrating analysis.
In this chapter, an attempt will be made to trace the 
inter-relationships of the factors affecting total household 
income, which were suggested in the analysis undertaken in 
the previous chapter. In particular, to see how the current 
rural development effort has interacted with these factors 
and therefore contributed to the shaping of the observed . 
pattern of income distribution in the area. As already pointed 
out, this analysis will focus on the examination of interhouse­
hold differences in reported cash receipts, particularly those 
from the farm enterprise (sale of crops). Because of the semi­
subsistence nature of the economy under review, the analysis of 
the cash receipts will be supplemented, whenever possible, by 
an analysis of a subsistence income component, mostly in the 
form of the household's available food supplies (largely maize, 
the staple food in the area). The omission of asset values 
from the analysis is regretted. However, because the focus of 
the analysis is on innovation adoption, it is largely the house­
hold's ability to purchase farm inputs, which is supposedly 
linked to the household's total cash receipts (including those 
from assets such as cattle, goats, grinding mills, etc.), which 
is crucial. Although the households do not keep detailed 
records of their cash receipts, it is believed that due to the 
limited nature and sources of the income flows, the respondents
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were fairly accurate in their reports. However, as pointed
out In chapter V, the lack of accurate information meant that 
the data, could only at best, be presented as ordinal scale 
data. This imposed a limitation on the nature of the . 
statistical’ analysis which could be undertaken.
In order to put the discussion of the sources of inter­
household differences in income in a theoretical perspective, 
a number of models, which highlight the relationships between 
household farm income (especially that from sale of crops) and 
the key factors affecting it, will be presented. The purpose 
of this part of the analysis will be to render the findings 
emerging from the survey applicable to similar circumstances.
1, Interhousehold Differences in Incomes Analysed
In order to explain the interhousehold differences in 
income observed in the survey area, a number of ■ associated 
variables were selected, ie;
(i) Cultivated area.
(ii) Family size (in standard consumption units),
(ill) Size of family labour force.
(iv) Total expenditure on hired labour.
(v) Amount of input credit taken.
(vi) Cash outlays on inputs.
Table 6.1 below summarises the levels and sources of house­
hold incomes of the household typologies observed in LLDP.
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Table 6,1. Reported Average Cash Receipts by Household 
Typologies and Sources.
Source Household Typology (%)
1 11 111 IV All
Crop sales 58.5 35.0 95.4 61.8 73.4
Livestock etc. 9.8 31.8 3.8 7.9 7.9
Business 25.5 19.8 0.8 25.7 15.2
Employment 6.2 13.4 - 4.6 3.5
Total 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0
Average total 
Receipts/household K54.23 K57.53 K251.75 K227.49 K171.67
Group total as %  
of total income 5.2 6.7 40.6 47.5 100.0
% of Respondents 
in group 16.3 20.1 27.8 35.8 100.0
26 31 44 57 158
A. Factors Associated With Crop Revenue.
The general proposition in this study is that farm income 
(from sale of crops) is a function of a number of interrelated 
factors many of which cannot be easily quantified (eg. soil 
quality, weather, a farmer's managerial expertise, etc.). 
However, such factors apart, a number of quantifiable factors 
can be identified. Fig, 6.1 summarises these factors and the 
suspected general nature of their interrelationships. Using 
the survey data, we shall try to establish the existence of 
these interrelationships and if possible to try to determine 
their strength as well as their direction of operation by 
testing the hypotheses which were outlined in Chapter I.
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I. The Relationship Between Farm Income and Crop Enterprise 
Undertaken.
Our first hypothesis concerns the relationship between 
farm enterprise (type of crops grown) and farm income, ie:
A household's level of total revenue from sale of cropjfe 
is likely to be closely associated with the type of crop 
enterprise undertaken (ie. adoption or non-adoption of 
innovations offered by the project .................la.
As pointed out in chapter IV, the main crops grown in 
LLDP are tobacco, groundnuts and maize, and the main innovations 
introduced in the area to boost farm incomes have been improved 
seed varieties of maize and groundnuts, aid fertilizers and 
insecticides for tobacco and improved maize. Thus working under 
the assumption that farm households will try to maximise revenue 
from the farm enterprise , it is expected that they will 
adopt the cultivation of those crops supported by the project 
(in the fc:rm of providing input credit and extension advice).
The survey data hav/indicated that those households who 
grew tobacco (typology I'll), had the highest gross farm receipts 
(an average of K240), followed by the improved maize growers 
( typology■■": ), who reported gross farm receipts averaging K141. 
On the other hand, those households who did not participate in 
either the tobacco or improved maize enterprises (typologies I 
and 11) had the least gross farm receipts, averaging K31 and 
K21 respectively - see table 5.5cJ.. Such evidence indicates 
that those households who took up the main innovations 
introduced by the project and used complementary inputs as 
recommended by the extension personnel, did obtain higher 
revenue from sale of crops than those that did not. This was 
supported by the results of a chi-squared analysis, between 
crop revenue and use or non-use of inputs, which yielded a 
chi-squared value of 36.2, with 2 degrees of freedom and 
significant at the 1 %  level. A Cramer's V of 0.49, indicated 
that the relationship between the two variables was quite sub­
stantial.
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Table 6,2 Relationship Between Crop Revenue and Use of Inputs,
Crop Revenue (K) Use of Inputs
Used Inputs Did Not Use Inputs All
0 - 1 0 12 23 35
11 - 75 38 21 59
76 and over _.5_9 __5 .. 64
Total 109 49 158
Chi-square = 36.2, 2 degrees of Freedom, significant at the 1%
level.
Cramer's V - 0.49
11. Innovation Adoption and Access to Credit.
The observation that the adoption of innovations is closely
associated with higher crop revenue raises the question :- What
factors are associated with innovation adoption? This question
entailed the examination of the characteristics associated with
innovation adopters (or for that case, non-adopters) and an
attempt to determine whether those factors found to be associated
with innovation adoption were causally linked with it.
The survey data indicated that farm crédit was the main
source of finance for farm inputs. This observation led to the
hypothesis that:
"The adoption of the innovations offered is likely to be 
closely associated with a household's access to seasonal 
credit ............................................... lb.
It was observed that among those who reported to have used 
farm inputs (69^ of the sample) only l5% reported to have obtained 
them purely on a cash basis, while the rest either got them solely 
on credit or supplemented what they got on credit with cash 
purchases.
Table 6.3 Source of Finance For Farm Inputs.
(%)
Cash only l6
Credit only 29
Cash and Credit 55
100
n= 109
186
Thus it appears that most of the people who used inputs 
(or innovated) did so mainly through the help of credit.
Table 5.4f, presented earlier indicated that there was a very 
high "repeat" tendency among the credit takers. This implies 
that even those people whose incomes had risen substantially 
over the years because of using innovations, still relied on 
credit for inputs, f'or example, in 1980/81, when provision 
of input credit to individuals was abolished.in LLDP, it was 
observed that most of the old credit clientele opted to join 
the farmers' clubs which became the only vehicle through which 
input credit could be obtained. Such evidence tends to suggest 
that in the relationship between innovation adoption (use of 
inputs) and access to credit, the direction of causality ran from 
"credit" to "adoption". However, there is need for caution here. 
While the above observations may be true, they do not provide 
conclusive evidence that access to credit induces innovation 
adoption. It is possible that the observed phenomenon reflects 
some other aspect , such as inefficiences in the input 
delivery system for cash purchases. It is common knowledge in 
Malawi that farm inputs are not always available in time or in 
adequate quantities at the ADMAJRC local markets, for sale to 
the smallholding community. It is. a usual phenomenon to see
farmers queatih^ at the ADMARC local depots a week of so after 
the rains have fallen and planting is well under way, trying 
to procure inputs. Such problems are largely attributed to 
transport bottlenecks, storage problems at the depots etc. On 
the other hand, ADÎ11ARC seems to place priority on input orders 
from say, LLDP, the Government Loans Board, or any other 
development agencies, and ofcourse, the estate sector. In such 
circumstances it is a rational reaction on the part of the 
farmers who wished to secure supplies of inputs to apply for 
input credit than risking to buy them oncash. In such a case, 
purchasing inputs on credit is just a matter of convenience 
occasioned by the inefficiences in the marketing system, ^or 
the marginal farmer, with very little cash to spare, the fact 
that inputs are usually made available at the ADMARC local 
markets only during the planting season, when other needs for 
cash are pressing, such as school fees for children (schools 
open in October), clothing, food needs, medicines etc, mean
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that he may not be able to purchase them. Afthough the access 
of such a farmer to credit may be restricted (on account of his 
economic status) it could be that if the inputs were available 
say at the time of crop marketing, within a reasonable distance 
from his home, he could have opted to buy some so as to improve 
his next crop yield. In this case, although his inability to 
take up innovations may seem to be associated with his lack of 
access to input credit, anather constraint would appear to be 
the lack of an efficient input delivery system.
This study does not intend to pursue the issue of input 
marketing in Malawi, suffice it to say that there is room for 
improvement in the way ADMARC discharges its responsibility 
as the sole distributor of farm inputs to the smallholder 
sector. And, there is need to re-examine the need for ADMARC*s 
monopoly in this field, especially given the transportation and 
storage problems which it appears to encounter, as well as the 
fact that input subsidization, which would appear to justify 
ADlîARC’s monopoly in input distribution, does not appear to 
feature much in ADMARC's input pricing policies. However, the 
issue of input marketing has been brought up to highlight, the 
danger involved in assuming causality from an association 
relationship. For example, the observation, in Malawi, that 
innovation adoption is closely associated with input distribution 
on credit, has led to the familiar accusations that government 
elitist policies have encouraged the channelling of resources 
through input distribution (eg. allocating of input credit) to 
a few "progressive" elements in the rural community.^ T h i s  
study points out that, although such a conclusion may have some 
elements of truth, it has the effect of preventing a more 
rational analysis of the situation. The above example 
has clearly indicated that innovation adoption can be constrained 
by inefficiencies in the input delivery system, which are not 
necessarily a result of deliberate Government policy, and yet 
there have been very few analyses of ADHARC's input distribution 
practises, despite the prominent position ADMARC occupies with 
regard to smallholder innovation adoption through its role as 
sole distributor of inputs to the smallholder sector.
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111, The Helatlonship Between Input Credit and Cultivated Area.
The fact that access to credit and crop revenue were closely
associated Implies that the way input credit was distributed in
the area had an influence on the pattern of innovation adoption
and therefore income distribution, and it therefore warrants a
closer investigation. The guiding principle in credit allocation
in LLDP is the ability to repay criterion. The record of credit
repayment in the project area shows that a very high recovery
rate (over 90%) was consistently achieved from phase 11 (1972/73) 
( 2 )onwards. Such a record suggests very stringent selection
criteria which ensured that those who were offered credit 
would be able to repay their loans. Our purpose at this stage 
is to investigate the criteria, upon which credit distribution 
lay. Here we shall investigate the hypothesis that:
A household's access to seasonal credit is closely 
associated with its cultivated area............... Ic.
Evidence provided by the survey data indicates that credit 
rec ipients (58% of the sample) cultivated, on average, 45% 
more land than those that did not receive credit. In addition 
when the relationship between ^ cultivated area and input credit 
was investigated it gave a chi-squared value of l6.8 (significant 
at 1%, with 2 degrees of freedom).
.  ^u-1__ r  ^^
and Total Cultivated Area.
Input Credit
Total .cultivated Area... Less than Kll Kll and over All
Less than 0.4 ha 10 3 13
0.4 - 1.2 ha 53 56 109
1.-3 8 28 . .. 3.6
71 87 158
Chi-square = l6.8, significant at 1%, with 2 degrees of freedom,
189
These findings tend to support the above hypothesis. 
However, it must be pointed out that the nature of the data 
does not allow us to probe more deeply into the problem, say 
to establish the direction of causality. As such, our 
conclusions on this aspect will tend to be speculative. It 
seems that the relationship between access to credit and total 
area cultivated tends to operate in both directions.
Cultivated Access to
Area Credit^ ------
In the first place, due to the risk minimisation aspect of 
credit allocation, large cultivated area is regarded as a 
collateral for credit.. That is, because of the priority accorded 
to subsistence production by all the smallholder households in 
the area, availability of a marketable output, from which credit 
repayment is supposed to be made, depends on a large cultivated 
area. That is, those households with large cultivated hectarages 
are regarded as being in a better position to produce marketable 
output, which will enable them to repay credit than those with 
small cultivated areas.on which subsistence crops, are likely to.' 
predominate. Consequently, credit tends to be readily'available 
to those with larger cultivated areas.. On the other hand, a house­
hold's access to credit, for whatever reason (such as being a 
farmer's club official, etc.,) increases the households 
prospects of achieving a larger output (through higher product­
ivities - land and labour, as a result of using inputs). At 
the same time it increases the household's need for cash, to 
pay off its loan commitment. This acts as an incentive to 
produce a marketable surplus, inducing it to cultivate a large 
hectarage to ensure that this new requirement is met. And 
where such a household may not have enough land to meet the new 
demand, it usually resorts to borrowing some from its neighbours 
and/or relatives who for one reason or the other (usually lack 
of labour), are unable to fully utilize all the land available 
to them. However, this can only happen if the household can 
mobilize the necessary labour required for the degree of . 
operation necessitated by t^ »e available credit. Thus although
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tlîe relationship tendsto operate in both ways, labour avail­
ability, in the final, analysis becomes the operative constraint, 
as access to credit alone does not ensure adoption of innovations 
The proposition regarding the relationship between credit 
and cultivated area is well supported by the evidence provided 
by Kinsey (1974), who observed an inverse relationship between 
credit worthiness and loan size. He found out that those 
households which had displayed a 100% credit repayment record 
had significantly large holding sizes than those who had dis­
played a 50% or so repayment recorcf.^  ^At the same time, he 
observed that those households who received project credit 
cultivated 33% more land, and had 84% more agricultural income 
than those who did not get credit.^^^Such results indicate that 
during the early phases of LLDP, when a liberal credit policy 
was pursued, households who cultivated small hectarages were 
found to have difficulties with credit repayment. This led 
to a more stringent credit rating policy which resulted in 
the exclusion of the majority of small farmers from getting 
credit. The fact that credit was only provided for producing 
marketable crops (especially those marketed predominantly 
through ADMARC) meant that unless a household had enough 
resources over and above those required to meet family sub­
sistence needs, it was unlikely to commit itself to grow cash 
crops. The author was informed by some Project Officers 
involved with credit that at.least up to the 1979/80 season, 
availability of funds did not constitute a constraint to their 
lending operations (as this period was characterised by the 
existence of unused up funds on the credit fund at the end of 
each year). The problem was finding those people who were 
prepared, and who qualified to take up the "credit packages" 
offered. In other words, credit availability was not restricted 
by an act of credit rationing as such, necessitated by lack of 
funds, but by the household's ability to produce a marketable 
surplus, as expressed by the household's total cultivated area. 
This implies that for us to have a clear understanding of the 
constraints to innovation adoption and therefore higher farm 
incomes in LLDP, we need to look more closely at the factors 
associated with the cultivated area.
191
IV. The Relationship Between Cultivated Area and Crop Revenue.
Before embarking on a detailed examination of the factors 
associated with cultivated areas, we shall try to establish the 
nature of the relationship between cultivated area and crop 
revenue, in order to explore the hypothesis that:
Total farm income (crop revenue) is closely associated 
with the size of the cultivated area .................2a.
This is the hypothesis upon which the credit rating policy 
seems to be based. The hypothesis was tested in a number of 
stages. The first stage involved the establishment of the 
suspected relationship. This was tested by a chi-squared , 
analysis which gave a chi-squared value of 11.7, significant 
at 5%, with 4 degrees of freedom, thereby supporting the 
existence of the relationship.
Table 6.5 Cultivated Area and Crop Revenue.
Hectarage Income Group
Less than K31 - 75 
K30
K76 and 
over
Total
0 - 0.8 hectares 32 11 7 50
0.9 - 1.6 hectares 10 11 14 35
lC'7 and over __5 4 6 15
Total 47 26 27 100
Chi-squared = 11.7, significant at 5% 4 degrees of freedom.
Next we investigated if variations in farm size had an .
impact on crop revenue. The crop revenue data was transformed
by multiplying the group means by the associated group .
frequencies, to make it amenable to an analysis of variance
exercise. The survey population was then broken down into a
number of categories based on farm size and the mean crop
revenues of the various farm sizes were compared. This exercise
revealed that variations in farm size had a substantial impact
on crop revenue (P value = 11.8 significant at 1%). In addition
2
a correlation exercise gave an R value of 0.28, which implied
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that 28% of the linear variation, in crop revenue could be
explained by variations in cultivated area alone. Such
findings tend to lend support to the hypothesis postulated
above. More important, they indicate that the innovations
being advocated in LLDP are more of an extensive nature than
of an intensive one, ie, they are of a type which depends on
(5 )availability of adequate land for their adoption. This 
aspect has a very important bearing on how widely they can 
spread, in a situation where cultivation technology is basically 
of the hoe culture, and where land pressure is rising fast.
B. Farm Size and Its Determinants.
The observation that cultivated area was positively 
correlated with crop revenue implies that those who cultivated 
large hectarages were more likely to get higher farm revenue 
than those who did not. However, in the previous chapter, it 
was argued that there were hardly any institutional barriers 
to a household's access to farm land. It therefore appears 
that under suc^ circumstances, we would expect a more even 
distribution of farm income among the households. And yet, the 
data reported in chapter V indicated that quite a substantial 
proportion of the households got very little income from sale 
of crops, and in the previous section of this chapter, it was 
indicated that this was largely because such people cultivated 
small hectarages which did not allow them much in the way of 
marketable surpluses. Such findings imply that the observed 
interhousehold differences in farm income go beyond the aspect 
of land availability as such. This section therefore explores a 
number of interrelated factors which are thought to have a 
bearing on a household's total cultivated area.
1. Labour Availability.
As pointed out in chapter 1, one of the major aims of this 
study is to re-examine the assumption that basically subsistence 
oriented households do possess surplus family labour resources 
which can be usefully tapped, through the development effort, 
into expanding smallholder cash production. This will be done 
by examining the relationship between the labour demands of the 
various innovations introduced by the developeimant effort in
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LLDP and the labour supply situations of the various household 
typologies. Since the survey results have revealed that use of 
hired labour for agricultural work does take place on a sub­
stantial scale in the area, we shall try to assess the role of 
both family and hired labour in cash crop production.
(a) Family Labour.
The data analysis in chapter V revealed that the main cash 
croppers in the area were the tobacco growers and the improved 
maize growers (typologies 111 and IV), while the other two 
categories (1 and 11) were predominantly subsistence farmers.
In addition , it was revealed that the cash croppers tended to 
have larger family labour forces than the subsistence croppers. 
This tended to indicate that available family labour was some­
how related with innovation adoption. A chi-squared analysis 
between innovation adoption (as represented by those households 
who grew either tobacco and/or improved maize - as adopters 
and those who did not grow them - as non-adopters) and available 
family labour, supported this view, ie Chi-squared = 26.96, with 
4 degree of freedom and significant at 1 %  level.
Family Labour 
Available (AEs)
Crop Enterprise
Tobacco
Growers
Improved
Maize
Growers
Others All
Less than 2 4 10 23 37
2 - 3 28 44 29 101
3 and over 12 3 5 20
Chi-squared = 26.96, 4df., significant at 1%.
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However, it has been argued above, that innovation adoption 
in the area was closely associated with cultivated area, mostly 
because input credit, the main source of finance for farm 
inputs, was distributed on the "ability to repay" criterion. 
Since innovation adoption is here seen to be lihked with 
available family labour, it would be expected that available 
family labour and total cultivated area, are closely related, 
and therefore that among the non-labour hirers those taking 
innovations would have large family labour forces and larger 
cultivated areas, while those households not adopting 
innovations would have smaller family labour forces and smaller 
cultivated areas. .These relationships are explored in the 
table below.
Table 6.7 Availability of Family labour and Adoption of 
Innovations (among non-labour hirers)
Family Labour 
Available (ABs)
Adoption of Innovations
Adopted Did not Adopt All
Less than 2 13 22 .35
More than 2 54 19 73
Total 67 41 108
Chi-squared = 14.6, significant at the 1% level^ with 1 df.
These results clearly indicate that large family labour 
forces are closely associated with innovation adoption* This 
is particularly so with respect to the tobacco enterprise, whose 
labour requirement is quite high more or less throughout the 
whole year, and therefore not particularly suited to casual 
labour which seems to be the most readily available form of 
hired labour in the area.
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Thefact that about 70% of the households surveyed reported 
having used only family labour on their farms during the 1980/81 
season, indicates that family labour is the most predominant 
form of farm labour in the area. It was therefore expected 
that this form of labour would have a very substantial impact 
on farm size. The following hypothesis was therefore put 
forward :-
For a peasant household solely dependent on family labour 
for agricultural work, the size of its cultivated area is 
closely associated with the number of family workers 
available to it (measured in adult equivalents)........ 2b,
.This hypothesis was tested for those households who hired
no labour. A simple correlation exercise revealed that there
was in fact a weak relationship between family labour available
to the household and total cultivated area (R = 0.24, significant
at the "1% level). This was rather surprising, and therefore
warranted further investigation. To this effect we investigated
the relationship between cultivated area and household consumption
needs (as represented by family size - in standard consumption
units). This was found to be quite substantial (R = 0.46,
significant at 1%). This tended to indicate that the allocation
of the labour resource by these households to the farm enterprise
is to some extent determined by their family consumption needsl^^
( 7 )This finding is consistent with recent studies in similar cases. 
However, it appears that the lower correlation coefficient 
obtained in this study, for the relationship between family 
size and farm size (ie R = O.46, as compared to R = 0.4 - 0,65 
reported by Hunt, for Mbere), coupled with the lack of a 
strong relationship between farm size and family labour, reported 
earlier, point to one underlying factor which is* important in 
our situation. That is, it reflects the fact that in LLDP, non­
labour hiring households (who are predominantly the poorer and 
non-innovating households) tend to have a lower dependence on 
the farm as a source of cash income, as was indicated in the 
previous chapter. This is reflected in the relatively large 
proportion of non-farm income in their total incomes positions.
For example, as much as 32% of the total income of the 26 
female headed households (only 4 of whom hired labour), came
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from non-farm income sources. This tends to imply that such 
households tend to allocate their labour resources to the farm 
enterprise up to the point where they can satisfy their sub­
sistence requirements, allocating any surplus labour to other 
activities outside the farm. More important, the results
highlight the important fact that most of these non-labour 
hiring households are actually the suppliers of hired labour 
to the relatively better off farm households and estates, on 
a casual or seasonal basis. This therefore tends to weaken 
the association between both family size and family labour 
and cultivated area,
(b). Hired Labour.
As already pointed out, 32% of our sample reported hiring 
labour for agricultural work. Of these, 82% grew either tobacco 
and/or improved maize varieties. This implies that labour 
hiring was very closely associated with innovation adoption. Tq 
explore this relationship, a number of hypotheses were examined, 
the first of which was:-
A household's cultivated area is likely to be related to 
the household's ability to hire labour (measured by total 
expenditure on hired labour) ..........     2c.
This hypothesis implies that those households who hired 
labour were likely to cultivate larger hectarages and therefore 
more likely to adopt innovations than those who did not.
The survey data indicated that, on average, those households 
who hired labour cultivated 85% more land than their non-labour 
hiring counterparts (ie they cultivated an average of 2.4 ha.
against 1*3 ha* for the ether)* a chi-squared test indicated 
that there was a highly significant relationship between labour 
hiring and cultivated area (0hi-squared = 15.1, with 3 degrees 
of freedom and significant at the 1% level). In addition, for 
this group of households, total cultivated area and expenditure 
on hired labour were substantially correlated (R = 0.40 
significant at 1%).
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Table 6.8 Relationship Between Labour Hiring and Cultivated Area.
Cultivated Area Number of Households
( ha) Hired Labour Did not hire labour Total
up to 1 hecatare 15 54 69
1.1 - 1.8 15 38 53
1.9 - 2.6 9 10 19
2.7 and over 12 5 17
Total 51 107 158
Average ha/
household „ 2.4. .... 1.3 1.7
Chi-squared = 15.1, significant at 70) with 3 df*
On the other hand, when the relationship between farm size 
( cultivated area) and family size was examined, for the labour 
hiring households, it was found to be a bit weaker than that 
between cultivated area and expenditure on hired labour, (ie 
R = 0.32, significant at 1%), while that between cultivated area 
and available family labour was even much weaker (R = 0.24, 
significant at 5%). These results can be interpreted to mean 
that farm production by these households is net necessarily 
geared-to family subsistence needs, thus suggesting a higher 
degree of commercialization, ie production for the market, and/or 
that these households placed greater reliance on hired labour 
for their agricultural production, allowing their family workers 
either a higher degree of leisure, or to engage in other off-farm 
activities which yielded higher returns to labour.
The first proposition was supported by the finding that among 
the labour hirers, .crop revenue and expenditure on hired labour 
were closely related, ie chi-squared = 11.62, significant at 1%, 
with 1 degree of freedom.
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TpViIio^ .Q Crop Revenue and Expenditure on Hired Labour,
Expenditure on 
hired labour Crop Revenue
Less than K20 K20 and Total
Less than K150 16 7 23
K150 and above 6 22 28
22 29 51
Chi-squared = 11.62, 1 DF, significant at 1%.
The finding that cultivated area, among the labour hirers 
was closely related to expenditure on hired labour, tended to 
support the view that these households placed a greater reliance 
on hired labour (ie, chi-squared = 15.1, significant at 1 
v/ith3^ of freedom). The finding that the survey data provided 
evidence to the effect that the relationship between farm size
and expenditure on hired labour (among the labour hirers) was
statistically significant, while evidence regarding the 
statistical significance of the relationship between farm size
and family labour force was not forthcoming, implies that hired
labour had a larger impact on cultivated area than family labour* 
Unfortunately, because our data wAÆ, largely of the nominal and 
ordinal nature, it was not possible to estimate the functional 
relationship between cultivated area and hired and/or family 
labour. Therefore our conclusions regarding cultivated area 
and these two factors will tend to be speculative.
As indicated earlier, the households who reported hiring 
labour, almost exclusively hired this labour during the peak 
season (ie. a 3-4 week period in December/January ) when the 
crops must be rescued from the weeds, and when the weather is 
favourable for the job, ie dry and sunny so that the uprooted 
weeds can dry. . This means that during this peak period,
a household which is able to raise say KIO for hired labour, 
which at the assumed wage rate of KO.10 per hour, is equivalent 
to 100 man hours, which equals the entire labour demands of 
1 hectare of local maize for the whole month of January, will
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bfe in a better position to clear its farm of weeds in time 
than say a household which gets an extra family worker during 
the peak season, who can only provide 5*6% of his estimated 
potential annual labour input during the 3 - 4 weeks period 
(which works aut at about 50-80 man hours, assuming a 5i hour 
working day, for 5 days a week). Because December and January 
crop labour demands are a critical factor in this type of 
farming, the available labour during this period will be the 
operative constraint to the household's farming activities 
(as represented by the size of the cultivated area). This is 
why a household's ability to hire labour during this peak 
season is closely associated With the household's total 
cultivated area.
11. Factors Associated With Labour Hiring And Cash Purchasing 
of Inputs.
The important finding that a household's ability to hire 
labour has an important bearing on the size of its cultivated 
area, and consequently, on its ability to adopt innovations 
leads us to our next hypotheses, and that is:
The household's ability to hire labour is closely related 
to the household's access to non-farm income earning 
opportunities (measured by total non-farm receipts)..... 2d.
and that;
Cash purchases of inputs are likely to be associated with 
a household's level. of non-farm income ............. 3.
. The main argument- here is that in the initial stages of 
development, incomes are generally too low to provide funds
for hiring or purchasing inputs. As such, it would be expected 
that a household’s ability to hire farm labour or purchase in­
puts would be likely to be associated with its -non-farm 
receipts. This implies that only those households which have 
access to non-farm income earning opportunities are likely to 
buy farm inputs and hire the labour required to enable them 
to take up the innovations which are inherently linked with 
large hectarages. Tq test these hypotheses, we looked at the 
relationship between non-farm income receipts and total
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total expenditures on hired labour and cash purchases of inputs.
For the purposes of this study, "farm income" is defined 
as that income which accrues to the household from sale of farm 
products produced on its own farm, while "non-farm income" 
is defined as that income which comes from sources other than 
sale of farm products. Two main son.rces of non-farm income 
were identified, ie., employment (both temporary and permanent 
employment) and business (including self employment- such as 
carpentry and bricklaying).
The survey data indicated that the various categories of 
households differed in their sources of non-farm income. For 
example, the labour hirers, who were predominantly tobacco and 
improved maize growers, reported ah average of K316 in household 
receipts for the 1980/81 season. Of this 17% came from non­
farm sources, mostly business and self employment. The non-labour 
hirers, on the other hand, reported an average household income of 
K104, of which about 30% came from outside the farm, mostly wage 
labour and off-season activities.
The evidence from the survey suggests that this differential 
in sources of non-farm income for the various households had an 
important bearing on their farming activities. For example, 
only 4 of the 26 female headed households in the sample reported 
having hired labour during the 1980/81 season and a similar 
number reported having purchased inputs on cash. Beer was the 
main source of funds for these outlays. The data indicates that 
for these households, non-farm income contributed about a third 
of total household income. It appears that such income played 
a very important role in supplementing their farm produce in the 
way of providing subsistence requireinents such as food (during 
the hunger gap). Such income did not serve as a means for hiring 
labour or purchasing farm inputs, and played no substantial part 
in raising farm incomes. Thus although it would be expected that 
these labour deficient households would tend to make up for this 
deficiency by hiring labour, their desparate economic position 
.dictated that they in fact hire out labour to meet their sub­
sistence requirements.
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For the labour hiring households, the situation was compli­
cated by the fact that they were divided into two main groups 
which displayed different characteristics with respect to non-farm 
income. On the one hand, were the improved maize growers who 
were associated with a high degree of non-farm income earnings, 
which made up about 31% of average total household receipts.
On the other hand were the tobacco growers who reported very 
little, in terms of non-farm receipts.
For the improved maize growers, about 4 of whom reported 
hiring labour,the available data indicated that there was a close 
relationship between income from business sources and revenue 
from sale of crops (Chi-squared = 12.2, significant at the 1% level, 
with 2 degrees of freedom). This suggested that non-farm income 
could have been an important source of funds for buying inputs and 
or hiring labour. However, there was no substantive evidence to 
to indicate that non-farm income was closely related to either 
expenditure on hired labour or expenditure an cash purchases of 
inputs. Instead the data indicated that there was a close 
relationship between crop.revenue and expenditure on inputs '
(Chi-squared = 6.8, . significant at 1% with 1 degree of freedom). 
These results indicate that although non-farm income may have 
given these households extra funds which could have been used for 
purchasing inputs and hiring labour, it was mostly income from 
sale of farm produce which was crucial in the households* farming 
activities.
For the tobacco growers the available data suggests that 
non-farm receipts hardly had anything to do with their farming 
activities. The data presented in the previous chapter indicated 
that the main source of inputs for these households was credit 
from LLDP, and that about half of those who hired labour paid for 
it in kind.. It therefore appears that the privileged access to 
credit, of these households , enabled them to get high revenue 
from their farming enterprises, as well as enabling them to have 
food surpluses which proved useful in hiring labour.
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Overall, it appears ttiat non-farm income played a positive 
role in the farming operations of the improved maize growers 
by providing them with extra funds for hiring labour and 
purchasing inputs* On the other hand, its role was different 
among the poorer households for whom it acted as a supplementary 
resource for meeting subsistent requirements which could not be 
fully met through their farming operations* Because most of such 
income originated from sale of labour to other households, in a 
way it had a negative impact on the farming operations of the poor 
households* Thus it appears that whether non-farm income helps 
a household to innovate or not, will depend on the overall 
economic position of the household*
2* Summary of Data Analysis*
On the whole it appears that labour availability and access 
to input credit were the two main factors that influenced the 
households decision to adopt innovations, and therefore affected 
its total income fi*om sale of crops* However, the results suggest 
that the two factors were not independent of each other. Labour 
availability (especially the hired component) appears to have had 
a much greater impact on a householdis ability to adopt innovations 
because of its effect on cultivated area, which in turn affected 
access to input credit* This interrelationship seems to create 
a vicious circle* That is labour deficiency leads to a small 
cultivated area, which in turn leads to lack of access to input 
credit, this leads to low farm income levels, that lead to a 
labour deficiency (due to inability to hire labour to supplement 
family labour.).
Big. 6*2 The Vicious Circle of Rural Poverty.
Labour
deficiency
Small Cultivated 
area
Lack of access 
to input credit
Low farm incomes 
levels
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Attempts by these smaller and poorer households, to break 
out of the vicious circle by way of adopting the innovations up 
to a size commensurate with their labour and financial 
resources, are hampered by LLDP’s practice of prescribing 
minimum packages for the innovations it offers. However, we 
shall consider this aspect in more detail, in a subsequent 
section of this chapter. In the section that follows an 
attempt will be made to illustrate, using the survey data, 
the impact of the interrelationship between labour availability 
and access to iput credit on total farm incomes, with the help 
of fig 6,3 j inorder to put the above discussion in
its perspective.
A.. Observed Pattern of Income Distribution According to 
Labour and Credit Availability.
The connection between both labour and credit availability 
on the one hand, and cultivated area ( and therefore crop income) 
on the other, is well demonstrated in the tree diagram below.
Bor the purposes of constructing this tree diagram, the 
households were classified on two criteria (after the survey) 
viz:-
(a) Labour Availability
(b) Access to credit.
In the first stage, two categories of households were 
formed. The first group consisted of those households who were 
considered to have "inadequate" labour available to them, ie. 
those with less than 2 adult workers and hired no labour. This 
category tended to include most of the female headed households 
(due to the absence of the adult male) living either alone or 
with juvénile children, and some of those male headed households 
where either the ma]e had no female spouse, or if the female 
spouse v/as present, both spouses were well advanced in age, and 
their labour valuation, on adult equivalent scale, was less than 
unity (individually). The other group consisted of those 
households who can be considered to have had "adequate" labour 
available to them, ie those that had at least two adult family 
workers and/or hired labour. This group included mostly the 
tobacco and improved maize growers. Next, the households were 
subdivided into those who took credit and those who did not.
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The tree diagram below shows how cultivated area and reported 
cash receipits from sale of crops (in terms of group averages) 
were distributed among the groups.
Fig. 6.1 Effect of Labour and Credit Availability on Crop 
Revenue.
(158)
All households
XI = 1.66 ha.
. Y, = K126
"Adequate” (107) / X51) "Inadequate"
Labour XI = 2.1 ha XI = 0.8 ha. Labour.
la, Y = K147 lb, Y s K65
(75)
XI = 2.2Va  
Y = K202
XI = 1.7 ha
Y = 124
XI = 1.4 ha 
Y = K141
(2a,
Taking credit
2b,
No credit
2c,
Taking credit
XI = 0.6 ha 
Y = K27
2d,
No credit
XI = average hectarage per household.
Y = Average Crop Revenue per household.
From the diagram it can be seen that those households, 
which had no labour constraints, cultivated on average 
 ^163^ more land, and consequently had 1265K more cash receipts 
from sale of crops, than those with '^ î-^ B.dequate la,bour*** In addition 
7 Q % \  d fthose "adequate” labour had access to, input credit, as 
compared t© only 33% of the other group. In fact , those with 
"adequate labour constituted 82% of the credit recipients.
Such findings support our earlier hypothesis 
regarding the interrelationships between labour
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availability, cultivated area and access to credit. More 
important, the data in the diagram indicates that, labour 
availability had a greater impact on total household revenue 
from sale of crops than access to credit. That is, amongst 
those households who had adequate labour, the differential 
in crop revenue between those who took credit and those who 
did not was 63%* On the other hand, the differential in crop 
revenue among those with "inadequate" labour taking credit 
and those not taking credit was 42#%.
This tends to imply that where labour is available, farm 
income is not significantly constrained by lack of credit. 
However, where there seems to be & labour shortage, lack of 
credit tends to depress^farm incomes even more. This seems to 
be indicative of the fact that labour availability is very 
closely associated with uptake of the innovations offered in 
the project area. This implies that once a household had 
decided upon adoption (after having examined its labour avail­
ability situation) both credit and extension advice are 
almost automatically forthcoming from the project to ensure 
the success of the innovations. On the other hand, those 
households who do not adopt innovations, largely because they 
lack the labour with which to adequately tend the new and 
improved crops, are unlikely to get any credit or extension 
advice, since these are usually provided as "packages". In 
the absence of any innovation packages especially suited to 
the households with smaller labour forces, it seems that such 
households will always be left out of the innovation stream.
They will continue to follow their old farming methods, and 
therefore will be faced with declining yields as the soil 
gets exhausted,thereby reducing their ability to provide their 
own basic subsistence needs. This will force such households 
to rely increasingly on non-farm sources of income, or hiring 
cut labour.
The main argument for including the credit programme in 
LLDP, as already pointed out was the understanding that lack of 
modern inputs, caused by low income levels among the smallholders 
was mainly responsible for the low level of farm productivity in 
the area, and that the provision of credit would enable a large
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proportion of the smallholding community to gain access to 
modern inputs and thereby raise their output l e v e l s . T o  
ensure effective use of credit, the "supervised” approach was 
adopted. Ai the same time, the main services of credit provision, 
input supply, extension and marketing were linked, presumably to 
ensure optimal results, thus the "package approach" was used.
So far our analysis has indicated that there were several 
problems associated with the strategy. First, the linking of 
the major services created some problems, largely because each 
of the components had a separate objective. For example, in the 
interests of extension, it was desirable that as large a number 
of farmers as possible should be put in touch with the new 
inputs. Provision of credit, to as large a group as possible 
was therefore necessary. On the other hand, from the point of 
view of the credit programme, it was essential that if the pro­
gramme was to be self-financing, lending had to be done 
very prudently to minimise defaults. The early experience of 
LLDP indicates that there were conflicts between the various 
objectives. For example, the "extension" objective was 
vigorously pursued during the first phase of the project
(1968/9 - 1971/72). But as mentioned in chapter iv, this led 
to high default rates, thus threatening the viability of the
(9)credit fund. More importantly, there were no attempts to 
assess the situation among the smallholders themselves to find 
out exactly what their requirements were. In an attempt to 
boost groundnuts production , for example, although improved 
seeds, and complementary inputs (eg. sulphur dust) and knowledge 
of improved husbandry methods were made available to the farmers, 
the output of the crop continued to decline. This was found to 
be largely due to the heavy labour demands and poor returns to 
labour associated with the crop.^"^^^ It was not until later that 
the labour bottleneck (especially during harvesting and proce­
ssing for the market) was appreciated, and technical innovations 
to ease it (eg. introduction of the groundnut lifter),were 
brought in. However, without any significant improvements 
in the producer prices, such innovations only meant higher 
production costs and lower net returns. Consequently,
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such innovations were not taken up by the farmers, in fact,they
can be seen today, standing idle at the unit centres, while the
(11)labour bottleneck persists.
Thus, the high default rates associated with the liberal 
credit policy that was pursued in the early years, in an attempt 
to spread innovations, coupled with the failure , on the part of 
the project to cater for the needs of the farmers that would arise 
from adoption of the "packages" offered (in terms of extra labour 
demands associated with the required timeliness of operations, 
storage problems, food supplies, etc.), led to the emergence of 
a credit scheme that tended to favour only those who were 
relatively better off (in terms of resources, etc.), and therefore 
able to qualify for credit, as well as willing to take on the 
extra risks associated with credit.
The consequence was that, it was mostly the smaller and 
poorer farmers who were left out of the innovation bandwagon. 
First, because they had smaller labour forces (and unable to 
supplement such with hired labour due to their low income 
positions), which resulted in their relatively smaller cultivated 
hectarages, which rendered them credit risks. Secondly, the 
"packages" available, which in most cases had a minimum size . 
attached to them, may have been too large for their resources. 
Thirdly, as the credit was geared to the production of certain 
marketable crops, it meant that there was an implicit assumption 
that the credit recipient had to produce for the market. Thus 
taking credit amounted to a commitment to produce an amount of 
output equivalent to the value of the loan (at the minimum), 
and with the pre-occupation of the poorer households on meeting 
subsistence requirements, such a prospect might have proved too 
much of a gamble.
208
B. Effect of Crop Enterprise on Household Incomes.
Another factor which was found to he very closely related 
with the household's level of crop cash receipts was the type 
of crop enterprise undertaken by the household. Because of 
the limited size of our sample, it was not feasible to 
incorporate the effect of the crop enterprise into the tree 
diagram developed earlier on, so as to complete the picture 
of how the three factors of labour availability, access to 
credit and type of crop enterprise undertaken, might be 
operating in the area, in influencing the pattern of income 
distribution. Instead, a simple linear programming model will 
be used here, to try to complete the picture.
I. The Linear Programming Model.
The main objective of the LP model is to try to demonstrate 
how, in the situation under review, the labour constraint does 
significantly contribute to the determination of the cropping 
pattern a household is able to adopt. Using the information 
given in the above typologies of households regarding family 
sizes, family labour forces, etc, an attempt will be made to 
present a model of the optimal farm pattern for each typology 
under various assumptions.
The main assumption is that each household intends to 
maximize revenue from sale of crops, subject to:
(a) A food self-sufficiency constraint.
(b) A labour constraint.
(c) A land constraint.
(d) A financial constraint.
(a) Food Self-Sufficiency Constraint.
Observations in the survey area indicate that it was the 
wish of all farmers to be self-sufficient in food, an aspect 
which is consistent with the risk aversion strategy of small­
holder farmers. The absence of any complete specialisation 
in cash crop production among the small scale producers in 
LLDP, supports this assumption. It was therefore assumed that 
each household would produce enough local maize (the main staple
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in the arei^ to meet its food requirements. It has been
estimated that on average the consumption requirements, in
this area of an adult person (measured in consumption
( 12)units) are 230 kilograms of maize grain. Thus, the
annual total food requirements for each household typology
was obtained by multiplying 230 kg. by the average number of
persons (in s.c.u.) per household in the group. The yield of
( 13)local maize was assumed to ber1100 kg/ha. It was assumed
that all households would cultivate local maize for subsistence 
purposes and that any surplus would be sold.
(b) Labour Contraint.
(i) Family Labour - The availability of family labour was 
calculated on a monthly basis, since the labour requirements 
data for the various crops was also provided on a monthly 
basis. It was assumed that each working member of a household 
would be capable of providing, on average, up to 125 man hours 
per month, for agricultural work. This represents about 5 
hours a day for 25 days a month. Hence the total monthly 
family labour supply for each household typology was obtained 
by multiplying 125 by the average number of workers per house­
hold typology. Such a figure should be regarded purely as an 
estimate, as it is recognised that the actual amount of hours 
which the family workers will be willing to work in the family
• farm will depend on a number of factors such as the relationship 
between the number of workers in the family and the requirements 
of the household to be fulfilled; from farm output etc.
(ii) Hired Labour. - As indicated earlier, about one third 
of the households surveyed reported to have used hired labour
(mostly casual labour) for agricultural work during the 1980/81 
season. Observations indicated that most of this labour hiring 
was done during the peak seasons, ie. November to January (the 
crop establishment period) and to.some extent - May and April 
(the harvest period). It was further observed that the wage 
paid for this labour varied with the type of operation being 
undertaken and the time of the year the labour was hired - 
reaching a peak in December and January. In the absence of
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reliable data on the exact nature of the trend in the rural 
wage rate, the legal minimum rural wage rate (that paid on 
established agricultural estates) was used as the basic rate 
at which households could either buy or sell labour. During 
the 1980/81 season, this was at KO.50 per working day, (about
00.60). Assuming a 5 hour working day, this works out at 
KO.10 per man hour. However, the actual wage rate paid during 
the critical period, (December - January) is likely to be much 
higher than this, as our LP model suggests. Thus the above 
figure should be viewed as being purely for illustrative 
purposes.
(c) Land Constraint,
, Our survey indicated that the average holding size in the 
region was 1.67 hectares. The 1977/78 survey undertaken by 
LLDP reported a mean holding size of 1.94 hectares per houses 
hold.( Allowing for the growing population in the area, our 
survey figure was fairly reasonable. The survey also indicated 
that well over half of the households had holdings which were 
below the mean size. Since the main thesis of the study was 
that land did not constitute the main contraint to farming 
activities in the area for the'-majority of households, all 
households were assumed to have equal access to farm land (up 
to a maximum of 8,0 hectares). In this way, the effects of 
land availability, on farm incomes, was isolated, so that the 
effects of the other factors, ie. labour availability, financial 
availability and crop enterprise, could be appropriately 
investigated.
It was also assumed that households would try to maximize
revenue from sale of crops, ie maize, tobacco and groundnuts.
Due to the absence of the exact knowledge regarding the labour
requirements for hybrid maize, it was assumed, in the model, to
have the sæne labour requirements as local maize. However, this
assumption is not accurate, since hybrid maize is associated
with extra labour requirements for such processes as fertilizer
application, pest control, etc., which make it relatively more
(1 5)labour intehsive than local maize. This leads to the need
for caution in interpreting the results.
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(d) Financial Constraint.
Finally, it was assumed that each household would be 
willing to purchase inputs (either on credit or cash) and hire 
labour to supplement its family labour force, whenever 
necessary. However, both activities were subject to financial 
availability. Thus two financial constraints were built into
the model, one for each activity.
(i) Input Purchase Constraint - Input purchases (either 
on credit or cash) have to be met from household income. 
Although credit purchases have to be met from future household 
income, current household income provides a very powerful 
indication of how much income the household expects to earn 
during the coming year, as such, it plays a vital role in 
déciding how much credit the household can afford to take.
For this purpose, it was assumed, in our model, that households 
would be willing to spend up to 50% of their current income 
to buy those inputs which were considered vital for raising 
household farm income. The proportion of 50% was airbitrarily
chosen, and it is felt that it could be a bit on the high side.
However, in the absence of any household income - expenditure 
data in the area to establish the investment habits of the 
people, the 50% figure was used to illustrate the extent to 
which lack of financial capital (for inputs) could be a 
constraining factor to farming activities of the various 
households,
(ii) Hired Labour Constraint - Similarly, any expenses 
incurred on hired labour have to be met from household income. 
For this constraint, kt was assumed, also arbitrarily that
a household could spend up to 25% of its current household 
income on hiring labour to supplement its family labour force 
especially during the peak labour season.
The financial requirements, of each crop (per hectare)
(for both inputs and hired labour) were derived from the gross 
margins data presented in table -6-^V
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il. Crop Enterprises Coneldered.
(a) Gross Margins.
In this analysis, only the main crops grown in LLDP are 
considered, namely, tobacco, maize and groundnuts. This is 
because these are the only crops for which project support 
(in the form of input credit and extension services) is 
available•
However, the maize enterprise has been divided into 
three, ie:
(1) Local maize for subsistence (XI)
(2) Local maize for sale (X2)
(3) Improved maize varieties (X3)*
Table 6. jo gives the gross margins associated with the above 
crop enterprises.
Prices).
Crop Enterprise.
Local Hybrid 
maize maize
Groundnuts Tobacco
Area (ha) 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00
Yield (kg/ha) 1100 3779 315 500
Farm gate Price (K/kg) 0,0496 .0.0496 0.33 0.440«
Gross Revenue 54.56 187.44 103.95 220.40
Variable costs 
Wood (K) 4.00
seeds (K) 1.24 17.30 22.22
Fertilizers (K) - 48.19 - 69.19
Hired labour (K) - 14.83 - 15.00
Transport (K) 4.94 - 1.75
Total 1.24 85.26 22.22 98.94
Gross margins (K/ha) 53.32 102.18 81.73 130.46
Gross margins/man hour 
(K) (a) 0.07 (N/A) 0.05 0.04
Sorce: LLDP Project Completion Report, Phase III Annex V(e) Tables 
(i) and (ii),
(a) - Calculated using the labour data in Table 6.5.
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(b) Lab our Demand s.
Table 6,1l. gives.the labour demands associated with each 
crop. The table indicates that the tobacco enterprise is 
associated with the heaviest labour demands, followed by- 
groundnuts and then maize. In addition it shows that the 
labour demands associated with the local maize enterprise 
are fairly spread out thoughout the year, save for the 
pronounced peak in December/January. ^he labour demand 
schedule for groundnuts has two peaks, a sharp one in December 
and a flat one between May and July, while tobacco exhibits 
a fairly heavy labour demand schedule throughout the year, with 
its trough in August/September and its peak in March/ April.
Table 6.11 Crop Monthly Labour Demands - (Man hours/hectare) 
in LLDP. 1977/78.
Month Local Maize Groundnuts Toba
October 49 12 261
November 86 40 116
December 99 272 252
J anuary 111 79 370
February 49 175 252
March 10 25 455
April 59 40 514
May 96 237 321
June 72 274 348
July 54 222 195
August 49 104 35
September 32 10 96
766 1490 3215
Source:. LLDP, Farm Management Survey quoted in LLDP, Sample 
Survey of Agriculture, 1977/78, Table 15, Page 2.
N.B. Original figures were in man hours per acre (l ha = 
2.47 acres).
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The Linear PrograimninR Results.
The LP exercise was set up for three different situations ;
viz :
(a) Where all households faced a labour constraint (being 
restricted to using family labour only ( but no financial 
constraint was specified )
(b) Where all households were subject to a financial 
constraint, for purchase of inputs, and the labour 
constraint could be overcome by hiring as much labour 
as the household required.
(c) Where both the labour constraint and financial 
constraint were in operation, ie, the purchase of
inputs and hire of labour were subjected to specified
financial constraints.
The formats of the LP model, for each category of house­
holds and under each of the tree basic conditions are summarised
in the appendix to this chapter. This section only concerns 
itself with the discussion of the results.
(a) With Labour Constraint But No Financial Constraint.
Two main results are apparent under this condition, and 
these are:
1) All household typologies were seen to cultivate farms 
belov/ the maximum .hectarage stipulated in the model (8 ha.)
2) Both tobacco and local maize (for sale) did not enter 
the optimal solution.
The above results indicate that after meeting subsistence 
requirements, all the household typologies were left with some 
labour to grow a cash crop of one type or the other^ However, 
which cash crop could be undertaken, very much depended on its
labour demands, especially during the critical months. The
results indicate that December and January were the two months 
when crop labour demands imposed the heaviest burden on the 
family labour force. January labour was particularly critical 
(as indicated by the high shadow price of labour, of KO.88 per 
hour, as against the minimum rural wage rate of KO.10 assumed
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in the modelj, A sensitivity test of the model indicated that 
in all cases, the groundnut enterprise (with a gross margin 
of K81.73 per hectare) would remain in the solution as long 
as its gross margins/hectare remained within the range K72.45 
to K279.69. At the same time, hybrid maize would algo remain 
in the solution as long as its gross margins per hectare did 
nbt go outside the K44.92 - K114.84 range (its gross margins 
per hectare were K101.80). This indicates that the solution 
was not particularly sensitive to the price of maize (in the 
downward direction) and price of groundnuts (in the upward 
direction). On the other hand, in all cases, the solution 
appeared to be highly sensitive to labour availability. For 
example, for the female headed households, with an assumed 
current supply of 170 man hours of family labour available 
per month, the solution would change if the labour available 
in December dropped below 152 man hours, or went above 179 
man hours. For January, the critical range was 106 - 190 
man hours. This clearly shows that the amount of family 
labour available during these two months was very critical 
to the cropping pattern undertaken by the household. The LP 
exercise indicated that under the above mentioned assumptions, 
the tobacco enterprise would not enter the solution as the 
available family labour, in all categories, was not sufficient 
to cope with it. Thus the only feasible enterprises were 
maize and groundnuts. The observation that it was optimal 
to grow some groundnuts for sale, rather than specializing 
in hybrid maize production for cash (which after all, offered 
higher returns to labour), tends to support the point made 
earlier concerning the difference between labour intensity 
per se. and the spread of the labour demands. In addition, 
it was hinted àbove that the labour demands of hybrid maize, 
were underestimated, thus making groundnuts the most feasible 
cash crop for the majority of households. In fact, 82% of the 
households grew the crop (although not all of them grew it 
especially for cash purposes) as a means of optimising the 
use of the family labour force.
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Table 6.12 Proportion of Households browing Groundnuts in 
LLDP. 1980/81.
Category 1 11 111 IV All
Proportion (%) 77 74 86 84 82
As already pointed out, December and January are the months
when households in the area face the heaviest demands for
labour. This is particularly worrisome, for this happens to be
the wet season in the country. As Chambers (1982) observed,
for tropical countries in general, this '.'season is likely to
be a time when poor households, face severe food shortages,
high exposure to infections (eg. Malaria and abdominal diseases)
(17)and malnutrition. All these have the effect of reducing
the family labour supply. Thus in effect, the position of 
most of the poor households in terms of family labour supply 
is likely to be worse than the one depicted in the model.
Table 6.1..3 Crop Enterprises in The Feasible Solution When 
Labour Inout is Constrained to Family Labour Only And 
Financial Constrain is Assumed Away.
1 11 Ill IV
TMG (K) 86.42 124.24 169.06 133.24
Optimal Activities (ha)
(Local maize for
subsistence ) XI 0.6g 0.87 1.35 0.99
(local maize for cash) - - -
(Hybrid maize)X3 0.78 1.12 1.51 1.21
(Groundnuts) X4 0.09 0.12 0.18 0.14
(Tobacco) X5 - - -
Total 1.56 2.11 3.04 2.34
Constraints Jan(0.05) Jan( 0.05) Jan( 0.05) Jan(0.05)
(Shadow Prices
bracketed) Dec (0,88) Dec( 0.88) Dec( 0.'88) Dec( 0.88)
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(b) Without Labour Constraint, But With Input Purchasing 
Constrained.
In the second stage of the analysis, the labour constraint
was removed by allowing the households to hire as much labour
as they required (with the availability of the means to finance 
it, ignored for the time).
The LP results indicated that all households would, in the
absence of the labour contraint, find it optimal to increase 
their farm revenues by expanding their tobacco hectarages until 
they hit the land constraint, given that they had adequate 
finances to meet the financial requirements of the tobacco 
enterprise. However, due to the operation of the financial 
constraint, the results indicated that the financially deficient 
households would tend to limit the hectarages of the outlay 
intensive enterprises (tobacco and hybrid maize) in favour of 
the local maize enterprise.
The results indicate that the poorer households categories 
1 and 11, would find it optimal to devote all their land and 
labour resources to the local maize enterprise, and a bit to 
groundnuts, as their financial resources could not allow 
them to meet the financial requirements associated with either 
the hybrid maize or tobacco enterprises. On the other hand, 
for those households with relatively more financial resources 
(categories 111 and IV), they would find it profitable to grow 
tobacco, in addition to the local maize and groundnut enterprises.
It is interesting to note that within the conditions 
specified in the model, the hybrid maize enterprise does not 
enter the optimal solution at all. This tends to indicate 
that at the given cost-price relationships, the hybrid maize 
enterprise is less profitable than its local counterpart. As 
Table 6. |0indicates,> local maize offered a higher return per 
Kwacha than the hybrid maize enterprise. In addition, it 
appears that the higher yield obtainable from liybrid maize 
was rot high enough (at the given farm-gate prices) to compansate 
for the higher costs associated with it. For example, the 
incremental revenue from a hectare of hybrid maize (over a 
hectare of local maize) was K132.88, while as the incremental
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costs required to realize this incremental revenue were 
K84.02 (see table 6,|o). Thus given adequate land and labour 
resources, it is optimal for a household to undertake the 
local maize enterprise rather than the hybrid one. This 
indicates that the cost-price relationship (of the hybrid 
maize enterprise) is counter to the projects desire to expand 
hybrid maize production. If the hybrid maize enterprise is to 
be taken up by many farmers, then it must be seen to be more 
profitable than local maize. This suggests that revising 
the price policy for maize, to achieve c\ cost-price relation­
ship whereby investment in the hybrid maize enterprise (in 
terms to amount of revenue earned per Kwacha spent) is more 
profitable than in the local maize enterprise. This is 
because, although the returns to labour from the hybrid maize 
enterprise may be higher than those from the local maize 
enterprise (in the region 1.28 :1, if for the sake of argument, 
we assume that hybrid maize requires 25% more labour per hectare 
per year, than the local maize, because'hybrid maize is'far more 
intensive in its financial requirements than local maize)^ it is 
the relationship between the returns to finances, of the two 
enterprises, which will be the main deciding factor regarding 
which enterprise will be undertaken, especially among those 
households where the financial constraint is the most binding 
constraint.
The LP results also indicated that for those households 
with relatively more financial resources for purchasing inputs 
(whether in the form of cash resources or access to seasonal 
credit), the tobacco enterprise featured in their optimal 
solution, in addition to local maize and groundnuts. This 
suggests that, if it was not for the quota controls, its 
production would have been much higher than is the case at the 
moment.
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Contraint (l^ or Input Purchasing) is Introduced, But Labour
Constraint Removed.
Household category
1 11 111 IV
TMG (K) 329.96 327.87 378.55 383.98
Optimal Activities (ha)
(Local maize - for 
subsistence) XI 0.69 0.87 1.35 0.99
(Local maize - cash) X2 6.92 6.70 4.47 5.05
(Hybrid maize) X3 - - - -
(Groundnuts) X4 0.39 0.43 1.28 1.13
( Tobacco) X5 - 0.90 0.63
Total 8.00 8.00 8.00 8.00
Constraints
(shadow prices ' , . > 
bracketed) Fin A 
(1.51)
Fin A 
(1,51)
Fin A 
(42.8)
Pin A 
(42.8)
-
Land
(40.33)
Land
(40.33)
Land
(0.60)
Land
(0.60)
(c) With. Both Labour and Financial Constraints Operating.
In the final stage -in addition to the financial constraint 
associated with purchasing inputs, households' hiring of labour 
was subjected to a financial constraint. That is, households 
could only spend up to 25% of the current incomes on hiring 
labour for agricultural work.
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Purchases And Labour Hiring are Constrained
Household Category
1 11 111 IV
TMG (K) 58.72 79.49 148.49 124.36
Optimal Activities (ha)
(Local maize 
subsistence): XI 0.69 0.87 1.35 0.99
(Local maize - cash) X2 0.58 0.92 0.40 0.19
(Hybrid maize) X3 0.20 0.20 1.11 1.02
(Groundnuts) X4 0.09 0.12 0.18 0.14
Tobacco) X5 - - -
Total 1.56 2.11 3.04 2.34
Constraints
(shadow prices in 
brackets) Dec \ Dec Dec Dec
(0.14) (0.14) (O.140 (0.14)
Jan Jan Jan Jan
(0.35) (0.34) (0.35) (0.35)
Pood Pood Food Food
(0.05) (0.05) (0.05) (0.05)
Pin A Pin A Pin A Pin A
(0.70) (0.70) (0.70) (0.70)
The results indicate that the total hectarage cultivated 
by each of the average households in each typology was the same 
(when the financial constraint regarding hiring labour was 
introduced) as for the situation where only family labour was 
used, Thic tends to support the view that households hired 
labour not for ground preparation work, but largely for weeding 
purposes. However, it was interesting to note that there was 
a change in the composition of the optimal crop enterprises.
Where as under situation (a), the hybrid maize enterprise 
featured in the optimal solutions of all the household typologies
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with the introduction of the financial constràint (regarding 
input purchases), the hybrid maize hectarages of categories 
1 and 11 households dropped by 74% and 82%, respectively, in 
favour of the local maize enterprise, which required minimal 
financial resources. In contrast, categories 111 and IV 
households, because of their greater financial resources, 
experienced drops of 26% and l6% in their hybrid maize hectarages 
respectively, as a result of introducing the financial constraint 
with regard to input purchases. This indicates that the avail­
ability of finances, to'purchase inputs (cash or credit) has a 
larger impact on the poorer households* ability to take up 
innovations, than on the relatively better off ones.
At the same time, the introduction of the financial 
constraint, to restrict labour availability, had the effect 
of restricting the cultivated area drastically, to levels 
manageable by the family labour forces as indicated above.
More important, the results indicated that the removal of the 
labour constraint, would have an income equalisation effect, 
as all households would tend to take up a land extensive 
system of cultivation (subject to land availability). As 
Table indicates, as long as there is no labour constraint,
the financial constraint has a minimal effect on the total farm 
revenue of the various households. However, where the labour 
constraint is in operation, as in table- 6* 13 the financial 
constraint tends to reinforce the income differences, by 
limiting the access of the labour deficient households to 
higher yielding crop varieties, as was observed in the tree 
diagram analysis presented above.
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3. Models of Innovation Adoption in LLDP.
It has already been pointed out that most of the innovations 
introduced in the LLDP (eg. monocropping, new and improved seed 
varieties, etc,), were of the labour intensive type in relation 
to traditional crops. At the same time, the need for self- 
sufficiency in foodstuffs, coupled with the fact that the 
distribution of inputs through the credit systems was based 
on the "ability to repay" criterion meant that only those who 
were able to cultivate large hectarages took up the innovations. 
These aspects had a significant impact on the way productivity 
and income improvements were distributed among the households 
as the reported cash income data indicated. In this section, 
an attempt will be made to illustrate how under the circumstances 
underlined above, the pattern of income distribution observed 
in the area may have emerged, by making use of a number of 
models.
A. Labour Availability and Innovation Adoption in LLDP
I. The 8 emi-Subsistence Farm Family Model.
Here, a modified version of the model developed by Fisk 
(1975), will be used to show how a basically subsistence 
production family unit, is likely to respond to the. introduction 
of a relatively labour intensive innovation.^
The model iS built on the underlying assumption that land 
availability is not the binding constraint to tie family farm 
income. Nevertheless, it is recognised that although households 
may not be institutionally constrained in their access to farm 
land, in the short run, the supply of farmland available to a 
household may be regarded as fixed. As such, this model adopts 
the Fisk approach of regarding the land factor as constant, so 
as to enable the effects of the other factors to be appropriately 
investigated. In the original Fisk model, technology and capital 
are also assumed to be constant, the only variable input being 
family labour. However, in the model presented here, both 
capital and technology vary (between households) as a result of 
the development effort being undertaken, which provides extension 
and credit services and encourages the use of modern inputs. 
Inorder to keep the analysis at a manageable level, the product­
ion of only one crop (maize) is considered.
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Graph 6.1, depicts the situation represented by the Fisk 
model, ie., where land, capital and technology are constant - 
which is akin to households growing a traditional crop, such 
as local maize under traditional methods of production. OP 
represents the production possibility curve of households of 
varying sizes (subject to diminishing returns due to the fixity 
of the land). OS represents the subsistence requirements of the 
various households. Under these circumstances, OP represents 
the income function. And as the graph indicates, under such 
circumstances, there is very little scope of a marketable 
surplus for most of the households.
In graph 6.2, we introduce a modern innovation, such as 
hybrid maize, which is meant to boost production of a market­
able surplus. It is here argued that the additional labour 
demands associated with the new innovation (such as early and 
timely planting, weeding, fertilizer application and soil 
conservation measures, etc.) and the stipulation of a minimum 
size of the package, require a critical minimum labour effort 
say 12 below which such an innovation may not be taken. Under 
such circumstances, the income\function of the households would 
be kinked, ie, 00'0"P*. The graph indicates that the production 
possibility curve, with the new innovation becomes 0"P'. It can 
be seen that a household with a relatively small labour force,
'say Lj^which is below the critical labour required for the 
minimum prescribed package (ie 10 kg of hybrid maize seed - for 
1 hectare), can only be able to grow the traditional crop 
giving it a very small marketable output. This tends to agree 
with the observation that only those households with either 
large family labour forces, or able to hire labour, grow the 
crop, while those with labour deficiencies, such as the female 
headed households (typology 1) do not grow it. It is very 
important to realize that this aspect of a critical minimum 
level of labour input required for the adoption of hybrid 
maize arises from both the stipulation of the minimum package 
that is a household should be able to raise the labour required 
to cope with 1 hectare of hybrid maize, and the fact that
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hybrid maize is relatively more labour intensive than local maize.
On the one hand, a household with a labour force larger 
than the critical level required for the adoption of hybrid maize, 
taking up the hybrid maize enterprise will enable it to obtain 
a larger marketable output, say CO *, which would have been non­
existent with the local variety, as at this point the household 
output C, just equalled its consumption requirements S3» The 
above model demonstrates that labour availability could be quite 
a crucial constraint to innovation adoption in the circumstances 
under review. For example, for those households with a labour 
deficiency (to deal with the minimum stipulated package), 
provision of inputs, say through credit, unless accompanied by 
some form of labour saving technology, is unlikely to induce 
them to innovate. While as, for those households with adequate 
labour supplies (family and / or hired), access to inputs is more 
likely to enhance their adoption of such innovations. This 
explains why our survey results have indicated that it is mostly 
those households with either large family labour forces or with the 
ability to hire labour, that have adopted the innovations 
introduced in LLDP. An.d,as already pointed out, the advocatif^ 
of such an adoption pattern has the likely consequence of 
inducing a rural labour market, whereby a group; of '^'progressive" 
farmers rely increasingly on hiring the labour of the poor 
households. The mechanics of such a situation will be demonstrated 
in the next model.
II. The Emergence of a Rural Labour Market.
The position of the smaller and poorer households is made 
worse by the nature of the output market. As already pointed 
out, although ADMARC offers one price to all smallholder 
producers for all varieties of maize, throughout the year, there 
are in fact differences in the prices which different farmers 
get for their output due to the disjointed nature of 
the market. As indicated earlier, ADMARC purchases only 
a small proportion of the smallholder maize crop (about 40%),^^^^ 
the rest being sold through private channels, where the price ranges 
from say K3-50 per 2001b. bag (91 kg), soon after harvest 
(May/June), to about K13-50 or more, during the rainy season 
( De c ember/ J anuary ). The ADI,"ARC markets do not open until mid-July
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(except for tobacco, which open in April)* The majority of the 
poor households sell most of their maize soon after harvest to 
raise badly needed cash for such things as clothing, etc., as this 
happens to be the slack season and there are hardly any non-farm 
income earning opportunities available* Ironically,these households 
end up buying maize during the hungry gap when its price is very 
high, usually using funds earned from wage labour, which seems to 
be in high demand at this time of the year.
For the larger farmers, the ADMARC price acts as their 
minimum guaranteed price. In the first place, they can afford 
to wait until the free market price has risen before selling 
their produce, at about 3 - 4  times the price obtained by the 
smaller farmers.Alternatively , they are able to sell in bulk 
(individually or in groups) direct to ADMAJRC depots or to 
industrial users, at higher prices. For example, in the 1980/81 
season the author came across a number of farmers in Unit 4, 
who had co-operated to deliver a lorryload of maize 
to Chibuku Products (a local brev/ery) at KIO per bag, while 
the smallholder price paid at the ADMARC local markets was K6.50 
per bag. Although they paid K1 per bag for transport, they still 
ended up with a much better deal. Thus the larger farmers tend 
to obtain a higher return to labour, from their maize enterprises 
than the smaller farms. It could be argued that this differential 
in returns enables the larger farmers to take on the higher 
yielding varieties, for it compensates them for the higher costs 
associated with input purchases. More importantly, the returns 
to labour from the maize enterprise, to the larger households, 
are much higher than those to the smaller and poorer farmers 
(due to the higher output prices and higher yields per hectare 
associated with the improved maize varieties). This implies 
that the gross margins from the maize enterprise presented in 
table 6.ID, which were based on ADMARC farm-gate prices, over­
state the gross 'Baz'gins obtained by many of the poor farmers, 
while they understate those obtained by the larger and better- 
off farmers. The implication of this aspect is that due to the
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disjointed product market and the differences in technologies 
used by the various typologies fo farmers, they face differing ■ 
marginal returns to labour from their maize enterprises, and 
they operate on different production functions. As long as 
this differential is large enough, a labour market is likely 
to emerge among the rural people. The model below, will
be used to illustrate how this is likely to take place.
The model to be employed is that developed by Nakajima 
(1970) and modified by Kydd (1978) in the model we shall
look at how a"non-adopting household" and an "adopting household" 
will react to the presence of a labour market. In the discussion 
above, it was argued that the introduction of a relatively labour 
intensive innovation such as hybrid maize, is likely to trigger 
off a rural labour market, especially if the adopting households 
cannot fully meetthe crop labour demands from their family labour 
forces, and at the same time, if there exists a group of people 
who for one reason or the other, cannot participate in the new 
innovation, and have very limited off-farm employment opportuni­
ties.
(a) The introduction of a rural labour market
Let us assume that a rural household can either sell or 
purchase some quantityoof labour if it so desires, at a wage 
rate determined by the market. If we further assume that the
household has no asset income, the equation for the household's
income function (following Nakajima, 1970), will be:
Y = Ys + Ym
Y = Ys + Px f i x  ,B) + W(L-% )
where Y = total household income.
Ys= subsistence income.
Ym= monetary income.
Px= farmgate price of product.
X = total labour input on farm.
I» = total family labour utilized on the farm 
Eind outside the farm.
B = total land cultivated by the household.
W ^ wage rate
228
Graph 6.1 Reaction of a Semi-Subsistence Household
To a Labour Market in a Nion- innovating: 
Situation
c
Ys
o
Labour'Inputs
(b)
w
 w
pi
O
Labour Inputs
229
Graph S , a Reaction of --a Semi-Subsistence Huosehold 
To a Labour Intensive Innovation In the
Existence of a Labour Market
Quantity of Labour
(b)
O
a
Ë
Quantity of Labour
230
In the graph 6.3, OP represents the production possibility 
curve of a household with a total labour force of L , producing 
say local maize (non-innovating). The slope of the line CQR 
represents the wage rate.. Point Q, where the production 
possibility curve touches the wageline, represents the most 
preferred point of farm production for the household, while 
point R, where the wage line touches the indifference curve, 
represents the most preferred total family income position.
Points Q ' and R*, in the bottom part of the diagram, represent 
the equilibrium points of total labour input on the farm and 
total labour input on and outside the farm, respectively.
The diagram indicates that given the total workforce of Lunits 
the most optimal strategy for the household would be to employ 
X units on the farm and hire out L - X units, at the going wage 
rate. In other words, at the existing level of technology, it 
would pay the household to hire out any labour units over and 
above the number of units at which the marginal revenue of 
labour on the farm equals the going wage rate (or to hire in 
labour up to that point if its own labour force is less than 
the equilibrium quantity X).
Now if we introduce a labour .intensive technology, as in the 
case depicted in graph 6.4, the position changes. In the first 
place, the most preferred point of farm production (at which 
the wage line touches the new production possibility curve) 
becomes Ql, with the corresponding labour input of XI. This 
indicates the total labour input required to attain the preferred 
farm production position is much larger than that in the previous 
situation, meaning that since the household has*a smaller labour 
force than XI, to take advantage of the new innovation, it will 
have to hire some labour at the going wage rate.
Another point illustrated by the graph is that even house­
holds with large workforces, if taking up the innovation, will 
be inclined to hire in labour (because of their higher income 
positions, made possible by the innovation) in preference for 
leisure. If there is a large group of innovators, competition 
for labour is likely to arise, and this may push up the wage 
rate. It could be argued that the advocation of a labour
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intensive technology may well prove to be a useful tool for
improving the incomes of the rural poor, if it leads to higher
rural wages. However as it has already been pointed out, the
poor households who usually hire their labour usually do so
out of need rather than choice. This means they have a very
low bargaining strength. Due to the differentiated product
market, the poorer farmers get lower returns to labour than
their better-off and innovating households. For these poor
farmers, the decision to hire out labour depends on the
comparison between the marginal revenue product of labour on
their farms and in wage employment. For the innovators, the > '
decision to hire labour rests on the differential between the
marginal product of the hired labour on the farm and the wage
rate. Because productivity is very low on the farms of the
poor households, the basis of their wage demands is low. The
position is further weakened by the fact that most of these
households are badly in need of food at the time their labour
is in demand, as such, they tend to be price takers rather than
(23)makers, thus making the situation exploitative.
It should be added that, because of the labour intensity 
of the innovations, the Innovating households will have two 
options, either to use labour saving technology or to hire 
labour. The decision as to which option will be followed will 
depend very much on the relative costs of the two options as 
well as the degree of substitutability between labour and 
labour saving techniques. But as already indicated, the type 
of innovations being considered in the case under review, 
appear to be those where labour saving technology (at least 
the available range) is less suitable. Hence the most likely 
option for the innovator is to hire labour. This decision is 
aided by the output pricing system, which makes investmont in 
labour saving technology less profitable while at the same 
time keeping returns to labour in peasant agriculture 
(especially among the non-innovators) low, thereby keeping the 
rural wage rate low.
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While the model does not pretend to state that the peasant 
farmers do actually sit down and perform the elaborate 
calculations implied in the model, it illustrates how, under 
the assumptions specified and implied in the model, households 
with different resource endowments are likely to react to changes 
in their economic enviroment, brought about by the introduction 
of a particular type of development strategy, given that the 
peasant farmers are rational in their allocation of resources 
in pursuing a given objective, or set of objectives, for 
which ample evidence is cited in the literature,^
Evidence from the survey does tend to support the model, as 
it indicated that those households not taking the innovations 
(categories 1 and 11) tended to rely substantially on hiring 
out labour to improve their household income positions, while a 
at the same time, those households who took up the innovation 
package in the area, tended to be associated with a greater 
degree of labour hiring (in addition to their larger than 
average family labour forces).
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à . A Summary.
What the analysis of the survey data has shown so far is
that while both average yields and average household incomes
may have risen substantially in the project area, such a rise
may not have been uniform across the various household
typologies. The analysis has indicated, for example, that
categories 1 and 11 households (female headed households, and
those male headed households growing neither tobacco nor
improved maize), because of their relative lack of adequate
labour and their restricted access to input credit (which
appears to be a direct result of their labour deficiency),
may not have benefitted much from the current development
effort, which in essence, depends a great deal on the adoption
of inherently labour intensive innovations to raise farm
productivities and farm incomes; Such a finding is consistent
with results obtained in other parts of the world where the
encouragement of innovation adoption among the smallholder
farmers has been adopted as the main strategy for raising 
(25)rural incomes. The study has indicated that the main
problem of the poor households ( ie. those in 
groups I and II), appears to be lack of cash to buy family 
necessities, which stems from their low farm productivities,
' _ Because they
cannot improve their farm income positions due to the reasons 
given above, these households usually resort to non-farm sources 
of income. However lack of cash earning opportunities in the 
rural areas( coupled with limited opportunities in the relatively 
small urban sector), forces most of these households to sell 
their crops early in the season when prices are very low, thereby 
opening up a "hunger gap" before the next harvest. The 
consequence of this aspect is that such households out of sheer 
necessity to survive, are forced to hire out their labour , badly 
needed on their own farms, to richer households and/or to agri- 
ultural estates, during the peak agricultural season. This tends 
to further aggravate their household income positions. Castro
(1981), observed that those who engaged themselves in wage labour 
in rural areas, tended to be the poor villagers. Because wage 
levels are usually low (due to the low bargaining power of such
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people), these households are unable to accumulate and are 
chronically poor.^^^^ Although time series data were not 
available to adequately prove this point, in our case,the 
results of the cross-section data reported in chapters V and 
VI, strongly support this point.
It therefore appears that unless some corrective measures 
are undertaken, such a strategy of development is likely to 
open up the income gap between the " poorer" and "richer" 
households, with the former getting more and more dependent 
on wage labour. In the concluding chapter we shall try to 
explore th® various ways through which such a situation can 
be averted.
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CHAPTER VII
POLICY IMPLICATIONS. RECOMENDATIONS AND CONCLUSIONS.
As indicated in the introductory chapter, this study has 
attempted to assess the impact of a smallholder agricultural 
development strategy on the alleviation of rural poverty^
LLDP, one of the pioneer experiments in smallholder agricultu­
ral development (both from the point of view of the World Bank 
and the Malawi Government), has been used cas a case study* 
However, before drawing conclusions from the evidence emerging 
from our Smallholder Agricultural Households Survey in the 
LLDP, it is important to point out some of the outstanding 
characteristics of the survey area.
The Lilongwe district, in which LLDP is situated is unique 
in a number of respects. Firstly, its natural factors, ie. 
good soils, moderate temperatures, and reliable rainfall, make 
it an area of great agricultural potential, especially for 
smallholder crops. That is, of the total land area available 
in Lilongwe (about 615,000 hectares), 6?^ is rated as cultivable 
and .this constitu ted about 7.8% of the cultivable land in the 
c o u n t r y . A s  table 6.1 indicates, the 1968/69 National Sample 
Survey of Agriculture estimated that during the 1968/69 cropping 
season, Lilongwe District alone, was responsible for more than 
20% and 30% of the total Malawian production of maize and 
groundnuts, respectively, and that average yields of both crops 
were the highest in the country (see table 7.1). This indicates 
that even before the project was underway, the quality and 
intensity of smallholder agricultural production in the District 
were higher than the national average.
Secondly, as a result of the area's agricultural potential,
qL
it has been a major recipient of agricultural efforts varying-©.f 
intensities right from colonial times. In addition to LLDP, 
the Colby School of Agriculture, Chitedze Experimental Station 
and the Bunda College of Agriculture are all situated in the 
district. And more recently, the establishment of the new 
Capital City in the district, and its subsequent expansion, have 
added impetus to the modernising influence of external factors
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(especially the availability of a growing and expanding market 
for food crops and the availability of off-farm employment 
opportunities in close proximity to the farm) on peasant 
production in the area. More important, Lilongwe has enjoyed 
the privilege of being one of the few places in the country 
where smallholder agricultural production of cash crops (eg, 
tobacco and groundh’uts) was tolerated and even encouraged 
during the colonial era, due to its distance from the Shire 
Highlands, where European settler agriculture was concentrated 
and also due to the fact that the crops involved were those 
which did not compete directly with settler crops. This has 
meant that both land and labour in the area were available for 
smallholder agriculture in contrast to, say the Shire Highlands 
where settler plantations of tea, tung and coffee took up most 
of the land and labour available. The consequence is that in 
the Lilongwe area the smallholder farmer has had a relatively 
long experience in peasant cash crop production. Thus the 
current agricultural development effort has been more or less 
built upon an existing structure and along the lines of 
adapting an already existing farming system and improving on 
it.
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Table 7.1 Smallholder Production. Yields and Hectaraae sl of 
Maize and Groundnuts in Lilongwe Districts Compared with 
National and Regional T'ôtais 1968-69.
(a) .Maize
Area (ha)
(%)
Yield
(kg/ha)_. (metric tons)
(#)
All Malawi 1068 (100.0) .1019.2 1091.0 (100.0)
Northern Region 110.2 (10.3) 817.6 90.0 (8.2)
Central Region 463.2 (43.4) 1176.0 '545.8 (50.0)
Southern Region 496.8 (46.3) 918.4 455.6 (4.7)
Lilongwe ' 152.1 (14.3) 1523.2 234.0 (21.4)
(b) Groundnuts
All Malawi 449.2 (100.0) 448 202.2 (100.0)
Northern Region 35.8 (8.0) 481.6 17.2 (8.5)
Central Region 216.4 (48.2) 660.8 142.8 (70.7)
Southern Region 197.1 (43.9) •212.8 42.0 (20.8)
Lilongwe 186.3 (41.4) 963.2 62.5 (30.9)
Source: NSC Sample Survey of Agriculture, 1968/69'
Table 7.2 ADMARCs Purchases of Tobacco and Groundnuts From 
Customary Land. 1950-1974. ('000 metric tons)
Period Tobacco
All Malawi Lilongwe
Groundnuts 
All Malawi Lilongwe
(%) { % )
1950-54 47.2 26.5 (56.2) 16.5 6.5 (39.5)
1955-59 50.8 30.1 (59.3) 54.2 16.3 (30.1)
1960-64 50.1 23.8 (47.5) 117.9 35.9 (30.5)
1965-69 60.8 27.2 (44.8) 168.2 58.5 (34.8)
1970-74 70.7 ' 35.9 (50.7) 161.8 49.5 (30.6)
1950-74 279.6 143.5 (51.3) 518.9 166.7 (32.1)
ource: ADMARC Reports, and Department of Agriculture Reports -
See Compendium of Agricultural Statistics, Tables 6, 7a, and 7e(lc) 
PP 8 and 21. NB. Original data given in short tons.
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In the light of the above evidence, it is clear that LLDP 
is not a typical underdeveloped area. This implies that any 
success of the project cannot be necessarily duplicated else­
where in the country where conditions may be different from 
those obtaining in LLDP. Nevertheless, the analysis has 
indicated the general constraints to smallholder productivity 
and the conditions under which a smallholder agricultural 
development strategy can reduce rural poverty. Such knowledge 
is valuable in that it may indicate how rural development 
efforts in other areas in the country could be appropriately 
planned and implemented.
1. The Agricultural Development Strategy Considered.
The analysis of smallholder agricultural development in 
Malawi has revealed that during the colonial and federal eras 
there was a general neglect of smallholder agricultural develop­
ment in favour of estate agriculture, which was in the hands of 
European settler farmers and companies. Government fiscal, 
marketing and pricing policies were manipulated in such a way 
that provided the estate sector with cheap labour. The con­
sequence of this neglect of smallholder agriculture was that 
peasants were forced either to work on the settler farms, often 
at low wages and unfavourable conditions, or to migrate to 
South Africa, Zimbabwe or Zambia, an aspect that created severe 
labour bottlenecks in the smallholder sector, and thus threat­
ened even subsistence production^
Attempts to reverse the situation in the 1950's met with 
very little success because of the coercive methods used by the 
agricultural department to revolutionize smallholder agriculture. 
Some of the methods of agricultural production that were being 
introduced had little economic rationality, and the use of 
coercion, at a time when political awareness was at its highest, 
meant that there was widespread resistance to their adoption.
The coming of political Independence in 1964, saw an abandon­
ing of the coercive approach to agricultural modernization. 
Instead, the Department of Agriculture, sought to teach the 
people better methods of farming through persuasion and example.
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Thus, in the late 1960*8, a smallholder agricultural develop­
ment strategy was adopted which concentrated efforts and ; 
resources on a few geographical places and or "progressive" 
farmers, to produce tangible results in the shortest time 
and therefore initiate a demonstration effect throughout the 
smallholding community. However, by the mid 1970*s it was 
clear that the approach was not cost effective and it was not 
egalitarian. A new approach to agricultural development, 
under the auspices.of the National Rural Development Programme 
(NRDP) was launched in the late 1970's. This Programme aims 
to achieve a broad based agricultural development.
While all these efforts at finding a viable smallholder
agricultural development strategy have been going on in the
post-independence era, the dual structure of the agricultural
sector inherited at Independence has been maintained.
Available evidence indicates that the role of the estate sector
has been consolidated and strengthened over the past decade or 
(2)so. It is only fair to state that while experiments with
small scale agricultural development have been going on, the 
estate sector has provided the economy with badly needed 
foreign exchange earnings (some of which have been used to
i
finance the Integrated Rural Development Programmes), and
therefore enabled Malawi to maintain a very respectable r^te
of growth in GDP over the past decade or so. This contrasts
remarkably with the growth records of other developing
countries which radically altered the structures of their
agricultural sectors soon after Independence, such as Tanzania.
According to World Bank estimates (World Bank 1981 b), during
the 1960-70 decade (the decade when both countries attained
their Independence), the average annual growth rate of GDP for
the whole economy (in real terms), for Malawi was 4.9% while
that for Tanzania was 6.0%. However, between 1970 and 1979,
Malawi's average annual growth rate rose to 6.3% while that
for Tanzania fell to 4.9%. ^ I t  is interesting to note that
during the later decade, Malawi registered an average annual
growth rate of over 4% in its volume of agricultural product-
( 5 )ion, while that of Tanzania was only between 1 and 2%.
As already indicated, » the high growth rate in Malawi's
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agricultural production during the period under review was 
spearheaded by rapid growth in the estate sector. Tanzania, 
on the other hand, put all its stakes on the "villagisation" 
and "collectivisation" schemes, with the consequence that 
when these failed to achieve increases in agricultural 
production, as many studies have i n d i c a t e d , t h e  result of 
this failure was severely felt by the whole economy, as ' 
reflected in the lower rate of GDP growth.
While such evidence provides some rationale of the prudence
of adopting the dual agricultural development strategy (estate
development and smallholder agricultural development), it
should not mask the lessons learned from the pre-indApendence
era. As already pointed out, over-emphasis on the estate sector
during that period led to government policies (fiscal, marketing
pricing and wages) which were geared to allocating resources
(mostly land and labour) away from the smallholding to the
estate sectors with disagreabl© effects especially on rural
wellbeing. As mentioned earlier, the two sectors compete for
resources of land, labour and capital finance. While available
evidence indicates that the estate sector expanded over the last
decade or so, largely by making use of idle resources, there is
a growing feeling that this may no longer be the case. Kydd and
Christiansen (1982), for example, argue that during the period
of rapid estate expansion, in the post-independence era, wage
and smallholder producer price policies have combined to channel
both labour and finances to the estate sector, which has also
(7)been favourably treated with respect to land allocation.
Thus although the dual strategy may have served Malawi well 
over the past decade so, in terms of piaintaining
agricultural growth, it could at best be a temporary solution
to the country's long term development needs.
It therefore appears that if NRDP is to succeed in sub­
stantially improving the income positions of the smallholding 
community, there is a great need to carefully weigh the impact 
of the estate sector on smallfarm development, both from the 
point of view of resource allocation as well as access to 
markets. It is said that smallholder farm development offers
the best opportunity to improve rural welfare in cases where
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the smallholder community predominates, and that evidence
indicates that smallholder productibn of most of the crops
now produced by the estate sector, actually enhances higher
output (due to the inherent efficiency of small farms in their •
use of inputs as opposed to large farms), it may therefore be
in the interests of the country to concentrate its agricultural
developement efforts on the smallholder s e c t o r . ^ T h i s
would entail running down estate production of some crops (eg.
burley tobacco which is largely produced on the estates on a
( 9)visiting tenancy system), and handing them over to small­
holders. This would have the effect of increasing employment 
opportunities within the agricultural sector, since smallholder 
agriculture tends to be more labour intensive than estate 
agriculture. In addition it would have positive distributional 
effects that would aid local industry (especially those involved 
in the manufacture of mass consumption goods) rather than channel­
ling most pf the income generated from agriculture to large 
farmers and estate owners who tend to have a high propensity to 
import goods from abroad.
2, A Summary of The Main Findings Emerging From The Survey Data 
Analysis.
In analysing the survey data, the main objective of the 
excercise was to trace out the interrelationships among the 
factors that were thought to be associated with household in­
comes from the farm enterprise, in an attempt to identify the 
main sources of interhousehold differences in incomes observed 
in the area,. The analysis has been carried out at two levels.
The first level is what may be termed as a descriptive analysis 
of the data. At this level, the aim was to isolate typologies 
of households which displayed similar characteristics so that 
a comparative study of the various typologies could be under­
taken. This has proved to be a very valuable exercise. It has 
indicated that the often professed homogeneity of the rural 
population in the area is merely a superficial one. The house­
holds have been seen to fall into a number of distinct typologies 
with distinct characteristics regarding farming systems, farm 
sizes, income levels, family sizes, etc. More important, this
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analysis has revealed that, the development effort undertaken 
in the area has had differing impacts on the different typo­
logies, For example, it has indicated that tobacco farmers 
and improved maize growers are earning substantially higher 
incomes from their farming enterprises than say, the female­
headed households, who are seen to hardly participate in 
tobacco and improved maize production, but to rely increasingly 
on wage labour and/or petty trading, not only to meet their 
ordinary cash requirements, but even to supplement their sub­
sistence food requirements. Such findings are of crucial 
importancein influencing the future direction of development 
policy, for they clearly indicate that the present development 
strategy, if not altered, is likely to lead to producing a 
polarised rural community, which may not have been contemplated 
by the policy formulators, as indicated in the policy state­
ments discussed in chapter III.
The second level of analysis is a statistical one. Here 
the main concern has been to find out the main factors that are 
associated with crop revenue. The hypotheses stated in the 
introductory chapter were explored. The hypothesis that a house­
hold's level of total revenue from sale of crops is likely to be 
associated with the type of crop enterprise undertaken (ie. adopt­
ion or non-adoption of innovations la), was well supported by
the data. This implied that the adoption of innovations was a 
key to higher farm incomes. Similarly, the hypothesis concerning 
the association between innovation adoption (defined by use of 
modern farm inputs) and access to credit was also supported by 
the survey data. It was found that those who adopted the 
innovations introduced by LLDP, mostly did so with the help of 
credit. Although the evidence supported the hypothesis, 
because the nature of the data did not allow us to confirm the 
existence of causality in the relationship, some reservations 
regarding the impact of credit on innovation adoption were 
expressed. It was argued that the pattern of input credit 
distribution (although it correlated with that of innovation 
adoption), could have been influenced by other factors, related 
or unrelated to innovation adoption. Inefficiences in the
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marketing of inputs (by ADMARC), were cited as one of the 
likely factors that could have contributed to the suppression 
of cash purchases of inputs, thereby making access to credit 
more closely related to uptake of innovations.
The evidence that households with larger hectarages had 
more access to credit than those with smaller ones, supported the 
hypothesis regarding the relationship between farm size and 
access to credit (hypothesis 2a). Such evidence tended to 
indicate that credit distribution wasbased on the "ability to repay" 
principle, implying that the pattern of credit distribution, 
and therefore innovation adoption, had its roots, not only at 
the macro level (deliberate Government policy to foster elitist 
development), as it has usually been claimed, but also at the 
micro-level, ie. it had also to do with the determinants of 
farm size at the household level. Of the two hypotheses put 
forward to explore the determinants of farm size, at the house­
hold level, the one partaining to the relationship between 
farm size and family labour force (hypothesis 2b) was not 
adequately supported. On the other hand, the hypothesis regard- 
ing the relationship between cultivated^snd hired labour (hypo­
thesis 2c), was supported by the available evidence. Such a 
finding was indicative of the fact that, in the circumstances 
under review, because of the sharp seasonality cf the.crop 
labour demands, and the inherent labour intensity of the crop 
enterprises supported by the development effort (eg. tobacco, 
groundnuts and improved maize varieties), it was only those 
households who could raise the peak labour requirements (mostly 
through the help of hired labour), who were in a position to 
take up innovations. Thus, smaller and poorer households, with 
inadequate labour resource to meet the peak labour demands of 
the n,ew innovations, at least at a level high enough to produce 
a marketable surplus, over and above their subsistence require­
ments, tended to be left out of th^nno vat ion. band wagon.
In an attempt' to explore the factors associated with a 
household’s ability to hire labour, we looked at the hypothesis 
that expenditure on hired labour was closely associated with 
non-farm income rec;eipts '(2d). However, -the- hypothesis could not 
be substantiated as the evidence was mixed. The largest group of 
households hiring labour (tobacco growers), were foumd to have the 
least proportion of non-farm income in their total household incomes 
and paying their hired labour largely in kind than cash. For this
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group of households, it appears that their ability to produce 
maize surpluses, made possible by their privileged access to 
input credit, as discussed in chapter V, enabled them to hire 
labour. As already indicated, most of those people who hired out
their services, did so in order to supplement their depleted
food supplies, to these people, payment in kind, which was 
usually in the form of maize, was the most preferred one given
that at the time of the year, food prices were very high.
On the other hand, the other group of labour hirers (the 
improved maize growers), depended largely on cash to pay for 
their hired labour. For this group, whose non-farm income 
receipts were mostly from trades, business enterprises and 
more secure forms of employment, the relationship between the 
expenditure on hired labour and non-farm income receipts was 
quite Bustantial, This implied that their access to non-farm 
income sources, enabled them to hire the labour required by the 
crop enterprises they undertook.
Finally, the hypothesis that cash purchases of inputs are 
likely to be associated with a household's level of non-farm 
income receipts was not supported. This could either reflect 
the inefficiencies in the input marketing system referred to 
earlier, or it could reflect the fact that, because input 
credit is readily available, once a household * s. :lik#lihood 
to produce a marketable ■ surplus is established (usually by 
referring to its previous record, or looking at the size of 
the area it cultivate the previous season), households find it 
more prudent to reserve any cash they might have, for hiring I 
labour during the peak season.
Overall, the analysis has indicated that labour availability 
played a very important role in the household's ability to adopt 
the innovation "packages" offered by the project. It has 
indicated that in the 1980/81 season, a substantial proportion 
of the households surveyed in LLDP (about 70%) had adopted the 
innovations offered, that is, they had undertaken such enter­
prises as tobacco, improved maize (hybrids and/or composites) 
and improved groundnuts, and used recommended inputs and 
followed crop husbandry methods as stipulated by the extension
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staff. This is a commendable achievement on the part of LLDP. 
Hov;ever, the evidence arising from the survey tends to indicate 
that the "non-adopting" farmers who are mostly female-headed 
households, are not likely to be brought into the line of 
adopters under the current development strategy which tends to 
foster the adoption of relatively labour intensive innovations 
(by tying input credit to particular crop enterprises). This 
is reinforced by the lack of innovation packages (such as 
smaller input "packages") which are appropriate for the small 
and poor farmers.
The analysis has indicated, for example that, the female 
headed households, who are unable to participate in the new 
innovations (largely because of the labour bottleneck) and are 
constrained by household commitments to venture into non-farm 
employment opportunities (such as moving from their homes in 
search of work, say on the estates etc), tend to hire out
their labour to better-off, "innovating" households, at relati­
vely depressed rural wage rates. It therefore appears that the 
income gap between the so called "innovators" and "non- 
innovators" is likely to widen as the former get more and more 
commercialised while the latter tend to become more marginal 
agricultural producers, depending increasingly on wage income. 
Such a trend seems to be contrary to the present rural develop­
ment policy, (as stated in NRDD, Strategies, Policies and 
General Features: 47), which seems to stress the need for the 
smallholding community to be self-sufficient in basic food­
stuffs and become increasingly producers of marketable surpluses 
rather than agricultural labourers. Such a contradiction high­
lights the conflict between estate development and smallholder 
development embodied in the dual agricultural strategy. If the. 
smallholder agricultural development effort is to achieve its 
objective, that is, to initiate a broad based agricultural 
development, by enabling the labour deficient and poor house­
holds to participate in innovation adoption, it is imperative 
that the labour availability problem is appropriately 
considered when designing innovation "packages". However, 
before examining the various alternatives which can be employed 
in enhancing the income positions of the poor "non-innovating"
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households, it must be stressed that there is need for more 
intensive research into the problems of the poor households.
For example, there is need for a more careful assessment of 
the family labour availability situation among the female­
headed households to findout the factors that determine 
labour allocation between various competing needs such as 
subsistence crop production, cash crop production, non-farm 
income earning opportunities (eg. beer brewing etc), and 
household chores (including child care). Such studies should 
be geared to identifying the labour bottlenecks of such 
households with a view to suggesting remedial policies.
It is only af|ter such studies are undertaken that appropriate 
innovation "packages" can be designed for such households. It 
is also important to find out how such poor households fare 
with regard to access to variods social services such as
health, educati on and other amenities. For it is the feeling of
the present writer that these under-privileged households may 
have limited access in such areas, due largely to sociological 
barriers, and this may have the effect of reducing the chances 
of the children from such households breaking out of the 
poverty trap. The writer is of the opinion that more research 
in these areas i s warranted if rural development is not to 
continue to be spotty and selective in its effects.
;
3. Propositions for Improving the Lot of the Poorer Households.
1. Reducing the Labour Bottlenecks.
As it has already been pointed out, the main factor that
prevents the poor households from taking up innovations 
offered in LLDP appears to be labour shortage, especially 
during the peak seasons. The survey results have indicated 
that this labour bottleneck imposes a double bind on the poor 
households. That is,' it restricts their cultivated areas as 
well as restricting their access to credit. It therefore 
appears that removing the labour constraint of these house­
holds is likely to have the effect greatly enhancing their 
farm income positions. A number of options are available for 
this task.
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(i) Mechanisation.
In a situation where labour is seen to be a bottleneck, 
mechanisation appears to be one of the options which can 
alleviate the problem. This was recognised by the project 
authorities right from the start, when medium term credit 
was made available to farmers to purchase oxen and ox-drawn 
implements etc. However, it has been pointed out that the 
main limitation of using mechanical implements to improve the 
labour situation in LLDP seemed to stem largely from the in- 
appropriateness of the available mechanical implements to 
those farming processes where the labour constraint was critical 
(such as weeding), and the depressed farm output prices that do 
not provide an incentive to farmers to invest in labour saving 
innovations. It therefore, appears that unless appropriate 
mechanical implements are introduced (such as mechanical 
weeders, etc) and an appropriate output price structure 
instituted, which will make investments in such implements 
profitable, mechanization per se, is likely to offer no solution 
to the labour shortage problem.
(ii) Hired Labour.
To the extent that labour availability is an important 
constraint to higher farm output for a majority of households 
(as the LP model suggested), hired labour has become an 
important element in enhancing agricultural output in the area. 
However, development of peasant agriculture based on hired 
labour has serious distributional implications. In a situation 
where there is a willing labour force (outside the beneficiary 
group) ready to provide the hired labour, such as a landless 
class or an influx of immigrants (as was the case in Malawi, 
up to the early I96O’s, when there was an infux of immigrants 
from neighbouring Mozambique seeking agricultural work in 
Malawi, especially in the southern region), this may not
have serious distributional effects among the beneficiary 
community, but in a situation where some of the peasant 
community that is part of the beneficiary group of the develop­
ment effort provides the hired labour, as is the case in LLDP, 
serious distributional implications are likely to arise. For
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it is likely that those households who are on the margin and 
cannot fully meet their consumption requirements from their 
own farms, will hire out their labour to wealthier households 
(and/or agricultural estates) especially in a situation where 
non-farm income earning opportunities are limited. This is 
supported by the relatively high proportion of cash income 
arising from selling labour, associated with categories^ and H  
households (ie, female-headed households and male-headed house­
holds neither growing tobacco nor improved maize varieties).
It is therefore seen that unless special programmes (supplement­
ary to the smallholder agricultural development effort) are 
specifically designed to improve the lot of these people, a 
smallholder agricultural development strategy that depends sub­
stantially on hired labour to spread adoption of innovations 
is likely to accelerate rural differentiation.
Boesen and Mohele (1979). have described how in a Tanzanian 
situation where labour was a bottleneck, liberal availability 
of credit (including cash loans for hiring labour) enabled 
households to take up the innovations offered. This led to a 
boom in the peasant production of flue-cured tobacco.^1 o) 
However, a change in political climate, which led to the 
abolition-of cash loans, and the restriction of hiring labour, 
coupled with adverse price movements in the price of tobacco, 
dealt a severe blow to the boom, leading eventually to a change 
in land use pattern, that is from emphasis on tobacco product­
ion (which is relatively labour intensive and therefore required 
hired labour) to more emphasis on the production of subsistence 
crops such as maize (which are relatively less labour intensive 
and therefore more easily handled by family labour). ^11^ For 
example, in the estimation of the gross margins for tobacco 
and improved maize in LLDP the principal crops from which the 
programme's benefits are expected to arise, hired labour is 
included (see table 6.|0), indicating that it is officially 
recognised that the adoption of these crops is strongly linked 
to a household's ability to hire labour, thereby, clearly- 
indicating that the poor and labour deficient households cannot 
participate in them, except as providers of hired labour to
252
others." In the absence of any close supervision of the rural 
wage rate structure (not only on the established agricultural 
estates, but also in the smallholder sector), such a strategy 
is likely to compound the plight of the poorer households.
iii. Alternative Grouping Patterns.
As previously indicated, monocropping is a major husbandry
recommendation in LLDP. However, it has been argued (Norman,
1975) that, although in terms of total annual man hour inputs
crop mixtures may require more labour per hectare, in a
situation where the timing of the processes associated with
various crops coincide (as is the case for weeding of maize
and, say groundnuts), this incremental labour requirement may
not be very high, and could well be compensated for by other
(12)
advantages associated with intercropping. In addition,
in a situation where subsistence production seems to be a very 
important objective of smallholders, monocropping could well 
undermine this objective. It increases the risk associated 
with crop failure. For example, results from the LP model 
have indicated that an average female headed household could 
(under the given set of assumptions) be able to provide its 
subsistence requirements from 1.46 hectares of pure stand 
maize.and be able to have a marketable surplus, if the assumed 
yield fo 1100 kg/ha is met. However, in adverse conditions 
(ie. via incidence of crop diseases or inadequate rainfall) 
where the yield could be reduced by say, 50%, the 1.46 
hectares of pure stand maize may only just meet the subsistence 
requirements of the household, with hardly anything left to sell 
for cash. If the 1.46 hectares were usefully interplanted with 
other crops, which are not prone to the particular crop diseases, 
or are draught resistant, such as cassava, sweet potatoes, 
legumes, etc. the prospects of the household could be brighter.
It should also be pointed out that thejnonocropping require­
ment limits the diversification of the farm enterprise. In 
the case of LLDP, this means only such crops as improved maize, 
tobacco and groundnuts which enjoy project support, will be 
grown by most households. This is supported by the evidence 
that on average, 63.4% of cultivated land in LLDP (1969/70 to
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1978/79)» was planted with maize, 20.7% and 11.1% with ground­
nuts and tobacco respectively, leaving only 5% for other crops. 
Self-sufficiency in food does not necessarily mean only having 
enough maize (the main staple food in the area), it also means 
having other food crops (vegetables, fruits etc) to provide a 
properly balanced diet. Thus, if monocropping is rigidly 
adhered to by all farmers in the area, it may lead to a shortage 
of other food crops such as, cassava, sweet potatoes, pulses 
and vegetables. And indeed, the writer observed that these 
crops were in short supply both in the urban and local markets 
in Lilongwe. Supplies of these crops in the area usually came 
in from other regions such as Dedza, Ntcheu, etc., although the 
potential to produce them locally in adequate supplies does 
exist.
It therefore appears that there is need for more research 
to establish crop combinations which could be usefully inter­
planted, and to find methods of intercropping amenable to 
modern technology, eg,alternate row planting of different crops 
in order to alleviate the labour bottleneck and enhance food 
self-sufficiency (in terms of a properly balanced diet) among 
the marginal farmers.
Our survey results have indicated that the poorer house­
holds (typologies 1 and 11) because of their smaller labour 
resources, lie at the bottom end of the income scale. Their 
position is made worse by the fact that input credit is tied up 
with the cropping pattern which is determined by the household’s 
labour avialbility situation. Since the crops for which input 
credit is readily available (tobacco and improved maize) are 
inherently labour intensive, it implies that the main hope for 
the poorer labour deficient households (within a smallholder 
agricultural development strategy) to Amprove their lot lies in 
their finding crop enterprises which have relatively low 
labour requirements (especially during the peak season). It 
appears that one possibility would be to encourage such house­
holds to grow crops like pulses, vegetables, sugar cane, sweet 
potatoes, etc. As pointed out above, the writer observed that, 
because of the monocroppin^equirement, and the bias of credit 
and extension towards particular crops such as tobacco and
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improved maize, these minor crops tend to be absent from a
great deal of the holdings in the area, with the consequence
that they are imported from other areas. The survey revealed
that a good number of the poorer households (especially typology
11) relied to some extent on selling say, tomatoes, sugar-cane,
vegetables, etc., to boost their cash incomes. Unfortunately,
these crops hardly receive any credit or extension support from
the project. This lack of interest for other crops, on the part
of the project is reflected in the absence of any serious
research efforts in the production techniques of minor crops
apart from beans, on which substantial research work has been
carried out mostly at Bunda College of Agriculture (University of
Malawi). The present writer is of the opinion that some of these
minor crops could with adequate project support, say in the form
of input credit, research services, and marketing co-ordination,
meet the needs of a good number of poor households. For one
thing, they are both less labour intensive, in that some of them
are essentially off-season crops (eg. vegetable:^. Experience
from other parts of the world have indicated that with proper
price incentives small plots of minor crops can substantially
(l3 )boost household incomes . At the same time, it could be 
useful to encourage the poorer households to keep small livestock 
such as goats and pigs, by extending animal husbandry advice,
V and probably credit to include such small livestock, rather than 
restricting these to large livestock as appears to be the case 
at the moment.
T-T. . Non-farm Activities Aimed àt. Raising the Incomes of the Poor 
Households.
It appears that, both from innovation theory and principles 
of financial management (pertaining to credit programmes), there 
is no easy way through which the poorest section of the rural 
community will benefit from a rural development strategy that 
depends largely on adoption of innovations in a smallholder 
context. And yet, if agricultural output is to rise in the 
developing countries (which is essential to sustain the rapidly 
growing populations) new innovations will have to be adopted.
That means resources will continue to be channelled towards 
those sections in the rural community which demonstrate the
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ability to use them effectively, hence by-passing the poorer 
section. Evidence from the socialist countries has indicated or­
ganisational innovations such as formation of group farms and 
co-operatives, etc., have their limitations in reconciling the
problems of increasing agricultural productivity and achieving
(14 )an eVen and fair distribution of development benefits.
This means that rural development planners will have to come 
to grips with the fact that smallholder agricultural develop­
ment per se. has its limitations in solving the problem of 
rural poverty. Thus there is need to seek for other alter­
natives of raising the incomes of those people for whom 
agriculture alone may not hold any promise. Even the so called 
"cuccess" stories of rural development such as Taiwan and Japan, 
reveal that the observed improvements in rural incomes and 
rural well-being did not come entirely from improvements in 
agricultural productivity.
Chinn (1979), in his analysis of rural incomes in a major 
rice growing area in Taiwan, indicated that income from non­
farm sources played a substantial role in reducing income in- •
(1 5 )equalities in the rural areas. He found out that income
differences evened out as participation in non-farm activities,
( 1 6 5especially sideline activities becsune more widespread overtime.
His results sugested that non-farm sources of income allowed
households with small holdings to close the income gap between
themselves and large farmers by allocating some of their labour
to non-farm activities. He cj tea similar findings for Japan
( IT)and the United States.
These findings strongly stress the importance of the inter­
dependence between the agricultural and non-agricultural sectors 
in the development process. More important, they indicate that, 
as the strategy of industrial development alone has failed to 
solve the rural poverty problem, smallholder agricultural develop­
ment alone will not do it either.
Low (1981), using examples from Lesotho and Swaziland, has 
argued that in a situation where increases in farm output appear 
to be less independent of family labour transfers, than in 
Taiwan, etc. (due to lower level technology used) off-farm
employment opportunities may have adverse effects on total farm
i 1 S)output and therefore lead to a decline in real farm incomes.
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Hie argument is that rising non-farm income opportunities in
H situation of low-level and static technology, higher returns
to labour in the non-farm than farming activities, will lead
to a labour allocation pattern, whereby families find it more
profitable to allocate more family labour to non-farm than to
farm activities. And, without substantial changes in
agricultural technology, this could load to a decline in total
(19 )agricultural output.
However, although it could be true that in Lesotho and 
Swaziland there v/as a decline in the farm labour force, as a 
result of rising employment opportunities outside the agricultu­
ral sector, as happened in Taiwan and Japan, it should be noted 
that the circumstances were different. In the latter, cases, 
the decline in the farm labour force was due to rising opportuni­
ties in the domestic non-farm sector, whereas, in the former 
cases the decline in farm labour was largely due to increased 
migration to South Africa. Colclough (1980) indicated that in 
Lesotho about ^ of the labour force was working abroad during 
the period under review.
In a situation where the labour transferred from agriculture
is employed in domestic non-agricultural activities, demand for
food and other agricultural products is likely to rise. With
an appropriate agricultural pricing policy, it is possible to
raise incentives among the remaining farm workforce to a point
where they find it profitable to take up productivity raising
innovations (especially labour saving ones), and this appears
(?i )to have been the case in Taiwan and Japan. In such a
situation, an increase in non-farm employment opportunities 
is likely to act as a catalyst for the adoption of innovations, as 
such, technology need not remain static and output need not 
decline with a drop in the farm labour force. In the two 
Southern African countries, since the fall in farm labour was 
largely due to outward migration, the linkage effect between 
agriculture and industry was lost, especially since most of the 
earnings of the migrants (even when remitted to the two 
countries) are mostly spent on South African produced goods.
As such, the demand for agricultural products from domestic
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industry is not that high and incentives to take up labour 
saving innovations in the farm sector (to replace the labour 
lost to industry) may not be present. This is likely to lead 
to a decline in farm output as Low claims to have observed in 
in the Southern African cases.
It therefore appears that Low's argument does not invalidate 
Chinn's conclusions regarding the role of non-farm income earn- . 
ing opportunities arising within the domestic economy. More 
important, Chinn is arguing for a rural development strategy 
that incorporates a non-farm activities component, to cater 
especially for those very poor households who for one reason or 
the other, cannot benefit from productivity raising innovations.
A closer investigation of the problems facing the poorer house­
holds covered by our survey sugests that lack of purchasing 
power ( to family necessities, including food, during the
"hunger gap") appears to be quite a serious problem. This 
forces these households to:
(a) Sell their crops early in the season when prices are 
very low, and
(b) to hire out their family labour to other households or 
agricultural estates during the peak season (when 
demand for hired labour on the more progressive farms 
is very high), thereby further aggravating their labour 
problems and hence their farm income positions.
It therefore appears that, since these households are unable
to raise their household incomes by adopting innovations, for
the reasons already discussed, another alternative (to those
given above) of raising their incomes would be to provide them with
opportunities to earn income in close proximity to the farm.
This could make a substantial contribution to the incomes of
such households without jeopardising their subsistence food
production (as it would reduce both the tendency to hire out
labour and sell food early in the season to get cash). In
such a case, the objective would not be to make these marginal
farmers surplus producers, but to help them achieve self-
sufficiency in subsistence food, while giving them the
opportunity to earn cash for their other household needs
(22 )
from non-farm sources.
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It would therefore be necessary to^Identify non-farm
activities in the rural areas which are geared to the village
economy which require small inputs of time and family labour,
in which the poor and labour deficient households could be
encouraged to engage in (especially during the off-peak
ceaeons), while continuing with their primary activity of
agricultural production - as is the case with the Antyodaya 
(23)
Scheme in India. This scheme, which originated in the
state of Rajasthan, India, came about because of the realiza­
tion that virtually no scheme for the distribution of loans, 
grants and other forms of assistance designed to promote 
productive activities of direct benefit has significantly 
affected the poorest section of the rural society even when 
such programmes were specifically designed to assist them.^^^^
It was therefore thought that a change of strategy was necessary. 
Under this scheme, the aim was to help a man discover and start 
up his latent or lost earning capacity, and then let him try by 
himself. The approach was for each village to select its poor­
est five families, who would be eligible for "Antyodaya" aid.
This aid was granted in the form of a grant (33%) and a low 
interest loan, with the funds coming from commercial banks.
The recipients had to identify non-farm activities, which were 
geared to the various needs of the village economy, such as 
unmechanised means of transportation and tilling, rural crafts, 
cottage industries, repair and servicing agencies, etc. The 
size of the enterprises must be such that they do not interfere 
with the households' subsistence agricultural activities.
The programme achieved a remarkable degree of success.
Chhabra (1982), reports that by the end of 1980, a total of 
about 217,000 farm families had been helped with loans amounting 
to about #27.6 million, with only 48,000 families receiving 
straight social security benefits, but the rest having been 
involved in self- generating activities. He reports that the 
scheme did not encounter any resistance from the existing village 
power structure,.as the recipients .were -freely selected by 
the villagers themselves. In addition,. Chabbra points out that
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the banks reported an 80% repayment rate (on schedule), ^
an aspect which is contrary to normal thinking which regards
the poor as bad credit risks, and a proof of the financial
soundness of the enterprises undertaken. Due to this good
performance, the concept of "Antyodaya" has’.been incorporated
in the national Integrated Rural Development Programme. This
does not offer any social security benefits, but concentrates
solely on credit coverage and skill development of the very 
poor people.
Conclusion.
It must be emphasized that the analyses in this study should 
not be interpreted to mean that the efforts of the smallholder 
development effort have not benefitted the rural population in 
the country. To the contrary, the evidence emerging from the 
study (within the limitations imposed by the available data) 
indicates that the efforts have been successful in inducing 
the spread of adoption of innovations by the smallholder 
community. In LDDP, for example, the survey results have 
indicated that about 60% of the sampled households participated 
in growing the recommended crops and followed recommended 
husbandry practices - mostly with the help of credit. The 
analysis has tried to indicate the likely reasons why the 
remaining 40% of the intended beneficiary group may not have 
adopted the innovations offered, and tried to suggest the 
various means by which the income positions of the poorer house­
holds could be enhanced. It has also tried to highlight areas 
of further research which could yield useful information about 
how to tackle the problem of rural poverty. By far, the largest 
contribution of the study is that both in designing and evaluat­
ing rural development programmes, it is very important to get 
more penetrating insights into the target population. In this 
respect, the study emphasizes the usefulness of identifying 
farm household typologies within the target population and then 
investigating the constraints faced by each typology separately 
so that the needs of each typology can be appropriately assessed. 
This is because in the past, there has been too much reliance on 
more broad generalisation of the characteristics of the target 
group. That is, the heterogeneity of rural households (as
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regards resource endowments) has been largely ignored by basing 
most of the project design and evaluation on the "average" 
household within the target population. The result of this 
has been that most of the packages, designed for the "average" 
farmer have proved to be inappropriate to quite a number of 
households, and very little attempt has been made to tailor 
means to the needs of the various groups of farmers as planners 
lacked the appropriate information. It is therefore, hoped that 
the approach of identifying household, typologies and analysing 
their characteristics will aid both project design and 
evaluation.
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APPENDIX I 
The Linear Programming Model
For each of the household typologies, a linear programming 
exercise was undertaken# The inequalities involved were as 
follows:
Objective" Maximise total gross margins (TMG) from the
five activities, ie#
TMG = 0X1 + 53.3X% + 102.2X3 + 81.7X4 + 130.5X5
For Typology I households (Female Headed), the constraint 
inequalities were:
(i) Labour (using the crop labour demands in table 6,11) :
Oct. 49X1 + 49X2 + 49X3 + 12X4 + 261X5 6 170
Nov.
Sep. 32X1 + 32X2 + 32X3 + 10X4 + 96X5 6  170
( ii) Land XI + X2 + X3 + X4 + X5 ^ 8
(iii) Food 1100X1 + 0X2 + 0X3 + 0X4 + 13X5 ^  960
(iv) Finances A 1.24X1+ 1.24X2+70.43X3+22.22X4+83.24X5 ^  19
Finances B 0X1 + 0X2+ 15X3 + 0X4+ 15X5 6  9.
For Typology II households ( non-tobacco and non-improved maize
growing male headed households)
(i) Labour Oct. 49X1+ 49X2+ 49X3+ 12X4+ 261X5 ^ 231
Sep. 32X1+ 32X2+ 32X3+ 10X4+ 96 X5 ^  231
(ii) Land XI + X2+ X3+ X4+ X5 ^  8
( iii) Pood 1100X1+ 0X2+ 0X3+ 0X4+ X5 ^  960
(iv) Finances A 1 .24X1+1 .24 X2+ 70.43X3+22.24X4+83.24X5é: 19
Finances B 0X1 + 0X2+ 15X3+ 0X4 15X5^ 9.5
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APPENDIX I 
(continued)
The inequalities for categories III. and. IV were set up in a similar 
manner. The complete IP Model was set up as follows:
Crop Enterprises______________ P'ousehold Typologies
XI X2 . X3 _.X4 . X5 ..I II III IV
Maximise TMG 
Subject to;
Î . 0 +  53. 3 +  102 .2  + 81 . 7+ 130 ,, 5 2 170 j 231 , 331 > 254
Oct.  4 9 +  49 + 49 + 12 + 261 < 1 7 0 ^ 231; 331 ) 254
Nov. 86+  86 + 86 + 40 + 116 Z 170 J 231 ^ 331 > 254
Dec. 9 9 + 9 9 + 99 + 272 + 252 Z 170 , 231 , 331 } 2 54
Jan.111+111 +  111 + 79 + 370 < 1 7 0 , 231 ^ 331 f 254
Feb. 49+  49 + 49 + 175 + 252 % 1 7 0 , 231 , 331 254
Mar. 10+  10 + 10 + 25 + 455 z 170j 231^ 331 > 254
Apr. 5 9 + 5 9 + 59 + 40 + 514 z 170j 2 3 1 , 331 J 2^4
May 96 + 96 + 96 + 237 + 321 z 1 7 0 , 231 , 331 > 254
Jun. 72 + 72 + 72 + 274 + 348 a 170, 231 J 331 ) 254
Jul. 5 4 + 5 4 + 54 + 222 + 195 a 1 7 0 , 231 ^ 331 > 254
Aug. 49+  49 + 49 + 104 + 35 z 170^ 231^ 331 J 254
Sep. 3 2 + 3 2 + 32 + 10 + 96 < 170^ 231^ 331 J 254
ii. Land 1 + 1  + 1  + 1 +  1 < 8 ^ 8 ^ 8 ^  8
iii. Pood 1 1 0 0 + 0  + 0 + - 0  +- 0 >  ?60  ^960^1483^,1090
iv. Finance . ^
A. 1.24+1 .2 4 + 7 0 .4 3 + 2 2 .2 2 +  83.24 5 18  ^ 19  ^ 84^ 76
B. 0 + 0+15.00+ 0+15.00 C 9 ^  9.5^ 42^ 38
Notes. XI -Local Maize for food
X2 “Local Maize for sale 
X3 -Hybrid maize for sale 
X4 -Groundnuts 
X5 -Tobacco
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